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Abstract 
Starting with the introduction of the Diner‘s Club payment card in 1949, the means of 
exchange have progressed well beyond traditional instruments such as notes, coins and 
cheques.  I use institutional economics to analyse historical data on the evolution of 
recently-developed retail payment systems in Australia, Canada, Germany, New 
Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.  The framework I create 
yields insights into the incentives faced by the users of payment instruments and the 
payment networks that provide them.  It also provides a means to assess the role of 
government in the evolution of retail payment systems. 
Ceteris paribus, consumers and merchants will prefer low transaction cost payment 
instruments.  In order to complete a transaction, a consumer will proffer an instrument 
that may or may not be accepted by the merchant.  Together, merchants and consumers 
will choose the payment instrument that generally reduces demand-side – i.e. consumer 
and merchant – transaction costs, relative to other available instruments.  Consumer 
irreversible costs of adoption enhance the importance of network effects.   To help 
overcome these, I argue payment networks need to make acceptance of their instrument 
attractive to merchants, which I find to be supported by analysis of the pricing of 
payment instruments.   It distinguishes recently-developed payment instruments from 
other new technologies – the most technologically advanced instrument will not likely 
be adopted unless it is first acceptable to merchants. 
In workably competitive conditions, profit-seeking payment networks will attempt to 
provide an instrument that gets used while it at least recoups its costs of supply from 
fees paid by users.  I argue this suggests a process of institutional adaption for profit-
seeking payment networks.  Network effects mean the use of an instrument grows 
disproportionately faster, the greater the number of people using it.  For instrument 
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supply, this means profit-seeking payment networks have an incentive to increase 
participation.  In the presence of potential inter-network competition, a payment 
network will likely experience greater participation if, ceteris paribus, it offers an 
instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than 
competing networks‘ instruments and provides it with lower costs of supply. 
Governments play two key roles in retail payment system development.  First, they can 
affect the development of systems by how well they protect property rights and enforce 
contracts.  Although this role is performed relatively well in my sample countries, my 
analysis suggests that the use of recently-developed retail payment systems would fall, 
substantially, were it not so.  Second and more importantly in my sample countries, 
governments impose restrictions on the freedom of contract for payment networks.  If 
restrictions on this freedom are such that they prevent the trading of property rights, 
they risk reducing either the demand or the supply of payment instruments.  Such 
restrictions might reduce demand if the instrument that would have been used no longer 
generally reduces demand-side transaction costs.  They might reduce supply in two 
ways: by impeding payment networks‘ attempts to offer instruments that reduce these 
transaction costs or by reducing inter-network competition.  In summary, I find that it is 
government restrictions on the freedom of contract that cause the substantial differences 
in the use of newly-developed retail payment systems between my sample countries.  
By risking reducing the supply and demand of retail payment systems, these restrictions 
may diminish innovation in payments, thereby harming dynamic efficiency. 
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Glossary 
ACH Automated clearing house 
A retail payment system providing instruments for direct entry 
payments first developed in the US in late 1960s and early 1970s 
Acquirer The financial intermediary of a merchant that acquires transaction 
information and funds relating to the merchant‘s use of a particular 
payment instrument 
ATM Automatic teller machine 
Card-based 
instrument 
A payment instrument that is based on a payment card 
Consumer-based 
instrument 
A payment instrument that does not make formal provisions for 
acceptance by merchants 
Costs of supply The sum of production costs incurred offering an instrument to 
users and the transaction costs incurred between members of a 
payment network in the course of producing that instrument. 
CPSS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
Part of the Bank of International Settlements 
CPA Canadian Payments Association 
Direct entry 
payments 
Payments initiated between accounts held at financial 
intermediaries 
EFTPOS Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale 
The name in some of my sample countries of a debit card system 
that allows consumers to debit their account by the amount of their 
purchase using a terminal at the point of sale 
ELV Elektronisches Lastschrift Verfahren 
Debit card payment instrument introduced by a merchant in 
Germany in 1990 that operates by using a card to generate a direct 
debit from a customer‘s to a merchant‘s account. 
ETSL Electronic Transaction Services Limited 
A company jointly- owned by New Zealand‘s banks created in 
1989 to operate a debit card payment network 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
The UK Government Authority that acquired responsibilities for 
prudential supervision of the UK‘s financial industry from the Bank 
of England in 1997 
Giro A retail payment system providing instruments for direct entry 
payments significantly developed in Europe in the 1800s 
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GZS Gesellschaft fur Zahlungssysteme  
The organisation jointly-owned by Germany‘s banks created in 
1982 to undertake all of Germany‘s Eurocard issuing and acquiring 
activities  
Institution A system of rules, beliefs, norms and organisations that together 
generate a regularity of (social) behaviour 
ISL Interchange and Settlement Limited 
a New Zealand interbank transfer clearing company 
Issuer The financial intermediary of a consumer that issued that consumer 
with the particular payment instrument 
Interchange fee A wholesale fee internal to a network that is paid between acquirers 
and issuers, redistributing revenues a network receives from 
merchants and cardholders 
A positive interchange fee is one an acquirer pays to an issuer and a 
negative interchange fee is one an issuer pays to an acquirer 
Mechant-based 
instrument 
A payment instrument that that makes formal provisions for 
acceptance by merchants, c.f. consumer-based instrument 
MSF Merchant service fee 
A per-transaction fee paid by a merchant upon completion of a 
transaction made using a particular payment instrument. 
NBFI Non-bank financial intermediary 
Network effect The circumstances in which the effect on the net value of an action 
of the number of agents taking equivalent actions 
Network 
externality 
A specific kind of network effect in which the equilibrium exhibits 
unexploited gains from trade regarding network participation 
Payment 
instrument 
Any instrument enabling the holder/user to transfer funds 
Payment network The group of organisations, as measured by their participation or 
ownership of assets, that is used to transfer funds for an instrument 
Payment scheme An organisation that provides payment networks with a common 
structure, including rules and wholesale pricing, which networks 
can use as they provide instruments to users.  The two most 
common payment schemes are Visa and MasterCard 
Payments system The set of instruments, banking procedures and interbank funds 
transfer systems which facilitate the circulation of money in a 
country or in a currency area 
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Property right The formal and informal rules that govern access to and use of 
property (something that can be owned) with key categories 
including rights to exclude, to determine the use of, to appropriate 
the income from and to dispose of property 
POS Point of sale 
RBA Reserve Bank of Australia 
Australia‘s central bank and regulator of the country‘s retail 
payment systems 
Retail payment 
system 
A system of payment networks providing the same type of payment 
instrument, one suitable for retail payments 
Self-enforcing 
institution 
An individual, taking the institutional structure as a given, finds it 
best to follow the institutionalised behaviour that, in turn, 
reproduces the institution in the sense that the implied behaviour 
confirms the associated beliefs and regenerates the associated 
norms 
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area 
A self-regulatory initiative set up in 2008 by the European 
Payments Council to eliminate differences in national standards for 
payments 
Store card A merchant-specific card which a customer can use for payment at 
a particular chain of stores or group of stores in the same industry 
Switch fee A fee paid to a payment network operator by one or both of the 
acquirer and issuer 
TfL Transport for London 
UK Government entity responsible for London‘s transport system 
including the stored-value instrument, the Oyster Card 
Transaction cost Costs of exchange between two or more parties that fall into one of 
three groups: search and information costs, bargaining and decision 
costs, and policing and enforcement costs 
Two-sided market A market will be two-sided if a platform within the market can 
affect the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of 
the market and reducing the price paid by the other side 
Value 
maximisation 
principle 
The principle that total transaction value should be maximised and 
divided among the transaction's participants 
ZKA Zentraler Kreditausschuss 
The central association for Germany‘s banking system 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Money as a Means of Exchange 
Until the emergence of money, bartering represented the basis for human exchange.  As 
civilisation evolved, money provided three functions: a unit of account, a means of 
exchange and a store of value.
1
  My thesis focuses on recent developments relating to 
just one of these functions, the use of money as a means of exchange.  Gradually, new 
payment instruments evolved as substitutes for traditional instruments, such as notes 
and coins, increasing the convenience and usability of money as a means of exchange.   
Money first appeared as objects of value, but, because of coins‘ convenience as a means 
of exchange, the kingdom of Lydia developed stamped coins of fixed weights of 
precious metals in about 600 BC (Evans and Schmalensee, 2005a, p. 26).  Eventually, 
paper money and bills of exchange (commonly known as cheques) also became means 
of exchange (ibid).  Recently, however, there has been a massive increase in the number 
of ways money can be used as a means of exchange.  Much of this change has followed 
other technological developments, particularly in computing and telecommunications.  
Cards were already being used for customer identification at some merchants, when, in 
1949, Diner's Club introduced a card that could be used for payment by consumers at 
many different merchants (Stearns, 2007).  This change heralded significant new 
developments of payment instruments or objects used by people to conduct transactions.
 
  
In their 2003 glossary of payment system terms, the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (―CPSS‖) define payment instrument as, ‖any instrument enabling 
the holder/user to transfer funds―.  A key issue for a payment instrument is, what sort of 
transactions is it used for?  Is it used for smaller value transactions between individuals 
                                                 
1
  Evans and Schmalensee (2005a) devote a chapter (Chapter 2) to describe initial developments in the 
use of money. 
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and small businesses completed every day at speed and in high volume or is it used for 
secure, large value transactions between financial intermediaries?  To better understand 
recent developments of money as a means of exchange, I focus on retail transactions, 
being of lower unit value and higher aggregate volume than financial wholesale 
transactions.
2
 
1.2 Focus of my Research 
This thesis assesses the economic factors behind the recent development of retail 
payment systems.  In particular, I seek to answer the question, how have institutional 
arrangements affected the development of the retail payment systems that have emerged 
since the creation of the Diner‘s Club card in 1949?  To answer this question, I focus on 
the emergence and use of new systems in the developed countries, Australia, Canada, 
Germany, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom (the UK) and the United States 
(the US). 
1.3 Defining a Retail Payment System 
The European Central Bank (2008) defines the term payment system in two ways; I 
make use of the first, which refers to a funds transfer system.
3
  This term is defined as, 
"a formal arrangement based on private contract or law, with multiple membership, 
common rules and standardised arrangements, for the transmission, clearing, netting 
and/or settlement of monetary obligations arising between the members."
4
  This 
definition implies the involvement of multiple firms with a retail payment system, 
                                                 
2
  While I define a retail payment system (in section 1.3), for the sake of simplicity I chose not to 
specify that I consider only instruments used for retail payments in my terminology. 
3
  The second of the paper‘s two definitions of payment system refers to ―the set of instruments, 
banking procedures and interbank funds transfer systems which facilitate the circulation of money in 
a country or in a currency area.‖  This definition is commonly used to refer to the banking industry, 
as a whole, a concept for which I use the term, payments system. 
4
  Clearing refers to the calculation of organisations‘ obligations (i.e. the amount banks owe each 
other) and settling refers to the process of those obligations' settlement. 
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which I find to be an important element of those systems.  I further restrict the definition 
by distinguishing between a retail payment system and the payment network(s) that 
make it up.  In subsection 2.4.2, I discuss support for a definition of payment network 
that refers to the set of participants and ownership of a portfolio of assets.  In this way, a 
retail payment system may be made up of one or more different networks, which may or 
may not be interoperable, but which provide the same type of payment instrument.  For 
example, Visa and MasterCard (and their issuers and acquirers) are payment networks 
that are part of the retail payment system that provides credit card instruments.  
Payment networks will often consist of financial intermediaries, including both banks 
and non-bank financial intermediaries (― NBFIs‖), but might also consist of other 
organisations for whom payments systems are important, such as those involved in 
public transport. 
Retail payment systems are distinguished from wholesale payment systems. In their 
handbook for examinations relating to retail payment systems, the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (2004) comments, however, that there is no clear 
division between the two.  Mayes (2006) argues that competition will take place at the 
margin with wholesale systems, which often use accounts at the central bank, trying to 
attract larger retail payments and vice versa; however, he admits, "there is no real 
prospect of very small transactions migrating to the central bank system."  Khianarong 
(2003) takes a different approach, comparing costs arising in the operation of retail and 
wholesale systems.  Because they are used for transactions of higher value, the latter 
often involve substantial expenditures to improve security and reduce the risk of crime.  
My focus is on retail payment systems suitable for transactions of lower values.  
Accordingly, transactions costs are relatively more important and risk mitigation 
relatively less so. 
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1.4 Economics of Retail Payment Systems 
Kemppainen (2003) discusses reasons why retail payment systems have much in 
common with network industries, when he investigates the approaches of regulators to 
systems.  The key one, I believe, is that network effects are often present for both.  
Consistent with Kemppainen's discussion, I use the definition of network effect given 
by Liebowitz and Margolis (1994), "the circumstances in which the net value of an 
action … is affected by the number of agents taking equivalent actions…"  Network 
effects will arise when having another customer changes the value to the existing users 
of that network.  A further complication for understanding the economics of retail 
payment systems is that systems provide instruments that are part of what Rochet and 
Tirole described as two-sided markets in their seminal 2003 paper.  That is, retail 
payment systems involve economic activity that links two distinct sets of users that 
obtain value by interacting over a common platform (in this case, a payment 
instrument).
5
  Rochet and Tirole (2006a) propose a formal definition: 
A market is two-sided if the platform can affect the volume of transactions by 
charging more to one side of the market and reducing the price paid by the 
other side by an equal amount; in other words, the price structure matters, and 
platforms must design it so as to bring both sides on board. 
According to Rochet and Tirole‘s definition, even payment instruments that do not 
necessarily involve consumers and merchants will still be a two-sided platform if the 
price structures between the two sides of the market influence the volume of 
transactions.  However, developing countries have experienced the creation of 
instruments based on mobile phones, which I describe in section 2.1, that allow the 
transfer of value by text message, but that do not make formal provision for acceptance 
by merchants.  Although instruments such as these have yet to develop in my sample 
                                                 
5
  While the term, platform, is in common usage in the literature for two-sided markets, I only use it in 
connection with this literature and otherwise refer to payment instruments. 
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countries, I investigate the extension of my analysis to these and I define payment 
instruments that make formal provisions for acceptance by merchants as merchant-
based instruments.  Other payment instruments I refer to as consumer-based 
instruments. 
In order to fully analyse the economics of retail payment systems, I need information on 
both prices charged for instruments and their amount of usage.  I find, however, that 
data showing both pricing and usage is generally available only for card-based, 
merchant-based instruments.
6
  While some data on the use of cash exist (such as the 
amount of cash in circulation), they will also capture its use as a store of value, as well 
as a medium of exchange.
7
  This makes them inappropriate for comparing cash usage in 
different countries.  Also, I have not found consistent data on the usage of card-based 
instruments that are not also merchant-based, a key such instrument being a card for use 
in an automatic teller machine (―ATM‖).8  However, historical information is generally 
available on the development of all types of instruments and the payment networks that 
offer them.  For this reason, I focus just on card-based, merchant-based instruments 
when I use information on the pricing and usage of instruments to analyse payment 
instrument demand.  However, my reliance on historical information allows me to 
analyse all instruments when I consider their supply by payment networks and of the 
role of government in the following sections of my thesis. 
                                                 
6
  I define a card-based instrument as a payment instrument based on payment card 
7
  The work of Amromin and Chakravorti (2009), which I discuss in section 2.2, confirms the 
significance of this issue. 
8
  A key issue for finding data from official sources for ATM usage is the definitional question of 
whether the number of ATM transactions should include balance inquiries and deposits, as well as 
cash withdrawals. 
6 
 
1.5 Countries Compared 
In this thesis, I analyse systems in New Zealand, as well as its neighbour, Australia.  I 
also investigate systems in the Canada, the US and the UK.  To this sample, I add two 
other countries, Norway, because it has a particularly well used debit card system, 
BankAxept, and Germany, because it is a major European country for which reports on 
retail payment systems are relatively accessible.  Table 1.1 provides some key facts for 
these countries.  Payment instruments rely on contracts for the purpose of transferring 
funds, which makes the enforceability of contracts relevant to the performance of retail 
payment systems.
9
  For this reason, I have included as background, information about 
the general, country-wide protection of property rights, during the period for which 
information is available from the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom.
10
 
                                                 
9
  The major contracts that newly-developed retail payment systems rely upon are summarised in 
section 2.1. 
10
  In subsection 2.3.1, I describe the definition of property right given by Wilkinson (2008). 
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Table 1.1 Key Facts for My Sample Countries 
Country 
Population 
(million) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
(US$, PPP) 
Index Rating for 
Property Rights (out 
of 100) 
Currency 
 2008 2008 2010 1995 2010 
Australia 21 $35,677 90 90 
Australian dollar 
(A$) 
Canada 33.3 $36,444 90 90 
Canadian dollar 
(C$) 
Germany 82.1 $35,613 90 90 Euro (EUR) 
New Zealand 4.3 $27,029 95 90
(1)
 
New Zealand 
dollar (NZ$) 
Norway 4.8 $58,138 90 90
(1)
 
Norsk krone 
(NOK) 
United 
Kingdom 
61.4 $35,445 85 90 
Pound sterling (£) 
United States 304.1 $46,716 85 90 
United States 
dollar (US$) 
Sources: Heritage Foundation (2010) Index of Economic Freedom; Author 
(1) Figures for 1996, data for 1995 being unavailable for these countries 
To give readers a better understanding of my sample countries relative to other 
countries, I compare the data in the above table to data for the 183 countries surveyed in 
the 2010 Index of Economic Freedom.  The countries in my sample are sizeable (the 
least populous of my sample countries, New Zealand, is the 62
nd
 smallest of the 
surveyed countries), wealthy (relative to an average GDP per capita (US$ PPP) of 
US$14,091 for the surveyed countries) and have had a strong general level of protection 
of property rights (relative to an average Property Rights rating for the surveyed 
countries of 44 in 2010) for the time period for which information from my source is 
8 
 
available.
11
  All countries operated their own currencies throughout my sample time 
period with the exception of Germany, which replaced the Deutsche Mark as its legal 
tender with the official currency of the eurozone, the euro, in 2002. 
1.6 Evidence of Payment Instrument Use 
Figure 1.1 shows data on the use, measured by transaction volume per capita per 
annum, of two common types of card-based payment instrument, debit cards and credit 
cards, in each of my sample countries.  I have combined transactions made with these 
instruments because credit cards represent a key source of short term credit in all of my 
sample's countries, but in two, Norway and Germany, bank account overdrafts also 
represent a common source and these may be accessed with a debit card.  I analyse 
instrument use for the period of time for which I've found consistent, reliable data for 
most of my sample countries, being the decade beginning the year 2000. 
                                                 
11
  I relate this general measure to the expectations of a country‘s citizens that their contracts will be 
enforced, rather than to specific instances when governments fail to protect property rights. 
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Figure 1.1 Average Transaction Volume for Debit and Credit Card Goods 
Purchases
12
 
 
The graph shows a large mix in the amount of adoption of debit and credit cards, as 
measured by the average volume of transactions per capita, per annum.  Among the 
observations that can be made from it: 
 New Zealand and Norway lead the countries in my sample in terms of adoption, 
but the latter rapidly gaining on the former 
 significant differences exist in the growth rates of adoption and 
 Germany has a very low adoption of debit and credit cards, relative to the other 
countries in my sample. 
                                                 
12
  My graph does not show any sort of ranking of major users of debit and credit cards around the 
world.  Although I have not completed an exhaustive search, I am aware of one country with 
particularly well-used cards, Iceland, which, using data from Iceland‘s central bank, I calculate to 
have 330 debit and credit card transactions per capita during 2008 (source for transaction data: 
Sedlabanki Islands [central bank of Iceland], 2010, acquired transactions).  However, because of a 
lack of historical information on the development of its systems, I have not been able to include 
Iceland in my thesis. 
10 
 
1.7 My Research Approach and the Layout of My Thesis 
In this thesis, I consider literature on the development of retail payment systems in 
Chapter 2, using it to indicate what features of instruments are important to that 
development.  In Chapter 3, I consider the features, particularly the pricing and usage, 
of major card-based, merchant-based instruments in my sample countries, features that 
my literature review indicates are important.  I turn to a historical analysis of the 
development of systems, consisting of networks offering all types of instruments in 
Chapter 4.  In Chapter 5, I analyse this development before concluding my thesis in 
Chapter 6. 
11 
 
Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
In spite of significant developments in the second half of the twentieth century, retail 
payment systems have only received significant academic attention recently.  This 
Chapter describes the work I seek to build on in my thesis.  In their survey of the 
literature, Scholnick, Massoud, Saunders, Carbo-Valverde and Rodrıguez-Fernandez 
(2008, p. 1486) say that literature relating just to credit cards, debit cards and ATMs is 
―not only large and growing, it is also remarkably diffuse.‖  For this reason, I introduce 
a framework to help me investigate the literature.  Firstly, in section 2.1, I describe the 
payment instruments that have been developed since 1949 before discussing 
substitutability between those instruments, as well as others developed earlier, in section 
2.2.  Given this variety of instruments and systems, I use section 2.3 to explain the 
method of analysis, particularly the framework of institutional change, that I use to 
investigate retail payment system development.  In section 2.4, I describe the diverse 
literature providing analysis of retail payment systems useful to my institutional 
perspective.  Finally, I describe the focus of my research on retail payment systems in 
section 2.5. 
2.1 Recently Developed Retail Payment Systems 
As I mentioned in section 1.1, the development of retail payment systems has followed 
developments in other technologies, particularly in computing and telecommunications.  
The ideas behind some recently-developed payment systems can be traced further back 
in time.  Using a card for payment was suggested late in the 19
th
 century and a number 
of retail chains experimented with what I call a store card, a merchant-specific card 
which a customer can use for payment at a particular chain of stores or group of stores 
in the same industry (Evans and Schmalensee, 2005a, p. 53).  The telegraph company, 
12 
 
Western Union, issued what is believed to be the first consumer charge card, a small 
rectangular piece of paper, in 1914 (Stearns, 2007, p. 32).  Indeed, Stearns has sufficient 
data to plot (pp. 32-35) the development of store cards in the department store, oil and 
airline industries in the US through the first half of the 20
th
 century.  In 1949, Diner's 
Club introduced the first payment card that could be used by consumers at many 
different retailers (Stearns, 2007, p. 36).  This system operated in a similar way to retail 
chain store cards, but with merchants choosing whether or not to accept the card.  The 
operator of the payment network maintained contractual relationships with both the 
consumer and the merchant, with such networks coming to be labelled three-party 
networks.
1
  Similar networks to the Diner's Club card followed, a particularly important 
one being American Express. 
Given the payment card often involved the provision of funds, it seems natural that 
banks would have a strong interest in their development.  Baxter (1983) describes how a 
Californian bank, Bank of America, created a four-party credit card networks in 1966 
when it started licensing its BankAmericard credit card program to other banks.  In this 
new approach to card payments, transactions would be completed even if the purchaser 
and the merchant used different banks.  With such networks, the four parties are the 
consumer, the consumer‘s financial intermediary that issued that consumer with the 
particular payment instrument (―the issuer‖), the merchant and the merchant‘s financial 
intermediary that acquires transaction information and funds relating to the merchant‘s 
use of a particular payment instrument (―the acquirer‖).2  As their name suggests, credit 
cards provide their holders with a line of credit with balances being repaid periodically 
and any outstanding amounts incurring interest.  Some payment cards need to have their 
                                                 
1
  Such networks stand distinct from four-party card networks, which I describe in the next paragraph. 
2
  Contractual relationships exist between the consumer and the issuer, the merchant and the acquirer 
and between the issuer and the acquirer.  The ownership and control of the network is not generally 
obvious for four-party networks. 
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balances fully re-paid on a regular basis, an approach commonly used by three-party 
networks such as American Express and Diners Club.  These cards are known as charge 
cards or deferred or delayed debit cards.  However, three-party networks also provided 
cards to consumers that offered credit, as well, such as American Express‘s Optima card 
(Evans and Schmalensee, 2005a, p. 13).
3
  Furthermore, American Express announced it 
was seeking banking partners to issue its cards in 1997 demonstrating that a three-party 
network could still have the activity of card issuing performed by other financial 
organisations (ibid, p. 184). 
Other payment instruments were created to provide more direct links with purchasers' 
accounts.  In 1967, arguably the world‘s first modern ATM was installed in the UK, 
allowing bank customers to access their accounts and withdraw banknotes using a card 
with a magnetic strip (Bátiz-Lazo, 2009, p. 6).  Hayashi, Sullivan and Weiner (2003, p. 
13) note that stores experimented by installing ATMs on their premises before one 
chain introduced a debit card system in 1976 that allowed cardholders to directly debit 
their account by the amount of their purchase using a terminal at the point of sale 
(―POS‖).  In my sample countries, such systems are sometimes called, Electronic Funds 
Transfer at Point of Sale (―EFTPOS‖).  This saved consumers having to withdraw a 
suitable amount of cash before using it to complete a transaction. 
Van Hove (2004) discusses another card-based retail payment system similar to a debit 
card that I refer to as, a stored value card.
4
  This type of system involves rechargeable 
cards, which can be used relatively easily for lower value transactions because 
transactions can occur without contact between a consumer‘s card and a merchant‘s 
                                                 
3
  I note that there is nothing to prevent four-party schemes offering charge cards, either, although I 
have not found evidence showing a significant amount of this has occurred. 
4
  In its glossary of payments system terms, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(2003) defines a stored-value card as, ―a prepaid card in which the record of funds can be increased 
as well as decreased.‖  Because of its greater lucidity, I rely on this term, but note that others, such 
as Van Hove, use the terms, electronic purse and e-money, to describe the similar instruments. 
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terminal; this means that stored-value transactions are often called, ―contactless.‖  Van 
Hove provides data for 16 European networks with the earliest roll-out (of Denmark's 
Danmønt system) occurring in March 1993.  Ives and Earl (1997) describe the 
development by UK banks of the Mondex stored-value network, which began its first 
trial in Swindon, UK, in 1995 and was subsequently licensed to banks around the world.  
Van Hove (2006) points to stored-value cards being used as ticketing system for public 
transport in an increasing number of countries including Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan,   
In many countries, direct links with consumers‘ bank accounts have grown from the 
automation of existing paper-based payment instruments.
5
  Evans and Schmalensee 
(2005a, p. 43) give the example of the giro, a consolidated account-to-account payment 
instrument significantly developed in Europe in the 1800s.
6
  A giro credit differs from a 
cheque in that payers pay an amount directly into a recipient's account rather than 
writing a cheque for that amount for the recipient to cash; however, a giro debit is more 
similar to a cheque, in that it involves the payer authorising the payee to deduct a certain 
amount from the payer‘s account.  In Europe, giros made the shift from paper to 
electronic form in the late 1960s and early 1970s, at around the same time that 
American banks responded to a rapid increase in cheque volumes by forming 
Automated Clearing Houses (―ACH‖) to process account-to-account retail payments 
electronically (Electronic Payments Network, 2004, p. 1).  Giro and ACH credits and 
debits fall into a category of payments known in Australasia as, direct entry payments, 
                                                 
5
  There is little clarity about when the automation of existing instruments results in the introduction of 
a new instrument.  For this thesis, I focus on developments that involve the experiences of the users 
of an instrument being materially different to before the automation.  By this standard, I do not 
consider developments such as the US Federal Government‘s Check Clearing for the 21st Century 
Act enacted in 2003.  The Act merely provided for the electronification by merchants of chequest 
that had already been received from consumers. 
6
  Although the giro has became significantly more popular as a payment instrument at that time, 
Davies and Davies (1999) say that a giro system functioned using state granaries as banks in the 
empire of the Ptolemies in Egypt as early as the 4
th
 Century BC.  This suggests giros developed 
substantially earlier than did cheques, which Evans and Schmalensee (2005a, p. 28) say was 
developed in northern Italy around the 12
th
 Century. 
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being payments initiated between accounts held at financial intermediaries (Australian 
Payments Clearing Association, 2009, p. 3; Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2003, p. 7), 
the term I use to classify all such payments.  I also use the term, direct entry payment, to 
classify those made using networks like Paypal.  Evans and Schmalensee (2005a, pp. 
307-308) describe the development of direct entry payments made using Paypal, which 
was acquired and significantly promoted by online auction company eBay in 2002.  Shy 
(2010, p. 24) reports that Paypal is the one successful development of direct entry 
electronic payments in the US ―over the years‖. 
Consumer-based instruments look likely to become more important to retail payment 
system development in my sample of developed countries.  Starting with M-PESA in 
Kenya in 2007, a number of developing countries have seen the creations of networks 
offering instruments that transfer value from one mobile phone to another through a text 
message (Jack and Suri, 2010).  Jack and Suri link M-PESA's success to a significant 
proportion of Kenya's population being without easy access to a bank account.  They 
give some details of the system, reporting (p. 7) that payers are charged flat fees of 
approximately US$0.40 while payees do not incur fees, except when withdrawing 
money from their M-PESA account.  Nyaoma (2009) reports that some small businesses 
use M-PESA for payment, in spite of the system having no formal provision for 
merchants.  Additionally, Bradford and Hayashi (2007) describe developments of 
mobile phone-based payment instruments that allow contactless POS payments in Japan 
and Korea, although importantly they describe such developments as yet to occur in the 
US.  That mobile phone-based instruments have yet to develop in the countries in my 
sample makes them beyond the scope of my thesis.  Nevertheless, I hope the insights 
from my thesis will be useful as these instruments develop in my sample countries. 
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2.2 Substitution between Payment Instruments 
By analysing the change in transactional demand for cash resulting from greater usage 
of debit cards in 13 countries from 1988 to 2003, Amromin and Chakravorti (2009) 
show that debit card use reduces demand for low denomination notes and coins.
7
  They 
suggest that this is because these denominations are most useful for completing 
transactions at the POS, while high denomination notes are used for non-transactional 
purposes such as being a store of value.  Furthermore, they discuss how significant 
amounts of some currencies, principally the US dollar and the Euro, are held outside 
their country of origin.  These two ideas indicate difficulties of using currency stocks to 
assess the use of a country‘s non-cash retail payment systems.  While Figure 1.1 might 
provide a comparison of the use of debit and credit cards in my sample countries, the 
use of cash as a store of value suggests a comparison with the use of cash would be 
inappropriate for comparing countries‘ use of newly-developed retail payment systems, 
in spite of Amromin and Chakravorti (2009) suggesting that there would be substitution 
between these payment instruments.  Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala (1996) analyse the 
adoption of noncash payment methods in 14 developed countries for the period 1987 to 
1993.  Consistent with Amromin and Chakravorti, they find a negative relationship 
between per capita cash holdings and the number of non-cash transactions per capita in 
only 8 of those countries.  Although they say that trends in the use of non-cash payment 
instruments are complex, Humphrey et al describe the trend from cash to non-cash 
instruments as "unmistakeable".  In their analysis of consumer payment instrument 
decisions, Scholnick et al (2008) provide evidence on the substitutability of cash and 
debit cards by looking at the relationship between debit card and ATM transactions.  
They consider bank level data from Spain for the period, 1997-2003, and find that debit 
                                                 
7
  They segment low denomination from high denomination bank notes by referring to what is 
generally available from ATMs. 
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card transactions at POS and ATM transactions are substitutes by showing that ATM 
surcharges increase debit card POS volume significantly. 
While these papers show substitutability between cash and non-cash payment 
instruments, they provide little evidence of substitution between non-cash instruments.  
Two key instruments, the usage of which I compare in Figure 1.1 for the countries in 
my sample, are debit and credit cards.  Zinman (2009) arguing there is strong 
substitution between these two when he models payment card use in 4,000 US 
households between 1995 and 2004.  He finds 38% of debit card use occurs as 
consumers choose debit to minimise the cost of transactions because choosing credit 
would raise such costs for consumers who already revolve debt, face a binding credit 
limit constraint or lack a credit card.  For those consumers not facing credit charges, 
Zinman suggests (p. 365) paying by debit card offers greater time savings because of no 
requirement to regularly repay balances.
8
  I refer to this point again in my analysis in 
subsection 5.2.1.  Zinman also cites evidence suggesting credit and debit cards are 
becoming stronger substitutes over time.  Supporting Zinman's conclusions, Klee (2006) 
finds debit cards are strong substitutes for credit cards when she analyses family level 
data for 1995 – 2001 from the US Survey of Consumer Finances.  She finds a 
significant rise in multihoming (whereby families hold both debit and credit cards), but 
describes how debit cards are more likely to be used by families with outstanding 
balances on their credit cards.  Lee and Kwon (2002) use data from the 1998 US Survey 
of Consumer Finances and assess substitutability between store cards and credit cards.
9
  
As well as finding a negative relationship between consumers‘ credit card usage and 
their use of store cards for transaction purposes, they find credit availability through 
                                                 
8
  While this cost might be thought of as being independent of the size of a credit card bill, I do not 
believe they will completely be so since repaying a larger regular bill may be more difficult for a 
consumer than a smaller bill. 
9
  Lee and Kwon do not appear to compare the relative use of debit cards with store cards. 
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bankcards is negatively correlated with consumers‘ use of store cards as a financing 
medium, suggesting the role of store cards as a supplementary credit line. 
Van Hove (2004) considers the advantages of European stored-value retail payment 
systems.  He argues that stored-value networks may offer instruments that operate with 
significantly lower costs for merchants than debit cards because stored-value 
instruments do not require real-time connection with a central computer.  However, he 
refers (pp. 31-32) to a lack of success for these systems in countries where debit cards 
are suitable for low value transactions and points out (p. 32) that a 2001 Internet survey 
conducted in Europe found that a ―resounding‖ 84% of respondents answered the 
question, ―Would you rather see that the credit/debit card were easier to use on small 
values?‖, affirmatively. 
The substitution between the giro (in paper and electronic form) and the cheque and 
ACH also seems unmistakeable.  When they investigate cashless payment instrument 
infrastructure in European countries, Kemppainen and Salo (2006, p. 9) divide countries 
into two groups, giro countries and cheque countries, in order to assess path dependence 
in infrastructure.  I interpret this to imply that cheques and giros are substitutable as 
payment instruments, although they will not be perfectly substitutable.  It seems 
obvious to conclude that their electronic, direct entry equivalents, ACH and electronic 
giros, are also substitutable. 
2.3 An Institutional Approach to Retail Payment Systems 
In section 1.3, I referred to a definition of retail payment system that implied the 
involvement of multiple firms.  Two questions follow naturally from it, what firms are 
these and how do they arrange themselves?  Moreover, because of my focus on retail 
payment system development, I also ask, how do these arrangements change over time?  
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In his study of medieval trade, Greif (2006) introduces a framework I use for analysing 
these questions; one based on the analysis of institutions.  With Greif‘s framework in 
mind, I discuss literature relating to specific influences on institutional design in 
subsection 2.3.1. 
Greif defines (p. 30) an institution as, "a system of rules, beliefs, norms and 
organisations that together generate a regularity of (social) behavior" and his framework 
focuses on a transaction as the base unit of analysis and promotes analysing the 
motivations or incentives of the actors that are party to it.  While other researchers have 
approached institutions as being exogenous, Greif employs game theory analysis to 
show that the medieval institutions he studies are in fact endogenous: individuals 
respond to the behaviour and expected behaviour of others and, in doing so, form 
regularities of behaviour, which leads to the formation of institutions.  In this way, 
institutions can become self-enforcing, which Greif defines as, ―... each individual, 
taking the structure as a given, finds it best to follow the institutionalized behavior that, 
in turn, reproduces the institution in the sense that the implied behavior confirms the 
associated beliefs and regenerates the associated norms.‖  While it is tempting to study 
self-enforcing institutions as equilibria, Greif argues that studying them in this way goes 
against the concept of endogenous institutional change: it implies that all institutional 
change must have an exogenous origin, which he finds to be unsatisfactory.  
Furthermore, Greif argues many tools of economics suitable for the study of equilibria, 
such as the game theory he uses, commonly predict multiple institutions will be self-
enforcing. 
Greif (2006) attempts to resolve these problems by describing at length what he calls 
the ―fundamental asymmetry‖ or preference for institutions that have been used, 
previously, to help people predict the actions of those around them when they are 
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confronted with unfamiliar situations.
10
  This suggests the worth of using an historical, 
context-specific analysis of institutions as a framework to study institutional change, 
which should include analysis of the parameters influencing behaviour.  Greif argues (p. 
16) that such an approach has advantages not available from alternative methods of 
studying equilibria: 
Studying institutions as equilibrium phenomena, while making explicit, as is 
done here, the forces rendering them self-enforcing, exposes the exogenous 
shocks that will lead to institutional failure – specifically, the shocks that cause 
an institution to be no longer self-enforcing.  But the perspective advanced here 
achieves more than that.  It enables us to study institutional dynamics as a 
historical process.  Institutions can remain stable in a changing environment 
and can change in the absence of environmental change, while past institutions 
– even those that are no longer self-enforcing – can influence the details of 
subsequent ones. 
This is not to rule out other analytical methods being important: Greif argues (p. 7) that 
the study of the impact, persistence and change of institutions relies on understanding 
the parameters faced by actors, for which alternative forms of analysis may be 
indispensible.  Based on this work, I investigate the development of retail payment 
systems using a historical analysis of institutions that relies on microeconomic theory 
for understanding the parameters associated with such systems.  I seek to identify 
institutions relevant to retail payment system development by understanding reasons for 
regularities of behaviour through recent history of my sample countries.  As further 
support for my approach, I cite the work of Hayashi and Weiner (2006) who investigate 
the practical use of analytical models of payment networks. They compare each model‘s 
assumptions and predictions with observations of debit and credit card systems in the 
US, the UK and Australia, finding that the models are limited in their application and 
predictive power.  They argue this is because of the importance of ―country-specific 
                                                 
10
  Greif (2006, pp. 164-166) argues that underpinning the fundamental asymmetry are actors‘ need to 
economise on knowledge, attention and cognitive resources, as well as obtain value from 
coordinating their actions with, and therefore predict, the actions of others. 
21 
 
factors‖, which I take to indicate a historical, context-specific approach represents a 
better method of analysis. 
While Greif‘s framework provides a method for analysing how institutions develop, it 
does not specifically analyse factors in institutional design relevant to retail payment 
systems.  I turn to literature on this subject below. 
2.3.1 Institutional Design 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) analyse the design of economic organisations and argue a 
key goal in that task is efficiency: they quote (p. 19) economist Frank Knight, when 
they say, "{people} in general, and within limits, wish to behave economically, to make 
their activities and their organization "efficient" rather than wasteful."  Milgrom and 
Roberts discuss efficiency with respect to the value maximisation principle, which holds 
that efficient allocations are those that maximise total transaction value and divide it 
among the transaction's participants.  The principle requires the assumption that there 
are no wealth effects, an assumption I also make in my thesis.  Consistent with that 
assumption and with the value maximisation principle, I do not analyse how payment 
networks apportion the profit they make in this thesis.  Instead, I consider the question 
of what is efficiency in relation to institutions before describing literature on two 
influences on an institution‘s efficiency. 
Institutions and dynamic efficiency 
Evans and Hahn (2010) distinguish the concept of dynamic efficiency from that of static 
(allocative and productive) efficiency, arguing that the former represents the appropriate 
standard for the regulation of industries experiencing technological change.  They call 
for regulation to maintain the incentives for dynamic efficiency, indicating the sense of 
seeing efficiency as a concept that an industry is encouraged to work towards, rather 
than to be at, at any point in time.  In so arguing, they call for the application of antitrust 
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regulation to dynamic industries, rather than industry-specific regulation, as a superior 
method of dynamic efficiency maximisation. 
In connection with the dynamic efficiency of the institutions supporting medieval trade, 
Greif (2006, pp. 397-398) argues that European institutions based on individualism, 
corporatism and self-governance are more conducive to efficiency than their Muslim 
counterparts.  He uses the concept of adaptive efficiency, implying it is an element of 
dynamic efficiency, and argues that, by having institutions more adaptive to changing 
circumstances, citizens of the European world benefited more than their Muslim 
neighbours because their institutions were more adaptive to a changing world.
11
 
Institutions and transaction costs 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) outline a key motivation for efficient design of 
organisations, economising on transaction costs.  Transaction costs will have an 
importance both in the decision to use a payment instrument as well as the structuring of 
the payment network offering it.  Because of the importance of transaction costs to both 
instrument usage and network structuring, I start by describing my basis in the literature 
for defining such costs.  I use the definition provided by Dahlman (1979) that 
transaction costs are costs of exchange between two or more parties that fall into one of 
three groups: search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing 
and enforcement costs.
12
  Some researchers, such as Kasper and Streit (1998), reserve 
the term, transaction cost, to describe the costs of transacting across a market and use 
                                                 
11
  As one example of the greater adaption to changing circumstances shown by the institutions of 
Europe, Greif (2006, pp. 205-206) analyses slavery, which was abandoned in the Western World 
around the mid-nineteenth century because, he argues, slavery proved less efficient than freer labour 
and enterprise for encouraging production and innovation.  In contrast, slavery continued in many 
Muslim countries until after World War II because, Greif argues, incumbent institutions there were 
less tolerant of contrary individual behaviour. 
12
  Although they focus just on market transactions, Kasper and Streit (1991, p. 129) also define 
transaction costs as the costs of exchanging property rights.  I find this approach insufficiently 
restrictive to be helpful, although I do discuss literature below showing a relationship between 
property right and transaction costs later in this subsection,  
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the term, coordination cost, to describe the costs of exchange for all transactions.  I see 
no reason to distinguish transactions that occur in a market and thus refer to transaction 
costs simply as the costs of exchange between two or more parties. 
In terms of the structuring of payment networks, transaction cost analysis may play a 
key role in understanding the ways payment networks are structured.  Ronald Coase 
developed a guide for understanding the use of different governance structures to 
coordinate activities, starting with a 1937 paper investigating the decision to coordinate 
an activity within a firm or obtain it from another firm.  Coase's guide centres on 
economising on transaction costs.  Coase (1988) explains how economising on 
transaction costs plays a key role in determining whether a good or service is provided 
within a firm or obtained from another firm (p. 19): ―[t]he limit to the size of the firm 
would be set when the scope of its operations had expanded to the point at which the 
costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm exceeded the costs of 
carrying out the same transactions through the market or in another firm.‖  Cheung 
(1969) extends Coase‘s transaction cost framework to contracts by building on an 
analysis of property rights and sharecropping in an earlier paper (Cheung, 1968) to 
show that economising on transaction costs is important to landowners‘ and tenants‘ 
choices of contractual arrangements. 
Williamson (1979) responds to criticisms that almost anything can be rationalised with 
reference to suitably specified transaction costs by outlining three dimensions that 
characterise a transaction, as the unit of analysis, when transaction costs can be thought 
to influence the governance structure used for the transaction: 
 asset specificity, which can create costs associated with hold-up during contract 
execution 
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 uncertainty, which reduce parties‘ ability to write fully contingent claims 
contracts and 
 irregular transactional activity, which reduces the ability of firms to rely on 
reputation to constraint behaviour. 
Each of these dimensions mean transaction cost minimisation makes it more likely an 
activity is performed within a single firm rather than obtained by one firm from another 
using a contract.  However, in a 1985 book, Williamson spends a chapter (Chapter 6) 
describing the limits to a firm and why every activity in an economy is not coordinated 
within a single firm.  He summarises the issue (p. 161): 
... the transfer of a transaction out of the market into the firm is regularly 
attended by an impairment of incentives.  It is especially severe in 
circumstances where innovation (and rewards for innovation) are important. 
In spite of their relevance to organisational design of payment networks, transaction 
costs are unlikely to play a supreme role.  Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp. 33-34) 
highlight that transaction costs are sometimes, but not always, logically distinct from 
production costs, being the costs of the inputs involved in a production process.  
Additionally, they argue that it is not obvious efficient organisations will minimise 
transaction costs.  While Milgrom and Roberts admit a "standard answer" to this 
question is that competition forces transaction cost minimisation, they suggest that 
making assumptions about competition reduces the applicability of transaction cost 
theory.  However, the apparent relevance of the work on transaction cost economics I 
described above, particularly Williamson (1979; 1985), means I find it difficult to 
dismiss transaction costs out of hand.   Instead, I pay careful attention to the roles of 
distinctions between production costs and transaction costs in retail payment system 
prices and of competition in transaction cost minimisation in payment network 
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operations.  Additionally, I consider other factors, besides transaction costs, that the 
literature indicates are important to institutional design. 
Institutions, transaction costs and property rights 
Coase (1960) analyses arguments of English judges about the costs and benefits of 
different assignments of rights to help them decide on cases of negligence.  He argues 
that these occurrences show a consciousness of the incidence of property rights 
influencing the level of transaction costs and of the need to solve the economic problem, 
which he describes as maximising the value of production.  Stigler (1972) builds on this 
work to describe the Coase Theorem, which he outlines as holding that, in a world of 
zero transaction costs, the assignment of property rights would not affect the value of 
production.  Given transaction costs do in fact matter and they will be affected by the 
assignment of property rights, it follows that the incidence of property rights may play 
an important role in retail payment system development. 
Since I pay attention to property rights, I investigate literature regarding their nature and 
determination.  In his analysis of property rights and government takings, Wilkinson 
(2008) reports that property is generally thought of as something that is owned or 
possessed to the exclusion of others.  Property rights are the formal and informal rules 
that govern access to and use of property with key categories including rights to 
exclude, to determine the use of, to appropriate the income from and to dispose of 
property.  I distinguish property rights from the freedom to contract over the transfer of 
property rights (Trebilcock, 1993, pp. 9-10). 
Institutions and other factors - network effects 
In addition to transaction costs, the literature indicates that other factors will play a role 
in institutional design.  For example, the work of Cheung (1969), which I introduced 
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above, shows that the allocation of risk plays a part in landowners‘ and tenants‘ choices 
of contractual arrangements, in addition to transaction costs.  While risk and numerous 
other factors may play a role in institutional analysis, but I limit consideration to factors 
I feel are most relevant to retail payment systems.  
Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) outline the importance of network effects relating to the 
adoption of new technologies: users are more likely to adopt the network those around 
them are adopting.  I use their definition of network effect in preference to their 
definition of the term, network externality: ―a specific kind of network effect in which 
the equilibrium exhibits unexploited gains from trade regarding network participation.‖  
Liebowitz and Margolis find ―scant‖ evidence of the existence of network externalities 
and caution about their rapid adoption as a basis for (interventionist) public policy 
towards industries.   Accordingly, I avoid the term, network externality, in order not to 
confuse its use with the term, network effect.  Economics literature indicates that 
network effects raise the importance of a network‘s decisions about how to behave 
towards other networks.  For example, Katz and Shapiro (1994) point to the role of user 
expectations of other users‘ actions in shaping network adoption decisions, thereby 
indicating that network effects raise the importance of coordination and compatibility in 
network decisions. 
2.4 Institutions of Retail Payment Systems 
Although I placed some limits on the way I analyse retail payment systems in the 
previous section, a large amount of literature remains relevant to my thesis and I survey 
it in this section.  I start by surveying the literature analysing the choices of payment 
instruments made by consumers and merchants in subsection 2.4.1, including literature 
indicating the importance of network effects to payment instruments.  In subsection 
2.4.2, I turn to literature covering institutions and payment networks and analyse 
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literature on the role of government in retail payment systems in subsection 2.4.3.  
Finally, I review the literature on how to measure the amount of card-based payment 
instrument adoption by merchants and consumers in subsection 2.4.4. 
2.4.1 Institutions and Payment Instrument Adoption 
Adoption and instrument attributes 
Rochet and Tirole (2003) describe the fundamental role of platforms in two-sided 
markets as reducing transaction costs by helping users on each side of a platform 
interact.  Competition between platforms will occur over methods of lowering 
transactions costs that also help to make participation in the platform attractive to both 
of the two groups of users or, as Rochet and Tirole put it, to bring both sides onboard.  I 
turn to Rochet and Tirole's conclusions about the prices chosen by two-sided platforms 
in subsection 2.4.2, but focus here on user adoption decisions.  In regard to these 
decisions, there appear to be a variety of causes of transaction costs.  Bolt, Humphrey 
and Uittenbogaarda (2008) compare the adoption of new payment instruments between 
1990 and 2004 in Norway, which has a system of explicitly charging consumers for the 
costs of different transactions, and the Netherlands, which has no similar pricing 
system.  They find that both countries have rapidly adopted electronic instruments in 
spite of their different approaches to consumer pricing.  They attribute this to lower 
(although non-priced) transactions costs associated with electronic payment systems.  
However, they do find that Norway‘s system of explicit pricing has accelerated the shift 
to electronic payment systems by approximately 20 percent, relative to that shift in the 
Netherlands.
13
  Because explicit pricing only accelerated the rate of this shift by 
approximately one fifth, I interpret this to show that other factors are also important.  
This indicates that payment instruments are differentiated products.  To analyse choices, 
                                                 
13
  They measure adoption in terms of average, annual number of transactions per person. 
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I find helpful the decision framework proposed by Rosen (1974).  According to it, a 
differentiated product has a vector of implicit or "hedonic" prices that reflects the 
specific amounts of characteristics associated with it.  Users will choose the best 
product in accordance with their assessment of these prices and their valuation of the 
attributes as a whole. 
Two papers analyse the causes of transaction costs for users of payment instruments.  
Borzekowski, Kiser and Ahmed (2008) analyse a 2004 survey of debit card use by 
Michigan consumers and note the importance of six factors to the decision of whether to 
use cash, a cheque, a debit or credit card to complete a transaction: 
 time (a preference for fast transaction processing at, for example, the checkout 
counter) 
 convenience 
 money (a pecuniary motive such as avoiding interest payments or fees, using the 
float, or seeking airline miles or cash rewards points) 
 restraint (a desire to limit overspending) 
 tracking (ability to track and record purchases) 
 acceptance (acceptance of the payment method by retailers). 
In her summary of research on consumers' payment instrument choice, Schreft (2006) 
mentions another attribute likely to be important to consumers is their ability to use one 
instrument, credit cards, to smooth their consumption over time.  Because of this 
important point, I add to the attributes, the liquidity constraint a particular instrument 
imposes on consumers.   
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Arango and Taylor (2008) consider payment instrument decisions from a merchant‘s 
perspective using a 2006 survey of Canadian merchants.  They find that merchants‘ 
preferences are shaped by both costs and the relative intensity of payment instrument 
use by their customers.  However, they use an analysis of payment instrument market 
shares relative to merchant perceptions of cost, reliability and risk of crime to show that 
merchants have little control over their customers‘ payment instrument decisions 
beyond their decision to accept an instrument.   They also discuss merchants‘ concerns 
about reliability of an instrument and the risk of loss from crime.   
Consumer costs of adoption, habit and learning 
Schreft (2006) warns of an additional concern for payment instrument choice, consumer 
decisions are complex.  Consistent with this, literature points to the barrier posed by 
significant irreversible costs to the adoption of new payment instruments by consumers.  
Yang and Ching (2009) use a structured consumer lifecycle model to estimate the cost 
of Italian consumers adopting ATM cards.  They show the cost of adoption is non-
trivial and arises because of factors such as non-pecuniary learning costs incurred at the 
time of adoption and uncertainty about the acceptance of new technology.  They also 
argue the benefits of adoption are variable because younger people can expect to benefit 
by using a new technology for a longer period, explaining the link between a 
consumer‘s age and their adoption decisions.  Similarly, Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran 
(2006) find consumer irreversible costs of adoption are a substantial impediment to the 
adoption of ACH direct entry payments by banks and consumers in the US when they 
analyse data on ACH adoption decisions between 1995 and 1997.  In contrast to 
consumers' costs, they find the costs of adoption for banks are low and do not explain 
much of why ACH has not been more widely adopted.   
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The irreversible costs of adopting new instruments faced by consumers are consistent 
with one common observation in the literature, the importance of consumer habit.  For 
example, Guariglia and Loke (2004) show the importance of consumer habit (which 
they measure by the lagged use of instruments) to the adoption of non-cash payment 
instruments when they study instrument use, by volume and value, in 15 developed, EU 
and G10 countries between 1990 and 1998.  (I discuss the results of this paper further in 
subsection 2.4.4 when I investigate literature on whether to measure payment 
instrument adoption by the value or volume of transactions made using an instrument.) 
Consumer irreversible costs of adoption are likely to influence the way dispersion of 
new payment instruments occurs.  For example, Ching (2010) investigates the diffusion 
of generic drugs that copy a name brand drug after the expiry of its patent, noting that 
customers are heterogeneous and some are more price sensitive than others.  Rather than 
fixed costs of adoption, he shows that consumer uncertainty that includes pessimistic 
priors about the quality of generic drugs creates a process whereby patients learn from 
others about generic drugs, the more price sensitive a patient the more quickly he or she 
tries the generic drug.  While product uncertainty and price sensitivity are different to 
the fixed costs of adoption, it seems likely that user heterogeneity contributes to a 
similar learning process for consumer adoption of payment instruments.  The literature 
does support the existence of such a learning process with payment instruments.  Van 
Hove (2006) highlights the role of public transport in stored-value card applications by 
showing it can underpin usage of stored-value instruments.  He quotes (p. 392) Eric Tai, 
Chief Executive Officer of the Hong Kong stored-value system, Oyster, who said in 
2005: ―[w]e have a killer application – transportation, which customers have to use on a 
regular basis.‖  I link this to consumer learning because, if a consumer already holds an 
instrument for a specific purpose, they are more likely to subsequently try to use it as a 
general payment instrument, particularly if they see those around them using it.  Such a 
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learning process will contribute to a gradual dispersion of new payment instruments 
among consumers, raising the importance of network effects, which I turn to, below. 
Network effects 
The importance of network effects to retail payment systems is well established in the 
literature.  In subsection 2.3.1, I discussed the work of Liebowitz and Margolis (1994).  
Given the potential existence of a dynamic process of learning similar to that described 
by Ching (2008), Liebowitz and Margolis' definition of network effects that I gave in 
section 1.4 seems very relevant.  A particular network effect relevant to retail payment 
systems is the chicken and egg problem.  This simultaneity problem was described in 
the context of retail payment systems by Evans and Schmalensee (2005a): who came 
first, merchants willing to accept an instrument or consumers wishing to use it?   There 
is little doubt that the idea has some importance: although Bolt et al (2008) suggest 
prices have a limited influence on debit card adoption in Norway and the Netherlands, 
one factor they show to be more important is terminal availability.  They find that a 
10% rise in the availability of terminals in Norway relative to the Netherlands increases 
the relative usage by 5.3% while a 10% rise in the relative price of debit card 
transactions decreases relative usage by just 2.2%.   
Guibourg (2001) considers network effects from a different perspective, that of 
interconnectivity of networks.  She argues that network effects increase the benefit of 
interconnecting payment networks. Guiborg‘s approach to networks is different to the 
one I use, which I discuss in subsection 2.4.2: she defines (p. 13) a network in terms of 
interconnection.  Her analysis of data from 1988-1999 for the G-10 countries as well as 
Australia, Denmark, Finland and Norway show that countries with a lower number of 
separate networks (i.e. greater inter-connectivity) experience greater transaction 
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growth.
14
  Guibourg‘s conclusion that governments should encourage network 
interconnection seems superficial, however, as her paper does not explain why networks 
would not choose themselves to interconnect.  For example, do regulatory impediments 
explain the lack of interconnection?  In addition to this question, I find Guibourg‘s 
paper is not altogether helpful because of problems defining what interconnection is 
when networks do not require merchants to have a terminal in order to use its 
instruments.  For these reasons, I consider the role of interconnection, but only in my 
historical analyses of countries, rather than in my earlier tabular summaries of the 
systems in my sample countries.   
Finally, while network effects might be important, I believe care should be taken to 
proper analyse factors contributing to their importance.  For example, Kemppainen 
(2003, p. 36) attributes the lack of success of stored-value payment instruments in many 
countries to the importance of network effects without providing any further analysis of 
factors.  In contrast, Chakravorti (2000) uses analysis of US trials of stored-value 
instruments to support the statement that the failure of such trials resulted from a failure 
to convince consumers and merchants that they should use and accept such instruments.  
While Chakravorti‘s statement could be interpreted in terms of network effects, I find 
the greater depth of his analysis more helpful and adopt his approach to network effects 
in my thesis.  For example, I observe payment networks structure themselves in order to 
increase demand for their instruments by overcoming network effects. 
Culture and adoption 
In his analysis of medieval trade, Greif (2006) pays close attention to the role of 
people‘s culture (including their religion) in the institutions that get used for medieval 
                                                 
14
  Data problems, including multicollinearity, prevent Guibourg from distinguishing between the 
effects of the number of inter-connected networks and the number of proprietary networks in each 
country. 
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trade.  This raises the question, to what extent is culture a motivation in adoption of 
payment instruments.  Two papers refute it playing any significant role.  Deungoue 
(2008) assesses changes in banks‘ offerings of five payment instruments, cash, card,15 
cheque, credit transfer and direct debit in the context of legislative attempts to create a 
Single Payment Area in the European Monetary Union between 1990 and 2001.  She 
argues that consumer behaviour in countries is converging because of more consistent 
regulation of payment instruments and of retail banking (which, she argues, influences 
payment instruments by causing a greater standardisation of retail banks‘ products).  
This, she believes, indicates that institutions associated with regulation are important to 
instrument choices in the EMU.  Similarly, Mann (2002) analyses the use of credit and 
debit cards in the US and Japan.  He argues that the difference in the use of credit cards 
in the two countries is driven by regulations that, until recently, prevented banks from 
lending revolving credit, an important basis for the issuance of credit cards.  He argues 
that bank-issued credit cards not being able to offer revolving credit meant they were 
used more like a debit card, which, in turn, meant debit cards were not developed in 
Japan as they were in the US.  Mann supports his arguments with initial evidence 
showing the removal of these regulations has resulted in early signs of convergence in 
card usage in the two countries.  I note both of these papers, Deungoue (2008) and 
Mann (2002), draw a distinction between a country's culture and its government's 
restrictions of freedom, outlining that the second plays a greater role in retail payment 
system development.  I return to this point in subsection 2.4.3 when I analyse literature 
on the role of government in retail payment systems. 
                                                 
15
  Deungoue makes no distinction between credit and debit cards in the paper. 
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2.4.2 Institutions and Payment Networks 
In this subsection, I describe literature relating to the structure of the institutions of 
payment networks.  I start by analysing literature supporting my approach to defining 
payment networks before investigating literature that shows how those networks 
interact as they compete with each other.  I follow this by discussing literature on each 
of network structuring, pricing and network rules with a focus on how networks 
overcome network effects of the sort described above. 
Definitions 
As I discussed in section 1.3, I define payment instruments as being provided by 
payment networks, with one or more networks that offer similar instruments making up 
a retail payment system.  Bakos and Nault (1997) employ an analysis of ownership of, 
and investment in, electronic networks (such as the Internet and information systems) in 
a world of incomplete contracts.  They show that networks are best defined 
economically with reference to their ownership and participation.  This approach stands 
in contrast to the definition of network provided by Katz and Shapiro (1985), who, in 
their analysis of network effects, competition and compatibility, define a network in 
terms of interconnection.  Guibourg (2001) used this approach in her analysis of the 
important of inter-connectivity for retail payment systems, which I described in 
subsection 2.4.1.  I find this latter definition unhelpful for assessing retail payment 
systems because, according to it, if payment instruments are interconnected, they are 
part of the same network.  Although I chose not to use their approach in my work, I 
highlight the subjectivity involved with defining a payment network by mentioning 
Anderson and Rivard (1999).  They assess the definition of ATM/POS debit card 
payment networks when they consider the approach of Canadian authorities to the 
Interac debit card payment network.  They argue that such networks can be described 
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with reference to "(a) the network switch; (b) network ownership and governance; (c) 
network participants; (d) network fees and (e) operating rules and regulations", an 
approach they use to assess the authorities‘ regulation of Interac.  Their paper gives 
readers an idea of the variety of factors relevant to network definition.  While defining a 
network in this way may be the most defendable way to assess government and judicial 
legal actions, I stick with Bakos and Nault‘s approach because it is based on a 
framework of incomplete contracts, which will be a key issue during the development 
of new retail payment systems that my thesis studies.  In summary, my approach holds 
that a retail payment system may be made up of one or more different networks, defined 
with reference to their participation or ownership of assets, but which provide a similar 
type of payment instrument.
16
 
Separately from a payment network, I define a payment scheme as being an organisation 
that provides payment networks with a common structure, including rules and 
wholesale pricing, which networks can use as they provide instruments to users.  The 
two most common payment schemes are Visa and MasterCard.  Differences in the 
operations of payment networks in different jurisdictions, however, mean payment 
schemes are distinct from payment networks.  The literature indicates a strong reason 
for differences in the operations of particular networks, the amount of competition they 
face. 
Role of competition 
Several important papers have described the role of competition in the development of 
retail payment systems.  It can occur on a number of different levels: between retail 
                                                 
16
  I note that my approach when defining a payment network is roughly equivalent to that employed by 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2010, p. 53) when defining a ―payment card 
network‖ in a recently released notice of proposed rulemaking in relation to debit card interchange 
fees and routing. 
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payment systems, between payment networks and within a payment network.  While 
some authors question that competition provided by newly-developed systems raises 
welfare,
17
 Garcia-Swartz, Hahn and Layne-Farrar (2006) support the role of competition 
between retail payment systems when they empirically estimate costs and benefits of 
electronic payment systems.
18
  They show that society has benefited, overall, from 
competition between payment systems and the shift towards electronic payment 
instruments.  Garcia-Swartz et al criticise many studies that preceded theirs as analysing 
only the costs of using different retail payment instruments (such as the fees paid by 
merchants) and disregarding the wider transaction cost benefits (such as the 
convenience).  They attempt to remedy this deficit by using their own social and private 
cost-benefit analysis for all parties for the same transactions made using different 
instruments.  While such valuations are difficult to make, they argue that, when all key 
parties are considered and all benefits are added, the shift toward a cashless society 
appears to have improved economic welfare.  This highlights the role of payment 
system competition and the importance of considering payment system choices made by 
consumers and merchants. 
Chakravorti and Roson (2004) go beyond competition between retail payment systems 
to consider competition between payment networks.
19
  They use a mathematical model 
to show that inter-network competition within a payment system unambiguously 
increases transaction volume and therefore consumer and merchant welfare.  I consider 
the extent of inter-network competition in my research and subsequent analysis.  
                                                 
17
  For example, Frankel and Shampine (2006) believe that it increases costs and distorts market 
outcomes by encouraging the use of less efficient payment systems. 
18
  Garcia-Swartz et al‘s calculations are not without controversy.  In particularly, the paper‘s results 
are further discussed in Shampine (2007) with a reply in Garcia-Swartz, Hahn and Layne-Farrar 
(2007). 
19
  Chakravorti and Roson do not clarify how they define a payment network and a payment system, 
instead appearing to assume that Visa and MasterCard are payment networks.  I argue this approach 
is consistent with the one I have taken. 
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Chakravorti and Roson focus their analysis on consumers and merchants and do not 
consider the choices of banks between networks.  Evans and Schmalensee (2005a, pp. 
275-284) consider these choices when they discuss the interest of anti-trust authorities 
in the rules of credit card networks around what is known as ―duality‖ or banks issuing 
the cards of more than one network.  The nature of competition for participants in 
payment networks does seem relevant to this thesis and I return to it in my analysis. 
It is also possible to look beyond inter-network competition to investigate that occurring 
at the intra-network level.  I find, however, the concept difficult to consider, 
conceptually, and several papers warn about the risk of ignoring one side of two-sided 
platforms: for example, Wright (2004) and Evans (2008) warn that doing this means 
applying ill-suited economic logic to two-sided platforms.  Wright examines eight 
qualitative ideas he labels as fallacies involving the misapplication of conventional 
economic theory when considering the structure of prices observed in two-sided 
markets.  These include considering the nature of prices relative to costs and only those 
prices faced by one side of the market.  Evans (2008) investigates the concept of market 
definition used during anti-trust analysis and agrees with the approach of Wright when 
he argues that a two-sided platform requires a market definition that includes both 
sides.
20
  Given its focus on the institutional structure of different systems, I adopt an 
approach consistent with Wright and Evans and consider conduct from the perspective 
of both sides of the market.   
This is not to say that competition occurring on one side of a two sided platform is not 
important for payment instruments; the literature strongly suggests that it is.  For 
example, Evans and Schmalensee (2005a, p. 156) say that, while it is difficult to 
                                                 
20
  This pragmatic approach is not without a number of theoretical complications.  Evans and 
Schmalensee (2005b), Emch and Thompson (2006) and White (2006) provide some discussion of 
the pros and cons of the doing this. 
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document, intense competition between issuers for customers will cause a greater 
proportion of the revenue received by issuers from interchange fees to be passed on to 
customers.  However, my approach is to consider both sides of two-sided platforms, 
thereby considering inter-network competition rather than solely intra-network 
competition.  In the case of Evans and Schmalensee‘s observation, my approach leads 
me to ask, does more competition for consumers lead to more use of an instrument 
rather than other instruments - what happens to the merchant side of the two-sided 
platform? 
Network structuring 
The literature I discussed above suggests that networks structure themselves in order to 
compete for the issuers and acquirers of a payment instrument, as well as for the users 
of a payment instrument.  Much of the recent literature on retail payment systems deals 
with the economic rationale for the structuring of payment networks, particularly a 
network's choices in the setting of a particular wholesale fee internal to a network, the 
interchange fee.  This fee is paid between acquirers and issuers, redistributing revenues 
payment networks receive from merchants and consumers.   I adopt the approach of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (2004, October 14, notes to Graph 2) and define positive 
interchange fees as being paid by acquirers to issuers with negative fees paid in the 
opposite direction.  Positive fees effectively raise the cost of accepting payment 
instruments for merchants and, for this reason, have generated much scholarly interest.
21
  
I also analyse the nature of a fee paid to a payment network operator by one or both of 
the acquirer and issuer, which is known as a switch fee.  While this fee is less important 
                                                 
21
  For example, Frankel and Shampine (2006) argue that positive interchange fees distort market 
outcomes by encouraging the use of more costly payment instruments.  As discussed earlier in this 
subsection, however, Garcia-Swartz et al (2006) disagree with this point.  They argue that, while 
difficult to determine social costs of different payment instruments conclusively, a shift from paper-
based to electronic payment systems does appear to be efficient, implying the market remains 
competitive.   
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to the funding of a two-sided platform within a payment system, Katz (2005, p. 123) 
argues that it may attenuate or strengthen the flows associated with the system‘s 
interchange fees and therefore cannot be ignored. 
Evans and Schmalensee (2005b) consider the historical context of, as well as 
alternatives to, interchange fees used by credit card payment systems.  When Diner‘s 
Club introduced its payment card in 1949, it collected the majority of its revenue from 
the merchant side of the business.  Early four-party credit card networks followed this 
approach by setting a multilaterally-determined interchange fee paid by acquirers to 
issuers.  A multilateral fee reduced the transactions costs internal to payment networks 
by removing the need for bilateral negotiations between pairs of network participants.  
The networks agreed a common interchange fee that left banks with an incentive to 
compete for merchants‘ business.  Small and Wright (2002) focus further on the 
feasibility of decentralised negotiations of interchange fees.  In a decentralised network, 
interchange fees are negotiated bilaterally.  Small and Wright show this would expose 
acquiring firms to hold-up by small issuers and lead to an increase in such fees, 
decreasing the use of credit card payment systems.  Accordingly, they indicate that 
multilaterally set interchange fees are preferable for the smooth operation of payment 
networks.  I consider the prevalence of multilateral interchange fees by specifying in my 
tables in Chapter 3 whether or not I judge the operations of payment networks to be 
centralised.  I argue that evidence such as Small and Wright (2002) suggests operations 
will commonly be centralised and I judge this operations to be centralised if evidence 
indicates that an organisation needs agreements with the majority of issuers and 
acquirers within a network before it can participate. 
Decisions on how to structure networks obviously pertain to institutional design and, in 
subsection 2.3.1, I discussed literature showing that transaction costs are important to 
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this.  I described four factors important to the structuring of retail payment systems: 
asset specificity, irregular transactional activity,
22
 uncertainty and innovation.  
Economising associated transaction costs will have a fundamental importance to the 
supply of instruments.  For this reason, I will describe how payment networks 
economise transaction costs as they provide payment instruments to merchants and 
consumers. 
The relevance of transaction costs mean I turn to the possibility of differences between 
the levels of transaction costs that exist in my sample countries.  As shown in my 
summary of key statistics for my sample country in Table 1.1, a major difference 
between my countries is their population size, which may have an important influence 
on transaction costs if having a lower population reduces the number of organisations 
needed by a payment network.  However, when she investigates the structure of the 
banking markets, Dick (2007) investigates the role of market size in banking market 
concentration.  She finds that banking industries are similarly concentrated, regardless 
of size, indicating that I should not expect major differences in the transaction costs 
associated with payment network structuring because of the different populations of my 
sample's countries.  Claessens and Laeven (2004) do, however, identify one important 
reason for differences between my countries when they estimate the degree of 
competition in 5 countries‘ bank industries using bank panel data from 1994 to 2001.  
They find no negative relationship between competitiveness and bank concentration, but 
do find greater foreign bank entry to an industry with fewer entry and activity 
restrictions to be more competitive. 
Pricing 
                                                 
22
  While transactions made using a payment network‘s instrument will occur very regularly, the 
transactions that create that network occur much less regularly. 
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Having surveyed the literature on the role of competition in retail payment systems, I 
turn to its effects, firstly by investigating literature on the decisions of networks.  As 
discussed in subsection 2.4.2, Rochet and Tirole (2003) show that a platform will 
compete with other platforms by choosing a pricing structure that ensures the 
participation of both sides in a two-sided platform.  They describe three important 
factors for pricing decisions: 
 The presence of marquee buyers (consumers generating a high surplus for 
merchants) makes it more beneficial for merchants to offer payment systems 
preferred by them, raising the price merchants will be willing to pay 
 Installed bases or captive buyers on one side of the two-sided platform tilt the 
price structure in favour of the other side 
 If one side multi-homes, or can access a platform in a number of different ways, 
the price structure will be (counter-intuitively) tilted in favour of the other side 
(because the other side can steer the first side to use its preferred platform). 
These three observations highlight important aspects to the price structures chosen by 
payment networks to get both sides onboard.  An idea central to these aspects is that, if 
one side of the two-sided platform is more likely to participate, the price structure will 
favour the other side.  Rochet and Tirole (2006b) support applying this idea to payment 
cards when they say that merchants will often internalise a card‘s benefit to cardholders, 
making them willing to pay significant per-transaction fees known as merchant service 
fees (―MSFs‖).  I now discuss literature that confirms the role of each of these three 
factors. 
As he investigates pricing structures used by platforms with two or more sides in 
industries such as payment cards, software and real estate, Evans (2003) observes 
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pricing consistent with Rochet and Tirole's predictions.  In relation to marquee buyers, 
Evans provides the example of American Express, a three-party credit/charge card 
network.  It can charge a relatively high MSF compared to other card brands because 
merchants view the American Express business clientele as particularly attractive.  This 
means merchants will still want to participate in the network despite higher costs.  In 
relation to captive buyers/installed bases of users, Evans (2003) discusses how ATM 
networks had an installed base of consumers who used their cards to access cash using 
ATMs.  When debit card services were added to ATM cards, networks needed to 
encourage merchants to install terminals that could process transactions using ATM 
cards.  Accordingly, networks' pricing structure favoured merchants relative to other 
payment cards.  While Evans shows multihoming is common to many two-sided 
platforms, he does not present clear evidence from the payment card industry regarding 
its effect on pricing.  Rysman (2006), however, provides more insight when he shows 
the subtleness of the multihoming effect as he investigates credit and debit card usage in 
the US between 1998 and 2001.  He finds that consumers concentrate their spending on 
a single payment network (single-home), although many hold unused cards that allow 
the ability to use multiple networks (multi-home).  Although he does not offer a 
conclusive answer as to why this happens, Rysman does investigate factors behind 
consumers‘ choices of favoured network.  He finds that customers‘ favoured network is 
likely to be the network most widely accepted.  My framework provides analysis of why 
this might happen, which I describe in subsection 5.2.2. 
The discussion above shows that pricing decisions are not self-evident; rather they are 
context-specific influenced by behaviour on both sides of the market.  Nevertheless, 
there is little doubt that pricing does play some role in system development.  I 
investigate the nature of per-transaction, retail prices faced by both consumers and 
merchants when accessing different payment systems.  Shy and Wang (2008) observe 
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that many networks making up the American credit card payment system charge fees 
that are proportional to transaction value.  For fees with this nature, I use the label, 
―proportional fees‖ (although these are also known as ad valorem fees).  I define per-
transaction fees that do not change with transaction value as ―flat fees‖.  As well as 
marginal fees, I acknowledge the role of fixed fees as being important to instrument 
adoption decisions.  In their analysis of payment instrument pricing in the Netherlands 
and Norway, which I described above, Bolt et al (2008) focused on marginal, per-
transaction fees, which they said would play a ―key‖ role in adoption of instruments by 
consumers, although they did acknowledge (p. 91) that fixed fees may also play a small 
role in adoption.  I take a similar approach to them as I focus on consumers‘ and 
merchants‘ decisions to use a payment system.  Although I focus on marginal, per-
transaction fees in my Chapter 3 tables that show features of the card-based, merchant-
based instruments of major payment networks within retail payment systems, fixed fees 
will remain important to my subsequent analysis. 
Network rules 
At the end of my analysis on the literature on network structuring, I mentioned there 
were two important choices available to networks.  Here, I turn to the second of them, 
investigating what the literature indicates regarding payment network rules.  Weiner and 
Wright (2005) discusses the use, internationally, of a variety network rules that often 
form part of four-party credit and debit card networks.  I focus on two rules that have 
attracted particular regulatory and judicial attention:
23
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  Among commentators noting the interest in these rules are Heikkinen (2007), Wright (2003) and 
Negrin (2005). 
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 the No-Surcharge Rule, which prevent merchants from charging customers for the 
use of a particular payment mechanism, in this case, a credit card (also known as 
the no-discrimination rule) 
 the Honour-All-Cards Rule, which, in the US or Australia, require merchants that 
accept a network‘s credit card to also accept that network‘s signature-based debit 
card, if the latter exists in that country (also known as the handle-all-cards rule).
24
 
Wright (2003) argues that removal of the No-Surcharge Rule allows monopolistic 
merchants to charge differential prices for credit card users.  This reduces the benefits 
the cardholder obtains from surcharged transactions resulting in the ―under-
subscription‖ of the card network, especially when cardholders face a fixed cost when 
joining a network.  Monnet and Roberds (2007) consider a mathematical model of a 
payment network and highlight the importance of a No-Surcharge Rule to participation 
in the network and therefore to entry of new retail payment systems..  By reducing 
agents' incentive to deal in cash, the rule increases participation and the viability of a 
payment network.  Bolt, Jonker and van Renselaar (2009) take a different approach and 
empirically analyse the number of Danish merchants who react to acquirers charging 
them flat fees for processing debit card transactions by surcharging.  They find that 22% 
of Dutch merchants surcharge and those who do surcharge do not do so for transactions 
greater than, on average, 10 EUR.  Furthermore, Bolt et al calculate that merchants who 
surcharged debit card transactions charged 23 euro cents on average, compared with an 
average MSF of 4-5 euro cents.  This suggests that some merchants respond to 
elasticities of demand for their customers that are different for small purchases.  Evans 
and Schmalensee (2005b, p. 93) propose two reasons why, when able to do so, more 
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  An alternative definition, which I do not use, but which is more common for credit cards in Europe, 
is that the Honour-All-Cards Rule requires merchants who accept a scheme‘s card to always accept 
that card no matter who the issuer. 
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merchants choose not to surcharge: there are transaction costs of imposing different 
prices based on payment methods; and that consumers may patronize other stores that 
do not surcharge. 
Rochet and Tirole (2008) turn to the Honour-All-Cards Rule and show how the rule 
performs a socially beneficial rebalancing effect between the interchange fees charged 
by two platforms (such as debit and credit cards) facing different levels of competition.  
They point to support for their model coming from the observation that Visa and 
MasterCard reduced their debit interchange fees and increased their credit interchange 
fees following the removal of the Honour-All-Cards Rule in the US in 2003. 
In order to understand the effect on payment system development of network rules, I 
investigate whether these two network rules, the No-Surcharge Rule and the Honour-
All-Cards Rule, are explicitly part of the payment systems surveyed.  I focus on the 
explicit use of such rules because some researchers, such as Epstein (2005, p. 582), 
argues that such rules will not be enforced, absolutely, but will be ―porous‖ in nature.  
At the beginning of my discussion of network rules, I mentioned regulator and 
government interest in these particular rules.  I further analyse literature on the role of 
government in the next subsection. 
2.4.3 Government Involvement in Retail Payment Systems 
I begin this subsection by admitting the existence of a substantial and important 
opportunity for analysis: understanding the institutions of government.  My focus on the 
institutions of retail payment system development means I define these government 
institutions as exogenous: while I analyse their role in system development, I do not 
attempt to understand the reasons for their existence.  I do not, however, mean my 
approach to diminish the importance of these institutions, instead arguing that the 
literature indicates they can in fact play an important role.  In relation to the adoption of 
46 
 
payment instruments by users in subsection 2.4.1, I described two papers that indicated 
governments play a key role in the adoption of payment instruments.  Firstly, Deungoue 
(2008) finds convergence in instrument adoption in EMU countries following the 
standardisation of regulations of payment instruments and retail banking.  Similarly, 
Mann (2002) finds convergence in instrument adoption between the US and Japan 
following the latter‘s removal of rules that prevented banks from lending revolving 
credit.   
A variety of motivations have been advanced for government involvement in retail 
payment systems and in economic activity, more generally.  Viscusi, Vernon and 
Harrington (1995) consider a general framework for why governments regulate markets 
– they consider (in Chapter 10) the application of what they call, normative analysis as a 
positive theory, which holds that regulation is supplied in response to the public‘s 
demand for a correction of a market failure or for the correction of highly inequitable 
practices.  However, they report (p. 326) that a key reason why this theory has lacked 
supporters in recent times is the large amount of evidence that refutes it.  They critically 
examine the economic theory of regulation, which is advanced in place of normative 
analysis as a positive theory.  This newer theory holds that regulation is supplied in 
response to demands of interest groups acting to maximise their income.  Accepting that 
intervention might not always be in the interest of the general public, I summarise the 
literature on two major objectives for government intervention that appear to at least 
start with a public interest motivation. 
The first public interest objective I consider is a desire for governments to ensure the 
stability of their country‘s financial system.  Because retail payment systems are often 
provided by members of a country‘s financial system, financial regulation is likely to 
affect retail payment system development.  In two papers forming part of a compendium 
47 
 
of work analysing financial regulation, Goodhart (2007) and Capie (2007) analyse the 
history of the creation and maintenance of financial regulation in different countries for 
approximately the previous 150 years.  They both show an historical process exists that 
started with comparatively little financial regulation, but with such regulation increasing 
in extent in response to crises, as part of reactive efforts to ensure the stability of 
financial systems.  As I explained at the beginning of this subsection, I treat the 
institutions of government (including of financial regulation) as beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  However, I find it useful in my analysis to observe that governments 
introduce an amount of financial regulation to attain a level of stability in financial 
systems.  I make no further assumptions around the extent of this regulation - indeed, 
both Goodhart and Capie report a range of approaches to such regulation exist in 
different countries.  Instead, I observe the effects of financial regulation in my sample 
countries on retail payment system development. 
A second public interest objective is a government‘s desire to prevent restrictions on 
competition that are detrimental to society and it has led to the development in many 
countries of what is termed, competition policy.
 25
  While the relevance of competition 
policy to retail payment system development may not be immediately obvious, 
Kemppainen (2003) points to the operation of retail payment systems, which often 
requires cooperation amongst firms that are otherwise competitors, as bringing 
―competition policy considerations into the picture‖.  Motta (2004) defines competition 
policy (also known as, anti-trust policy) as the set of policies and laws made which 
ensure competition in a marketplace is not restricted in a way that is detrimental to 
society.  He uses the well-known Sherman Act, which was created as US federal law in 
                                                 
25
  Carletti and Hartmann (2002) use a survey of theoretical and empirical evidence to analyse the 
relationship between competition policies and policies to preserve stability in the banking sector.  
They find little relationship between the two and, given my treatment of these policies as exogenous, 
I provide no further analysis of that relationship here. 
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1890, as an early example.  Motta argues that the over-riding objective of competition 
policy should be to maximise total welfare and, although he does not go as far to 
recommend it as an objective, he acknowledges the role of dynamic efficiency in this 
standard.  However, he makes it plain in his discussion that it is not the only public 
interest objective of what gets labelled, competition policy.  As with financial 
regulation, I limit my analysis of competition authorities to analysis their effects of 
financial regulation on retail payment system development.  
These two public interest objectives are not the only reasons advanced for government 
intervention in retail payment systems.  Other reasons appear more consistent with the 
economic theory of regulation proposed by Verscusi et al (1995).  Heikkinen (2007) 
discusses the "substantial" regulatory pressure on card-based payment systems.  She 
argues that complaints from merchants, which especially focus on MSFs, explain why 
most past and current propositions for regulation have focused on the relationship 
between the payment card industry and participating merchants.  In relation to MSFs 
and merchants‘ pricing, Guerin-Calvert and Ordover (2005) analyse merchant 
complaints in the context of remedies available to merchants and government regulators 
in regard to an obvious payment system price for credit card networks, the interchange 
fee.  They argue that merchant complaints have, in large part, precipitated regulator 
concerns that interchange fees are "too high".  They discuss the complex problem of 
analysing merchant benefits from processing transactions using payment cards and, 
thus, the complexities involved with defining an interchange fee that is "too high".  
Nevertheless, it appears that merchant pressure leads governments to attempt to regulate 
prices of payment cards.
26
  However, I also believe care needs to be taken not to 
                                                 
26
  Semeraro (2009) labels one reason used by merchants to justify interchange fee regulation the 
Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis; that is, interchange fees inflate the retail prices 
faced by all customers because merchants need to pay the interchange fees from those paying by 
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exaggerate the importance of merchants to the regulation of retail payment systems.  In 
Australia, merchant complaints about positive interchange fees charged in credit card 
networks arguably led to the eventual regulation of negative interchange fees for 
EFTPOS transactions.  In spite of merchants taking several unsuccessful court cases 
attempting to stop it, the regulation of EFTPOS interchange fees resulted in transactions 
made using this instrument becoming more costly for merchants. 
In regard to governments' influence on network rules, I described my focus on two in 
the preceding subsection, the No-Surcharge Rule and the Honour-All-Cards Rule, 
which governments and authorities have often intervened to remove.  I suggest that 
analysis of payment networks' adoption of these two Rules will to an extent measure 
government involvement with their operations. 
2.4.4 Measuring Adoption: Volume vs. Value and Other Data Issues 
There are two key ways of measuring adoption of recently developed payment 
instruments: the volume of transactions completed using instruments or their total value.  
For several reasons, I focus solely on the volume of transactions.  Guariglia and Loke 
(2004) provide evidence showing the relative merits of each measure using data from 14 
developed, EU and G10 countries between 1990 and 1998.  They find both transaction 
volume and value are affected by past payment habits and the extent of payment 
instrument infrastructure (measured by the number of EFTPOS terminals), but that they 
find subtle distinctions in the influences on the two variables.  One subtlety is that 
Guariglia and Loke find a negative relationship between cash holdings and the volume 
of card transactions, but a positive relationship between cash holdings and their value.  
They argue this is consistent with a common feature of debit card systems, minimum 
                                                                                                                                               
credit card who, according to the Hypothesis, are richer consumers.  Semeraro analyses the 
justification, but does not find it a convincing reason to allow merchants to surcharge credit card 
transactions. 
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transaction values, which reduce the volume of debit card transactions, but have less 
effect on their value.  Secondly, they find that the interest rate is positively related to the 
value, but not the volume, of non-cash transactions, which they suggest happens 
because an increase in the interest rate raises the opportunity cost of holding a larger 
amount of cash.  This is a further reason for focusing on volume.  Although Guaiglia 
and Loke (2004) are silent on the effect of income on the two variables, there are 
reasons for thinking that income will have a greater effect on value of a country‘s non-
cash transactions, rather than their volume.  Kravis and Lipsey (1982) are among 
researchers observing a link between price levels and a country‘s wealth.  More costly 
goods will mean greater exchanges of value in each transaction.  Consistent with this 
idea, Snellman, Vesala and Humphrey (2001) analyse substitution of non-cash payment 
instruments for cash in 10 European countries and estimate that income (GDP per 
capita) has a positive effect on the value of cash holdings.  This makes it likely that the 
value of transactions completed by non-cash payment instruments is also positively 
correlated with income.  Turning to the volume of transactions, Humphrey et al (1996, 
p. 931) use data for 1987-1993 in 14 developed countries and show no clear relationship 
between income and the volume of transactions made using non-cash payment 
instruments (they do not analyse the value of transactions).  I also note that the two 
countries with the largest amount of retail payment system use measured by volume 
shown in Figure 1.1, Norway and New Zealand, are also my sample's richest and 
poorest, respectively, as measured by the GDP Per Capita figures shown in Table 1.1. 
Other Data Issues 
In my introduction to this thesis, I showed the usage of debit and credit cards in each of 
my sample countries in Figure 1.1.  As clarified on the Figure, it is based on 
transactional data from official sources for each country, being the Committee on 
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Payment and Settlement Systems (the ―CPSS‖), which regularly updates statistical 
information for a document known as the Redbook, the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
Norges Bank and Statistics New Zealand.
27
  The lack of data on cash-only transactions 
from some official sources (in particular, Statistics New Zealand) means I focus only on 
transactions for the purchase of goods and services (that is, I exclude data for 
transactions that only have a cash-out component).  For data from the CPSS Redbooks, 
I use the report for the years 2004 to 2008.  To get the volume of transactions per capita, 
I use population data also available from the sources above with the exception of 
Australia for which I use data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  When I find a 
discrepancy between figures for the same year provided in separate documents, I use 
those provided in the most recent publication.  I further clarify my data sources in my 
analysis of country-by-country retail payment system development in Chapter 4. 
Another data issue for payment instruments is that there are two ways of measuring 
transaction volume in a country: the volume of issued transactions, being the number of 
transactions on cards issued in a country, and the volume of acquired transactions, being 
the number of transactions on merchant terminals in a country.  The two will be 
separated by the card use of that country‘s residents as they travel in other countries 
compared to the card use of international tourists as they travel within that country.  In 
my country-by-country summaries in Chapter 4, I state whether the transaction volume 
data I use is for issued transactions or acquired transactions.  Given my preference for 
using consistent data from official sources, I am almost always constrained by the 
nature of the data available, which, with the exception of acquired transactions for New 
Zealand and the US, is for the volume of issued transactions.   
                                                 
27
  Official sources commonly do not separate credit card transactions into those made using three-party 
card instruments from those made using four-party card instruments.  For this reason, my tables in 
Chapter 3 showing the attributes of payment networks show only aggregated transaction data. 
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I investigate the appropriateness of comparing data for issued transaction volumes with 
data for acquired transaction volumes, which my reliance on official sources forces me 
to adopt, by analysing differences between acquired transactions and issued transactions 
for the two countries for which both are available; these are Norway and the UK.  
Figures from Norway‘s central bank, Norges Bank, allow a comparison of issued 
transactions to acquired transactions for the combined amounts of debit and credit card 
transaction volumes.
28
  Between 2000 and 2009, issued transactions are at most 5.1% 
greater than acquired transactions, averaging 3.6%.  Data from the UK Cards 
Association show acquired transactions, in contrast to CPSS Redbook data for the UK, 
which show issued transactions.  The issued transaction data from the CPSS for credit 
and debit cards are at most 5.6% more than the acquired transaction data from the UK 
Cards Association and average 2.5% more. 
2.5 Focus of my Research 
The discussion above shows the complexity involved with retail payment systems.  I 
will attempt to add to the literature on retail payment systems by adopting a history-
based institutional analysis.  Such an approach will provide an alternative analytical 
method to mathematical equilibrium analysis; one that I feel may be better suited to 
understanding retail payment systems‘ complexities.
                                                 
28
  That is, the figures do not allow issued and acquired transactions on debit cards to be separated from 
those on credit cards. 
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Chapter 3  
Important Features of Payment Instruments 
In this Chapter, I provide tables showing the important features, particularly the pricing 
and usage, of instruments provided by major payment networks in retail payment 
systems in each of my sample countries.  My tables focus on the features of networks 
offering card-based, merchant-based instruments that I define as being major because I 
have readily found evidence allowing me to summarise their features.  There will of 
course be networks that I have not summarised because I have not found sufficient 
information showing their features.  I describe what the columns in each of my tables 
refer to: 
 The row headers in the first column of my tables show which the retail payment 
system of that row or collection of rows.  When I have found distinct payment 
networks are in the same retail payment system (by virtue of providing the same 
type of payment instrument), I place each network in a separate row, but wth the 
same row header (first column) 
 The second and third columns list major network names and whether or not I 
judge their operations to be centralised, according to the definitions of networks 
and centralised operations that I discussed in subsection 2.4.2 
 The fourth column shows the usage of the retail payment system, as measured by 
the average number of transactions per capita in 2008.  As I discussed in 
subsection 2.4.4, my official data sources generally provide data aggregated for 
debit and credit cards, preventing me from showing data separated for different 
payment networks 
 The fifth and sixth columns show current per-transaction retail fees for POS 
transactions charged to merchants and consumers.  None means no per-transaction 
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fees are charged.  Fixed refers to per-transaction fees that do not change in size 
with the size of the transaction.  Some fixed refers to fees that, depending on a 
consumer‘s account, are generally either zero or fixed.  Proportional refers to fees 
that are proportional to the transaction‘s value 
 The seventh and eight columns show the two wholesale per-transaction fees, the 
interchange fee and the switch fee.  I clarify the nature of interchange fees 
(whether they are flat or proportional) and if the paid from acquirer to issuer 
(positive fees) or in the other direction (negative fees).  I also clarify the nature of 
switch fees, which are paid to the payment network operator, and whether they are 
paid by the acquirer or issuer 
 Finally, the ninth and tenth columns show whether or not I have found 
information showing whether or not payment networks explicitly make use of the 
Honour-All-Cards and No-Surcharge Rules, which I described in subsection 2.4.2. 
I follow each of my tables with tables showing my sources for each cell.  I have left 
cells blank when I have not found convincing evidence for me to summarise the 
particular feature of that network.  For some blank cells, I include a reference for 
readers to follow, should they be interested. 
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3.1 Australia 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
AMEX,
Diners Club,
JCB
Y Proportional 
fee
None na na N
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Visa,
Mastercard
Y Proportional 
fee
None Positive 
proportional 
fee
N N
EFTPOS N Some flat fees Some flat fees Negative flat 
fee
None na
Visa Debit,
Debit 
Mastercard
Y Flat fee None Positive flat 
fee
N N
NB: For a description of this table, please see the text at the beginning of this Chapter.
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction
Wholesale Fees
Network Rules
68
Debit Card 81
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3.1.1 References for Australia 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Weiner & 
Wright (2005, p. 
297)
Reserve Bank 
of Australia 
(2007, p. 22)
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Weiner & 
Wright (2005, p. 
297); Author
Reserve Bank 
of Australia 
(2007, p. 22)
Reserve Bank 
of Australia 
(2007, p. 6)
Weiner & 
Wright (2005, p. 
304)
Weiner & 
Wright 
(2005, p. 
304)
Reserve Bank 
of Australia 
(2007, p. 22)
Reserve Bank 
of Australia 
(2007, p. 23)
Reserve Bank 
of Australia 
(2007, p. 6)
Arun 
Campbell, 
Australian 
Payments 
Clearing 
Association, 
personal 
communicatio
n,  June 17, 
2010
Weiner & 
Wright (2005, p. 
304)
Reserve Bank 
of Australia 
(2007, p. 6)
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction Wholesale 
Fees
Network Rules
See subsection 
4.1.5 of this 
thesis
Debit Card See subsection 
4.1.5 of this 
thesis
Reserve Bank of Australia 
(2007, p. 6)
Reserve Bank of Australia 
(2007, p. 6)
Reserve Bank of Australia 
(2007, p. 6)
Woolworths Ltd (2010, April 
1); Mitchell (2010, April 17)
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3.2 Canada 
 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Amex,
Diners Club
Y Proportional 
fee
na na Y
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Mastercard,
Visa
Y Proportional 
fee
Positive 
proportional 
fee
Y
Interac Direct 
Payment
Flat fee Some flat fees, 
no-fee 
accounts 
common
None Issuers and 
acquirers pay 
equal flat fee
na N
Mastercard 
Maestro
Y Flat fee None Issuers and 
acquirers pay 
equal flat fee
Y
Visa Advantage Y Flat fee None Y
NB: For a description of this table, please see the text at the beginning of this Chapter.
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction
Wholesale Fees
Network Rules
77
Debit Card 111
Retail Payment 
System
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3.2.1 References for Canada 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Weiner and & 
Wright (2005, p. 
297)
Arango & 
Taylor (2008, 
p. 10)
Standing 
Senate 
Committee 
(2009,p. 21)
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Weiner and & 
Wright (2005, p. 
297)
Arango & 
Taylor (2008, 
p. 10)
Standing 
Senate 
Committee 
(2009, p. 2)
Standing 
Senate 
Committee 
(2009, p. 22)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
Septermber 
23)
Arango & 
Taylor (2008, 
p. 10)
Canadians 
love... (1997, 
November 3)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
September 23)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
September 23)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
September 
23)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
Septermber 
23)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
September 23)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
September 23)
Standing 
Senate 
Committee 
(2009, p. 22)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
September 
23)
Visa-branded 
debit cards... 
(2010, October 
19)
Visa-branded 
debit cards... 
(2010, October 
19)
Standing 
Senate 
Committee 
(2009, p. 22)
Arnfield 
(2009, 
Septermber 
23)
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction Wholesale 
Fees
Network Rules
See subsection 
4.2.5 of this 
thesis
Debit Card See subsection 
4.2.5 of this 
thesis
Visa-branded debit cards 
swiping into Canada (2010, 
October 19)
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3.3 Germany 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
American 
Express, Diners 
Club
Y Proportional 
fee
None na na
Four-Party 
Credit Card
MasterCard, 
Visa
Y Proportional 
fee
None Positive 
proportional 
fee
Y
Electronic 
Cash/Girocash
Y Proportional 
fee
None na
(2) na
ELV/ec direct 
debit
Y None None None na
MasterCard 
Maestro/
Visa V PAY
Y Proportional 
fee
None Positive 
proportional 
fee
Y
Stored-Value 
Card
Geldkarte Y 1 Proportional 
fee
None na
NB: For a description of this table, please see the text at the beginning of this Chapter.
(2) In a structure unique to Germany (European Commission, 2006, p. 19), network operators (Netzbetreiber) collect fees from merchants and pass them 
to the appropriate issuing bank.  The fee does not pass through an acquiring bank and therefore isn't an interchange fee.
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction
Wholesale Fees
Network Rules
5
Debit Card 23
(1)
(1) EHI Retail Institute (2009, p. 16) provides data to obtain a breakdown of debit card transactions in Germany measured by sales value in 2008: 59% are 
completed by Girocash, 40% by ELV/ec direct debit and 1% by Maestro/V Pay.
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3.3.1 References for Germany 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Four-Party 
Credit Card
UPDATE 1-
German retail 
group files 
credit card fees 
complaint 
(2006, Jan 19)
Retail 
Banking 
Research Ltd 
(2005b, p. 
17)
Retail 
Banking 
Research Ltd 
(2005b, p. 
46)
European 
Commission 
(2006, p. 19)
Germany 
passes 
important 
milestone 
(2000, March 
17)
Visa (2011, 
February); 
MasterCard 
(2011, 
February)
Retail 
Banking 
Research Ltd 
(2005b, p. 
17)
Stored-Value 
Card
CPSS (2000, pp. 
33-34)
CPSS (2000, 
pp. 33-34)
CPSS (2000, 
pp. 33-34)
Network Rules
See subsection 
4.4.5 of this 
thesis
Debit Card
Retail Banking Research Ltd 
(2005a, p. 27-28)
EHI Retail 
Institute (2009, 
pp. 11, 27)
See subsection 
4.4.5 of this 
thesis
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction Wholesale 
Fees
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3.4 New Zealand 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Amex, 
Diners Club
Y Proportional 
fee
None na na Y
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Visa,
Mastercard
Y Proportional 
fee
None Proportional 
fee
Y N
EFTPOS NZ, 
Paymark 
EFTPOS
Y None Some flat fees None Flat fee paid 
by issuer
na
Visa Debit Y None None None Flat fee paid 
by issuer
?
Stored-Value 
Card
Snapper Y Proportional 
fee
None na Y
NB: For a description of this table, please see the text at the beginning of this Chapter.
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction
Wholesale Fees
Network Rules
60
Debit Card 181
na
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3.4.1 References for New Zealand  
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand 
(2003, p. 8)
Liu et al 
(2004, p. 3)
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand 
(2003, p. 8)
Liu et al 
(2004, p. 3)
Liu et al 
(2004, p. 5)
Matthews & 
Hu (2006, p. 
11)
Stored-Value 
Card
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction Wholesale 
Fees
Network Rules
See subsection 
4.5.5 of this 
thesis
Debit Card See subsection 
4.5.5 of this 
thesis
Gabor Szikszai (Snapper, 
2010, February 15, personal 
communication)
Gabor Szikszai (Snapper, 
2010, February 15, 
personal communication)
Peter McLeod (EFTPOS New 
Zealand, 2009, October 22, 
personal communication)
Taylor (2010, p. 14)
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3.5 Norway 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Diners Club,
American 
Express,
Domestic credit 
cards
Y Proportional 
fee
na na
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Visa,
Mastercard
Y Proportional 
fee
Positive 
proportional 
fee
Y Y
BankAxept Y None, or very 
low, flat fee
Flat fee None na
Visa,
Mastercard
Y None, or very 
low, flat fee
Flat fee None Y Y
NB: For a description of this table, please see the text at the beginning of this Chapter.
Per-Transaction
Wholesale Fees
24
(1)
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Central 
Ops.
191
(1)
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Network Rules
Debit Card
(1) Figures do not include use of Norwegian cards abroad and assume that category of "Cards issued by international card companies" are all credit/charges 
cards rather than debit cards
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
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3.5.1 Norwegian References 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Norges Bank 
(2007, pp. 58, 
60)
Norges Bank 
(2007, p. 14)
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Norges Bank 
(2007, p. 60)
Norges Bank 
(2007, p. 14)
Norges Bank 
(2007, p. 14)
Kredittilsyne
t (2004 p. 
41)
Kredittilsyne
t (2004 p. 
43)
Norges Bank 
(2007, p. 7)
Gresvik & 
Haare (2009b, 
p. 24) 
Norges Bank 
(2006b, p. 24)
Norges Bank 
(2007, p. 14)
Norges Bank 
(2007, p. 7)
Kredittilsynet 
(2004, p. 17); 
Gresvik & 
Haare (2009b, 
p. 24) 
Norges Bank 
(2006b, p. 24)
Kredittilsynet 
(2004, p. 17); 
Norges Bank 
(2007, p. 14)
Kredittilsyne
t (2004 p. 
41)
Kredittilsyne
t (2004 p. 
43)
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction Wholesale 
Fees
Debit Card See subsection 
4.6.5 of this 
thesis
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Network Rules
See subsection 
4.6.5 of this 
thesis
Central 
Ops.
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
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3.6 United Kingdom 
 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Amex,
Diners Club
Y Proportional 
fee
None na na
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Visa, 
MasterCard
Y Proportional 
fee
None Positive 
proportional 
fee
Y N
Debit Card Solo, Maestro, 
Visa Debit, Visa 
Electron
Y 89 Flat fee None Positive flat 
fee
Y N
NB: For a description of this table, please see the text at the beginning of this Chapter.
Per-Transaction
Wholesale Fees
Network Rules
32
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
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3.6.1 References for the United Kingdom 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
OECD (2006, p. 
243)
Office of Fair 
Trading (2003, 
p. 110)
Office of Fair 
Trading 
(2005a, p. 12)
Four-Party 
Credit Card
OECD (2006, p. 
243)
Office of Fair 
Trading (2003, 
p. 110)
Office of Fair 
Trading 
(2005b, p. 120)
Office of Fair 
Trading 
(2005a, p. 12)
Retail 
Banking 
Research 
(2005, p. 17)
Office of 
Fair Trading 
(2005a, p. 
14)
Debit Card OECD (2006, p. 
243)
See subsection 
4.7.5 of this 
thesis
Van Hove 
(2007, p. 8)
Office of Fair 
Trading 
(2005b, p. 121)
Office of Fair 
Trading 
(2005a, p. 12)
Retail 
Banking 
Research 
(2005, p. 17)
Office of 
Fair Trading 
(2005b, p. 
121)
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction Wholesale 
Fees
Network Rules
See subsection 
4.7.5 of this 
thesis
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3.7 United States 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
American 
Express,
Discover,
JCB
Y Proportional 
fee
None na na
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Mastercard,
Visa
Y Proportional 
fee
None Positive 
proportional 
fee
N Y
14 'PIN' online 
networks
"Largely" flat 
fees
Some flat fees Positive fixed 
fees, 
proportional 
fees
Flat fee paid 
by issuer and 
acquirer
na
Mastercard,
Visa 'signature' 
offline networks
Y "Primarily" 
proportional 
fees
None Positive 
proportional 
fee
N Y
NB: For a description of this table, please see the text at the beginning of this Chapter.
(1) Figure includes private label cards, which I have not summarised on this table.
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction
Wholesale Fees
(2) According to the 2007 Federal Reserve Payments Study, PIN debit made up 37% of these transactions and signature debit, 63%, in 2006.
Network Rules
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(1)
Debit Card 113
(2)
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Central 
Ops.
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3.7.1 References for the United States 
To Merchant To Consumer
Interchange 
Fee Switch Fee
Honour-All-
Cards
No-
Surcharge
Three-Party 
Credit/Charge 
Card
Weiner & 
Wright (2005, p. 
297)
Mann (2002, p. 
1094)
Zinman (2009, 
p. 360)
Four-Party 
Credit Card
Weiner & 
Wright (2005, p. 
297)
Mann (2002, p. 
1094)
Zinman (2009, 
p. 360)
Weiner & 
Wright (2005, 
p. 293)
Weiner & 
Wright (2005, p. 
304)
United States 
Department of 
Justice (2003, 
p. 7)
Hayashi, 
Sullivan & 
Weiner (2006, 
p. 13)
Hayashi, 
Sullivan & 
Weiner (2003, 
p. 78)
Hayashi, 
Sullivan & 
Weiner (2006, 
pp. 37-38)
United States 
Department of 
Justice (2003, p. 
7)
United States 
Department of 
Justice (2003, 
p. 7)
Hayashi, 
Sullivan & 
Weiner (2003, 
p. 52)
Hayashi, 
Sullivan & 
Weiner (2003, 
p. 78)
Debit Card
Weiner & Wright (2005, p. 
298)
Weiner & Wright (2005, p. 
302)
Central 
Ops.
Per-Transaction 
Retail Fees
Per-Transaction Wholesale 
Fees
See subsection 
4.8.5 of this 
thesis
Network Rules
See subsection 
4.8.5 of this 
thesis
Retail Payment 
System
Network 
Names
Transactions 
per Capita, 
2008
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3.8 Observations from my Tables 
I make a number of observations from analysis of my tables: 
 Only Australia and the US have major networks (both offering debit cards) that I 
do not judge to be centralised.
1
 
 I found only New Zealand and Germany to have major networks offering stored-
value instruments. 
 As I observed in my discussion of Figure 1.1, Germany has relatively very low 
usage of debit and credit cards.  Its usage of stored-value cards also appears very 
low, although I have not found other observations to compare this with. 
 Merchants face proportional fees for POS transactions made using three-party 
credit/charge cards and four-party credit cards in all of my sample countries while 
consumers do not face transaction fees for such instruments, at least in the 
majority of countries, .  For four-party credit cards, this retail pricing was 
underpinned by positive proportional interchange fees in all of my sample 
countries. 
 In the two countries with the highest usage of debit cards, New Zealand and 
Norway, merchants are not charged (significant) per-transaction fees for POS 
transactions.  Of the other countries, merchants in Germany and the US are 
charged proportional fees (in the case of the US, on the majority of transactions) 
and merchants in Australia, Canada and the UK are (generally) charged flat fees.  
Such fees are underpinned by positive interchange fees, except in the cases of 
Australia, New Zealand and Norway.  Australia has negative flat fees for its 
                                                 
1
  Although I have not deemed US online debit card networks to be decentralized, evidence indicates 
that 14 networks exist, far higher than the number of networks in any of the other retail payment 
systems in my sample countries. 
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EFTPOS transactions, but no switch fees.  While New Zealand has no interchange 
fees for debit card transactions, it has flat switch fees paid solely by the issuer.  
There are no debit card interchange fees in Norway, although I have not found 
evidence on the nature of Norwegian switch fees. 
 Finally, I observe little relationship between the usage of payment cards in my 
sample countries and the prevalence of two network rules I analyse.  Significant 
numbers of networks operate without using one or both rules, however.  When 
considered alongside the literature I discussed in subsection 2.4.3, this suggests 
significant government involvement with retail payment systems in all of my 
sample countries, with the possible exception of Norway. 
While these observations go some way to indicating possible reasons for the adoption of 
card-based, merchant payment instruments, they do not answer the research question 
that I posed in section 1.7.  In particular, the tables provide no indication of why the 
systems developed in the way that they did.  In Chapter 4, I turn to an historical analysis 
of retail payment system development to investigate how and why such development 
occurred. 
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Chapter 4  
Historical Reviews of Retail Payment System Development 
Consistencies in the political environments between my sample countries mean that I 
set out my historical summaries by dividing the chronology of each country‘s retail 
payment system development into four subsections.  Chronological divisions will not be 
exact and, on several occasions, events I associate with one subsection happen before 
events in a preceding subsection.  My four subsections are: 
 development of retail payment systems during a time of significant government 
intervention in the banking industry 
 significant changes to the ways in which the financial system was regulated 
 developments following these changes and 
 developments during a period of government or government authorities 
intervening in the operations of payment networks within retail payment systems. 
I add two subsections for each country.  The first discusses my sources for statistics that 
show the adoption of credit and debit card, the data that underpins Figure 1.1 and my 
tables in Chapter 3.  The second includes a bibliography for each specific country in my 
sample with each bibliography including references for information in my tables in 
Chapter 3. 
In addition to sections on each of my sample countries, I include one (section 4.3) that 
investigates the importance of the European Union to the three European countries in 
my sample, Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom.  I summarise lessons from my 
summaries in section 4.9. 
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4.1 Australia 
4.1.1 Retail Payment Systems and Government Controls on Banking 
Grenville (1991) provides a summary of the extent and effects of banking sector 
regulation in the decades following World War 2.  At this time, banks operated with ―a 
complex set of overlapping controls which represented a ‗belts and braces‘ approach to 
constrain the banks‘ balance sheets without relying on higher interest rates.‖2  
Furthermore, new entry into banking in Australia was not thought possible until the 
1980s (Davis, 2003, p. 12).  Harper (1991) argues the controls facilitated a profitable 
cartel amongst the banks and hampered product innovation.   
Bankcard and other Australian joint-ventures 
Besides cash and cheque, innovations involving retail payment systems initially centred 
on the three party credit card networks, American Express and Diners Club, and a 
number of store cards, which, according to one media report, were mainly used by 
wealthy individuals (Weekes, 2006, February 3).  Following agreement with the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (―RBA‖) and the Australian Federal Government, a group of 
nine Australian banks launched Bankcard, a four party credit card network, in October 
1974 by mailing cards to bank customers (Innis, 2006, February 15).  A desire to share 
electronic data processing and communications costs led the banks to establish a shared 
facility, Charge Card Services Limited, for the operations of Bankcard (Bankcard 
Association of Australia, 2009). 
                                                 
2
  Constraints on charges on borrowing included rules controlling credit card operations, particularly 
the near uniform State Credit Acts enacted in five Australian States following the 1972 Molomby 
Report (Prices Surveillance Authority, 1992, p. 135).  These Acts prohibited the charging of fees 
and interest beyond a credit charge on outstanding balances based on a fixed annual interest rate.  
They were only amended following a 1992 Prices Surveillance Authority report that identified 
problems with the profitability of credit card operations for banks. 
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The early operations of Bankcard raised some concerns about collusion; as I explain 
below, banks would not give NBFIs access to Bankcard and an agreement existed 
between banks about the final prices charged for Bankcard to merchants and 
cardholders.  In 1976, credit unions in Australia sought access to the Bankcard network, 
however, negotiations for them to obtain this broke down in 1978.  Building societies 
and credit unions responded by introducing the Visa Debit card in 1982 (St George 
Bank, Bendigo Bank, Australian Association of Permanent Building Societies and 
Credit Unions Services Corporation, 2001, p. 8; Australian Retailers Association, 2002, 
p. 13).  In 1980, the Trade Practices Commission issued a determination regarding an 
application for the authorisation of aspects of interbank agreements for the Bankcard 
network (Australian Financial System Review [the Campbell Report], 1981, para. 32.20 
and footnote 5).  The agreements were authorised subject to amendments to: (i) allow 
member banks to participate in any other card network; (ii) allow member banks to 
make their own decisions on prices and terms faced by merchants and cardholders and 
(iii) remove any agreement between banks in relation to a No-Surcharge Rule for 
merchants. 
In spite of the concerns created by Charge Card Services Ltd, a number of other joint-
ventures were set up in Australia to develop retail payment systems.  In the mid-1970s, 
the Australian banks set up Central Magnetic Tape Exchange (―CEMTEX‖) to process 
their direct entry payments centrally (Reserve Bank of Australia, 1997, para. 64).  In 
1977, following the first ATM network in Australia being introduced by a major bank, 
Westpac, credit unions began development of a shared ATM network in Queensland 
(Sager, 1989, p. 251; Australian Science and Technology Council, 1986, p. 26).
 
 In 
1983, the permanent building societies created a central facility for processing direct 
entry, ATM and EFTPOS transactions when they created Cashcard Australia Limited 
(Reserve Bank of Australia, 1997, para. 64; First Data Corp., 2003, December 22).  In 
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1984, the credit unions established AUSTNET, a switch offering ATM and EFTPOS 
services for holders of the credit unions‘ Redicard (Australian Science and Technology 
Council, 1986, p. 26).  Bankcard, itself, entered into joint-venture arrangements in Visa 
and MasterCard, but these were discontinued in 1981, leading to Visa and MasterCard 
launching credit cards into Australia in 1984 (Weekes, 2006, February 3).  (After that 
failed attempt, BankCard always lacked the international acceptance of Visa and 
MasterCard payment instruments, leading to banks withdrawing it as a product in 2006 
(Brammall. 2006, February 3). 
Reviews of Australia’s financial industry 
In 1979, the Australian Federal Government established the Australian Financial 
System Inquiry to prepare what became known as the Campbell Report (named after the 
Committee‘s chairman, Keith Campbell).  Up until that time, Davis (1984, p. 135) says 
―the structure of financial regulation in Australia had remained virtually unchanged for 
several decades.‖  The Report was an endorsement of a massive process of deregulation, 
involving an end to most direct controls of banks, the floating of the exchange rate and 
the entry of foreign banks (Davis, 2003, p. 2).  In regard to retail payment systems, the 
Report recommended (paras. 23.53-23.54) that, to ensure ―the features of security and 
reliability of the core segment of the payments system, and the community‘s general 
confidence in it,‖ cheques continue to only be issued by banks.  Davis (1984) describes 
this recommendation, and others involving distinctions between banks and NBFIs, as 
being based on the past regulatory environment and unsupported by analysis of 
potential arguments in the distinction's favour.  The Campbell Report did not, however, 
recommend that there be any other restrictions on participation in payment systems 
(including not on cheque issuance by way of an agency relationship). 
75 
 
7
5
 
In May 1983, the Federal Government appointed what became known as the Martin 
Review Group, named after Chairman, V.E. Martin, to review the Campbell Report in 
light of the then Labour Government‘s economic and social policies and the need to 
improve the efficiency of the financial system (Australian Financial System Review 
Group [the Martin Review Group Report], 1984, para. 1.1).  The Group reported late in 
1983, endorsing the broad views of the Campbell Report and making further 
recommendations regarding the regulation of banks, banking participation and payment 
system access.  Following those recommendations, the Government removed virtually 
all restrictions on bank lending (Tyree, 2001, p. 41; Martin Review Group Report, 
Chapter 5) and invited applications from foreign banks for four to six new bank licences 
(House of Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, 
1991, para. 2.81).  However, 16 applications were accepted in 1985, ―much to the 
dismay of some applicants who had been confident they would have been included in a 
smaller number‖ (ibid).  At para. 2.31, the Martin Review Group Report effectively 
endorses the approach of the Campbell Report in regard to cheque clearing.  It states 
that the Group did not ―advocate permission for payment orders or cheques drawn on 
NBFIs to be cleared through the clearing system, either by themselves of by banks, 
because of the importance that it attaches to maintenance of full confidence in the 
clearing system.‖  In 1986, the Australian Government passed the Cheques and 
Payment Orders Act, which required that cheques continued to be drawn on a bank.  It 
did introduce the concept of a payment order, a cheque in all respects save that it was 
drawn on a building society or credit union, although these never gained widespread 
usage (Tyree, 2001, p. 42). 
The Martin Review Group Report made two other important recommendations about 
the development of new retail payment systems.  The first was that NBFIs be 
encouraged to participate in CEMTEX, the organisation created by banks to centrally 
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process interbank transfers (the Martin Review Group Report, paras, 4.12-4.14, p. 197).  
Although I have not found sources arguing why it happened, the banks reacted by 
disbanding CEMTEX in 1984 and exchanging transaction information bilaterally 
(Financial System Inquiry [the Wallis Report], pp. 631-632).  Building societies and 
credit unions established their own direct clearing networks through their industry 
organisations (Australian Payments Clearing Association, 1996, p. 43).  The Martin 
Review Group Report recommended (paras. 6.1-6.5) the creation of the Australian 
Payments System Council to facilitate a joint, participatory approach to retail payment 
system development.  In June 1984, the Federal Government followed this 
recommendation and established the Australian Payments System Council to advise the 
Treasurer on the development of payment systems and act as a forum for discussing 
payment system problems (Dean, 1988, 15 July; the Wallis Report, p. 385; Tyree, 2001, 
p. 42).  It was chaired by the RBA and had broad industry and consumer representation.  
Tyree says that ―[r]ecords of its early years show that discussion centred almost 
exclusively on access to networks‖. 
Development with threatened property rights: EFTPOS and the Australian Payment 
Clearing Association 
In 1984, the banks also took over their own data capture and processing for Bankcard 
transactions from their joint venture, Charge Card Services Ltd (Prices Surveillance 
Authority, 1992, p. 10).  The Bankcard website attributes this development to 
improvements in technology, although the Prices Surveillance Authority report was not 
convinced (pp. 36-39) by this rationale, pointing to trends in the UK towards third party, 
rather than in-house, processing of credit card transactions.  In 1987, Charge Card 
Services was renamed Cardlink Services Limited and used to reduce the cost of credit 
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card transaction processing by Australian banks (Cardlink Services Limited, 2009; 
Credit card imaging, 1996, November 21).  
The first EFTPOS trial I have found records of was run by Whyalla Credit Union and G 
J Coles (which became the major department store chain, Coles Myers) and began in 
South Australia in June 1982 (Australia Science and Technology Council, 1986, para. 
6.2.2).  This was followed by a number of other bank and NBFI trials.  The pilots 
continued, although there was initially no interchange of transactions between them.  
One pilot's terminals could not accept transactions made using another's cards.  This 
started to change from 1985, when bilateral agreements began to be negotiated, 
allowing network interconnection (Australian Competition Tribunal, 2004 [ACompT 7], 
para. 37).  A closed or ‗gateway‘ approach was developed with banks providing 
merchant terminals, switching transactions from terminals and receiving and settling 
funds from the issuer.  This type of system was ―strongly advocated‖ by the four major 
Australia banks (Australia Science and Technology Council, 1986, paras. 4.4.3-4.4.4; 
Gyoery and Seberry, 1987, p. 11).  In spite of the Australia Science and Technology 
Council arguing it gave the gateway bank ―a good deal of control over the total process‖ 
and NBFI and retailer preferences for an open system, a closed system became the norm 
for the Australian debit card payment system. 
As part of the bilateral agreements for interconnection, the payment of negative 
interchange fees was instituted to provide acquirers with ―some return on the 
considerable investment required to implement and maintain a secure, on-line, real time 
acquiring infrastructure‖ (ACompT 7, para. 38, quoting the evidence of Mr Charles 
Gove).  In 2000, 39 interchange agreements were counted, all involving the payment of 
negative interchange fees with the majority of fees between A$0.18 and A$0.25 
(Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
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[the Joint Study], 2000, p. 61).  Those organisations without bilateral agreements for 
EFTPOS, but wishing to offer their customers EFTPOS services, were able to do so by 
making use of a ‗gateway service‘, which provides links to other EFTPOS service 
providers for a fee of A$0.10-0.15 per transaction (the Joint Study, 2000, p. 62).  The 
need for merchants to invest in EFTPOS terminals eventually led larger merchants to 
negotiate the payment of fees from acquirers, with the first such agreement reached in 
1991 (ACompT 7, para. 42).
3
  The Prices Surveillance Authority (1995, p. 271) 
describes the MSF for EFTPOS transactions as ranging from slightly more than a nil 
charge to A$0.95 for one small retailer.  The Authority reported that the average charge 
was between A$0.01 and A$0.15, but that most small retailers paid between A$0.20 and 
A$0.30 per transaction.  The Payments System Board (2007, pp. 26 – 27) says however 
that the average MSF for EFTPOS transactions in 2006 was -A$0.02, reflecting the part 
payment of negative interchange fees by acquirers to larger merchants.  It is not clear 
that the Prices Surveillance Authority included such interchange fee payments in its 
calculations.  The Authority does provide (p. 62) evidence of the fees paid by 
cardholders in 1995, with half the banks charging cardholders no fee and the others 
charging a transaction fee of A$0.20-0.50, typically after a limited number of free 
transactions.  Finally, the Authority‘s report also states (p. 277) that a No-Surcharge 
Rule exists in agreements between merchants and banks governing the provision of 
EFTPOS transaction services, although I have found no evidence of its continued use. 
During the late-1980s and early-1990s, concerns about the banking industry led the 
Australian Parliament to create a committee to examine industry issues and the House 
of Representatives Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration 
                                                 
3
  By 2004, half of all EFTPOS transactions were completed using terminals and PIN pads owned by 
merchants (ACompT 7, para 45). 
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published its report, the Martin Parliamentary Committee Report, in 1991.
4
  
Specifically, the concerns related to perceptions of the excessive profitability of banks 
and of whether banking customers were seeing the benefits of an increase in 
competition (Martin Parliamentary Committee Report, paras. 1.1-1.4).  The Report 
recommended the completion of a feasibility study of direct payments system access for 
NBFIs and a formal Prices Surveillance Authority brief to examine the profitability of 
the credit card business (Wallis Report, p. 573).  In 1992, the Authority released its 
report, Inquiry into Credit Card Interest Rates.  The report made a number of 
recommendations modifying controls on credit cards.  Specifically, it recommended that 
the State Credit Acts, which had been introduced from 1972 to regulate credit cards in 
the Australian states (Wallis Report, p. 570), be amended to allow networks to charge 
cardholders fees beyond just a credit charge, allow merchants to surcharge credit card 
transactions.  The report also recommended that the RBA take over the ―long term 
monitoring‖ of banks‘ credit card products.  Following this report, State Credit Acts 
were amended to allow differential pricing structures for credit cards, but were not 
amended to prevent credit card networks‘ imposition of the No-Surcharge Rule (the 
Joint Study, 2000, p. 54). 
At approximately the same time, the banking industry responded to similar concerns 
about fees and access to payment systems and an executive committee of the Australian 
Bankers‘ Association recommended that an independent organisation be established to 
oversee Australia‘s payment systems (Spencer, 1991, pp. 44-46).  This eventually led to 
the creation of the Australian Payment Clearing Association, which was incorporated as 
a public company in 1992.  At that stage, the banks accounted for 72% of the assets of 
financial intermediaries in Australia with just four banks making up three quarters of the 
                                                 
4
  I distinguish this report, the Martin Parliamentary Committee Report, from the Martin Review 
Group Report, which was published in 1983. 
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banking industry (Martin Parliamentary Committee Report, p. 25 and para. 2.86). The 
dominance of this small group of banks suggests it was difficult for other financial 
intermediaries to take a different approach.  Indeed, in 1994, the Australian Payment 
Clearing Association absorbed the operations of the direct entry systems of building 
societies and credit unions, as well as the banks‘ bilateral direct entry system that was 
introduced followed the disbandment of CEMTEX (Australian Payment Clearing 
Association, 2009, p. 10; Wallis Report, pp. 631-632).  In particular, the Association 
became responsible for the Bulk Electronic Clearing System, which is used for the 
processing of direct entry transactions, and the Consumer Electronic Clearing System, 
which is used for ATM and EFTPOS transactions.  While involved in the setting of 
standards, however, members of the Association are not immediately able to exchange 
transactions with other members as they still required bilateral interchange agreements 
with other members before this could occur. 
Continued consumer dissatisfaction with bank fees, particularly those charged for 
account services, led to the publication of another report by the Prices Surveillance 
Authority in 1995.  As well as surveying bank account fees, the Prices Surveillance 
Authority was asked to consider EFTPOS interchange fees and the pricing principles of 
Visa and MasterCard in relation to debit cards in Australia.  In addition to completing 
these surveys, the Authority recommended that State and Territory Governments enact 
legislative changes to remove legal barriers to NBFIs being able to provide a full range 
of banking services. 
However, in spite of the creation of Australian Payment Clearing Association, problems 
persisted with access to retail payment systems.  For example, the final report of the 
Financial System Inquiry, published in 1997, (which became known as the Wallis 
Report) expressed concerns about access for acquirers to the EFTPOS system (p. 398): 
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... confidential information provided to the Inquiry demonstrates that the 
relative negotiating strength of major merchant acquirers and card issuers over 
interchange fees is uneven and that regional banks have been frustrated in their 
efforts to gain access to the EFTPOS network as acquirers. 
Other developments: stored-value payment systems 
In 1995/96, four trials of stored value cards were run in Australia: two (Quicklink and 
Transcard) had transport applications and were run by local companies; while the others 
represented the world‘s first stored value card trials by Visa and MasterCard (Clarke, 
1997, p. 48).  While being technically feasible, however, the trials were met with mixed 
success; they failed to realise sufficiently high adoption rates to be economically 
feasible (Clarke, 1997, p. 50). 
4.1.2 A New Approach to the Regulation of Banks 
The Wallis Report 
In 1996, the Government established another Financial System Inquiry, which produced 
the Wallis Report, named after the Inquiry Chairman, Stan Wallis, in March 1997.  The 
inquiry conducted further investigations of the state of Australia‘s financial industry 
regulation and its final report recommended regulations on the basis of function rather 
than of status - it called for the creation of a new financial entity, the Authorised 
Deposit-taking Institution, in place of the legal concept of a bank (Tyree, 2001, pp. 42-
44).
5
  The Wallis Report also recommended changes to authorities regulating banks and 
retail payment systems: the creation of the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
with responsibilities for prudential supervision, previously exercised by the RBA, and 
the disbandment of the Australian Payments System Council with its functions being 
taken on by the Payments System Board, to be created within the RBA.  The latter 
                                                 
5
  In spite of the creation of the legal entity, Authorised Deposit-taking Institution, Beatty, Aubrey and 
Bollen (1998, pp. 504-512) outline the significant controls that continued to exist around 
organisations‘ use of the words bank, building society and credit union. 
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recommendation was made following concerns expressed in the Wallis Report about the 
efficiencies of, and, as discussed above, access to, Australian payment systems (p. 398).  
In regard to efficiency, the Wallis Report noted concerns about retail payment system 
prices that had been expressed by the Australian Payments System Council and in the 
1992 Prices Surveillance Authority report.  Finally, the Wallis Report recommended 
that all forms of payment instrument storing value be subject to regulation (the Wallis 
Report, 1997, p. 406). 
As its first response to the report, the Australian Government passed a series of 12 bills 
into law during 1998 (Australian Treasury, 1998, p. 19).
6
  The package included new 
legislation and amendments that opened access to retail payment systems (by, for 
example, allowing NBFIs to issue cheques), but requiring that issuers of payment 
instruments, including stored-value instruments,
7
 be an Authorised Deposit-taking 
Institution regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority or otherwise be 
authorised by the RBA ―(in which case further regulation may be required)‖ (Australian 
Treasury, 1998, p. 23).  Furthermore, the Australian Government passed the Payment 
Systems (Regulation) Act 1998, which created the Payments System Board within the 
RBA to control risk in the financial system while promoting efficiency and 
competition.
8
   Assistant Governor of the RBA, Dr. Philip Lowe, has said (Lowe, 2005, 
May, p. 269) that the RBA‘s new role came as a surprise: ―[w]e had not been arguing 
for an extension of our powers, and we had not been seeking responsibility for 
payments system efficiency.‖  Some commentators initially expected the RBA not to 
take an interventionist stance towards retail payment systems, given its ―long history of 
                                                 
6
  The Government‘s second response was to transfer to federal authorities regulatory responsibilities 
for financial entities previously held by Australia‘s States and Territories. 
7
  Issuers of such instruments are treated as a special type of ADI, known as a Purchased Payment 
Facilities Provider, subject to specific prudential requirements (Australian Prudential Regulatory 
Authority, 2008). 
8
  To avoid confusion, this thesis will refer to the views and actions of the RBA, rather than to those of 
the PSB, specifically. 
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pursuing a soft approach to regulation‖ (Tyree, 2001, p. 48).  However, Davis (2003, 
pp. 8-9) was less surprised, saying that the RBA‘s direct involvement with the banking 
sector had reduced in recent years, particularly with the devolvement of prudential 
supervision to the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority; he also describes the 
RBA‘s increasing independence from the Australian Federal Government, suggesting 
that the RBA was more willing to act in a controversial manner. 
4.1.3 Payment System Development Following the Reforms 
The Wallis Report recommended legislative changes that gave both a new approach to 
the regulation of banks and gave the RBA an ability to intervene in the operations of 
retail payment systems, which the RBA strongly indicated it would exercise within 2 
years.  This leaves only a short time period involving development after the reforms, but 
before the RBA began intervening in system operations, in which I have identified only 
one important development event.  Since payment networks may well have been 
anticipating interventions, however, it is difficult to argue that this event occurs strictly 
before the influence of interventions.  Nevertheless, I keep to my chronological 
approach and describe it as such.  In November 1997, a new bill payment service, 
BPAY, was launched in Australia (BPAY website, 2010).  BPAY is owned by Cardlink 
Services Ltd, the company that, as described above, was originally set up to centrally 
process Bankcard transactions.  At the time of BPAY‘s introduction it was owned by 
the four major banks as well as the Bank of Western Australia.  BPAY operated under 
an open access regime and, in 2011, reported on its website that ―[n]ow, over 170 
Australian financial institutions, ranging from banks to credit unions and covering about 
90 per cent of the consumer banking market, belong to the scheme.‖. 
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4.1.4 Interventions in Retail Payment Systems 
In creating the Payments System Board within the RBA, the Government envisaged it 
intervening only ―when the scope for voluntary reform had effectively been exhausted‖ 
(Lowe, 2005, March 2, p. 11).  However, the legislation it provided few avenues for 
appeal against the RBA‘s decisions.  In 2000, the RBA and Australia's competition 
regulator, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, satisfied another 
recommendation of the Wallis Report by completing the Joint Study, which investigated 
the efficiency of debit card, credit card and ATM networks.  The Joint Study raised a 
number of concerns related to retail payment systems, including that interchange fees 
encouraged the use of credit cards, which, according to the Study, were a more 
expensive payment instrument.  The RBA subsequently intervened to reduce or correct 
those issues the Study had identified.  To account for the RBA‘s actions, Dr. Lowe later 
detailed five benchmarks against which the RBA judged efficiency and competition 
(Lowe, 2005, March 2, pp. 9-10): 
(i) relative prices reflect the relative resource costs; 
(ii)  merchants are free to choose the price they charge for accepting 
payment instruments and are free to choose which instruments they 
accept; 
(iii) prices are transparent; 
(iv) restrictions on access are limited to those strictly necessary for the safe 
operation of the system; and 
(v) there is competition within and between individual payment systems. 
Regulation of credit cards 
In its first act of intervention, the RBA ‗designated‘ the four-party credit card networks 
that were in Australia at that time (Visa, MasterCard and Bankcard) as being under its 
regulation.
9,10
  Visa and MasterCard were unsuccessful in a challenge to the RBA‘s 
                                                 
9
  Designation is required by the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 before imposition of 
―standards‖, rules for the operation of payment systems. 
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decision in the Federal Court on procedural and jurisdictional grounds and the RBA 
introduced interchange fee regulation and removed the No-Surcharge Rule existing for 
credit cards during 2003, before imposing minimum entry standards during 2004 
(Chang, Evans and Garcia Swartz, 2005, pp. 332-333). 
The RBA mandated that interchange fees for Bankcard, Visa and MasterCard must fall 
from approximately 0.95% to approximately 0.55% (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007a, 
para. 129).  This flowed through to average MSFs for Bankcard, Visa and MasterCard 
falling from approximately 1.4% in 2003 to approximately 0.8% in 2007 (Reserve Bank 
of Australia, 2007a, p. 22).  The RBA initially estimated this saved merchants A$430 
million, annually (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2004, p. 12).  However, Chang et al 
(2005, p. 339) find that issuers regained 30-40% of the reduction in interchange fee 
revenue by increasing fees to cardholders in the months that followed the new 
regulations.  Chang et al also find that cardholder fees have mainly been increased 
through higher fixed fees, making little difference to cardholders‘ per-transaction fees or 
benefits, contrary to the RBA‘s intention of encouraging relative prices to reflect 
relative resource costs.
11
  They say it‘s difficult to predict the decrease in use of credit 
cards that would likely come from an increase in fixed fees.  Further difficulties in 
assessing the effects of the reforms are caused by banks changing the nature of the 
products they issue.  For example, banks started issuing products more likely to cause 
cardholders to borrow on their cards and revolve positive balances (Simon, 2005, p. 
                                                                                                                                               
10
  Simon (2005, p. 376) describes how, slightly prior to the designation of the four-party payment 
schemes, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission was conducting an investigation 
into the legality of the practice of agreeing an interchange fee represented fixing MSFs. 
11
  Reserve Bank of Australia (2007a, para. 95) does point to a reduction in cardholder reward schemes, 
by reporting that, in 2003, consumers were required to spend A$12,400 on a standard credit cards of 
major Australian banks  in order to receive an A$100 voucher.  In 2007, they were required to spend 
A$16,200, which it argued was effectively a 0.2% increase in the price of a credit card transaction 
for consumers.  Chang et al (2005, pp. 339-340) respond, however, that this change has largely 
come from a cap on rewards and, for most consumers, will no`t have had much effect on the 
marginal incentive to use a credit card. 
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379).  They also started making ―serious, and predictable‖ attempts to shift cardholders, 
particularly high spending cardholders, from regulated four party credit card networks 
to the unregulated three-party networks, American Express and Diners Club, the cards 
of which they had started issuing (Chang et al, 2005, p. 340).
12
  Although MSFs for 
these cards had also fallen following the RBA‘s reforms, they had decreased less than, 
and remained significantly above, the fees for the Visa and MasterCard networks.  
Furthermore, Chang et al believe that: 
[t]he RBA‘s hope that regulating the associations‘ interchange fees would exert 
substantial downward pressure on the American Express and the Diners Club 
merchant discount rates is particularly unlikely to be realized as high-spend 
rewards cardholders move to the unregulated systems. 
The reforms also caused the No-Surcharge Rule of the Visa and MasterCard networks 
and the equivalent American Express and Diners Club rules to be abandoned.  The 
Payments System Board Annual Report (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007b, p. 25) 
provides a graph that shows an increasing amount of surcharging with 17% of very 
large merchants and approximately 5% of very small merchants imposing a credit card 
surcharge in June 2007, although the Report does not clarify if the surcharging relates to 
Visa and MasterCard or to American Express and Diners Club or to both.  More critical 
of the intervention in the setting of the No-Surcharge Rule by the RBA is Visa‘s 
Submission to the 2007-2008 Review (Visa, 2008).  Referring to the analysis of 
Stillman, Bishop, Malcolm and Hildebrandt (2008, p. 28), Visa notes that surcharges 
often exceed the marginal cost of accepting cards for merchants. 
Regulation of other retail payment systems 
                                                 
12
  Chang et al also comment (pp. 329-330) that American Express reached an agreement with AMP for 
the latter to issue its cards in 1998.  However, it ―more prominently‖ reached issuance agreements 
with major banks following the RBA‘s reforms. 
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In an effort to deal with concerns about interchange fees shown by the RBA, a working 
group, composed of industry participants, released a discussion paper in 2002 regarding 
reform of interchange arrangements of, and access to, Australia‘s EFTPOS system 
(EFTPOS Industry Working Group, 2002).  In the following year, a group of banks 
voluntarily approached the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and 
offered to set the interchange fee for EFTPOS transactions to zero in an effort to 
forestall the regulation of EFTPOS fees (ACompT 7, paras. 8, 17).  The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission eventually authorised the agreement after it 
became satisfied that its concerns about access would be adequately addressed.  
However, a group of merchants appealed the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission‘s decision to the Australian Competition Tribunal, which found in the 
merchants‘ favour, setting aside the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission‘s authorisation.  According to the RBA, this effectively ended the prospect 
of voluntary reform.  After ―... noting that there was there was little further prospect of 
industry reform of interchange fees‖, the RBA ―designated‖ the EFTPOS system for 
regulation and imposed a standard for interchange fees in 2004 (Reserve Bank of 
Australia, 2006, April, p. 4).  Merchants also challenged the RBA‘s decision to 
designate EFTPOS in the Federal Court, although the challenge was ultimately 
unsuccessful (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2006, April, p. 3). 
In an effort to reduce the delay associated with this second challenge, the RBA released 
draft standards for EFTPOS and Visa Debit interchange fees and the use of the Honour-
All-Cards Rule in February 2005 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2006, April, p. 4). 
However, the challenge represented a barrier to a final decision on the standards, until 
the Federal Court found in favour of the RBA in November 2005 and standards were 
imposed on the systems in November 2006 (Payments System Board, 2007, p.22).  The 
standard imposed required negative interchange fees for EFTPOS transactions without a 
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cash-out component to be between A$0.04-0.05.
13
  MSFs for Visa Debit had historically 
been the same as those for credit card transactions, prior to the RBA‘s credit card 
reform, at approximately 0.95%.  The RBA implemented a cost-based positive 
interchange fee standard of A$0.12.  Since Visa debit cards still operated with positive 
interchange fees and EFTPOS with negative, MSFs for EFTPOS transactions remained 
lower following the RBA‘s new standard.  In 2010, supermarket chain, Woolworths, 
announced it would route transactions made using Visa or MasterCard debit cards over 
the EFTPOS network, thereby incurring lower MSFs, but causing some customers to 
incur higher per-transaction fees for their transactions and thereby attracting some 
complaints from customers (Woolworths Limited, 2010, April 1; Mitchell, 2010, April 
17). 
The average MSF for EFTPOS transactions, which, in the period leading up to the 
standard‘s introduction, had been approximately A$0.02, had risen to approximately 
A$0.08 by 2007 (Payments System Board, 2007, p. 26).  However, the change in 
pricing appears to have had limited effect on pricing to cardholders. Payments System 
Board (2007, p. 28) says that ―all-you-can-eat‖ accounts (which have no transaction 
fees) were becoming more popular following the reforms, in spite of evidence that half 
of surveyed banks offered such accounts in 1995 (Prices Surveillance Authority, 1995, 
p. 62). 
As well as the draft standards for EFTPOS and Visa Debit, the RBA‘s 2005 report also 
analysed the use in Australia of the Honour-All-Cards Rule.  It saw benefits for 
consumers of the honour-all-issuers aspect of the rule (which holds that merchants 
                                                 
13
  Because it had yet to regulate interchange fees for ATM transactions, the RBA decided not to 
impose a standard for EFTPOS transactions involving cash-outs (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008, 
p. 22).  However, the RBA found that some interchange fees for cash-out transactions had fallen, 
while others remained at previous levels (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007, p. 22). 
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accepting a scheme‘s cards are required to accept all cards issued by members of that 
scheme).  The RBA was concerned, however, that the honour-all-products aspect 
(which holds that merchants accepting one sort of a scheme‘s cards are required to 
accept all cards issued no matter the type of card) was detrimental to competition 
between Visa Debit and EFTPOS.  It says that (p. 41) Visa Debit ―has a competitive 
advantage over EFTPOS because merchants are forced to accept the card when they 
make the decision to accept Visa credit cards and must pay a higher price to do so than 
with EFTPOS.‖  The RBA threatened to remove the rule by direct regulation unless 
Visa voluntarily abandoned the rule and, when Visa failed to do so, directly removed it 
with effect from 1 January 2007 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2006, July 7). 
In 2005, the RBA announced that there was not a strong case to regulate BPAY‘s 
interchange fee, called a Capture Reimbursement Fee (Reserve Bank of Australia, 
2007a, paras. 56-57).  It noted that this fee was reviewed regularly, had fallen steadily 
and was expected to fall further.  The RBA also found that a regulated reduction in the 
Capture Reimbursement Fee would likely lead to higher costs for consumers, 
encouraging greater use of more costly bill payment systems. 
A continued interest in regulating retail payment systems 
In 2006, the RBA announced it would review the effects of its reforms in what became 
known as, the 2007/08 Review.  In order to provide a basis for the review, the RBA 
published an Issues Paper in May 2007.  In its paper discussing the conclusions to its 
review (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008), the RBA said it had considered three broad 
options in its approach to interchange fee regulation, to retain regulations leaving the fee 
standards unchanged, to retain regulations reducing fee standards or to step back from 
regulation.  Although it said that competitive conditions had improved and its 
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preference was to deregulate interchange fees, the RBA was concerned about the risk 
that interchange fees would rise, possibly substantially, if it did so. 
In a submission for American Express to the 2007/08 Review, ACIL Tasman discusses 
provisions of in-store finance products (such as those offered by GE Money) that 
contain rules that effectively amount to a No-Surcharge Rule, thereby questioning the 
consistency of the RBA‘s approach.  Furthermore, ACIL Tasman argued that the 
removal of the No-Surcharge Rule amounted to increasing the barriers to entry and 
expansion for new and existing retail payment systems.  Added to this factor, ACIL 
Tasman quotes a February 2007 article in the magazine, Cards International, that said: 
There is … evidence that major offshore card issuers have bypassed the 
Australia market because of the protracted nature of the RBA reforms, 
preferring to enter markets where conditions appear more stable. 
In spite of these concerns, new products have been introduced to the Australian market, 
including contactless Visa and MasterCard cards and a MasterCard-branded debit card.  
In February 2006, American Express and major Australian airline, Qantas, launched a 
range of Qantas American Express credit cards (Country survey - Australia: Reforms 
lead to new revenue hunt, 2006, July 15).  Australia‘s banks continued to trial Stored-
Value Card products during the late 2000s, including one trial that involved Visa, a 
major bank and a major mobile phone company cooperating to introduce Australia‘s 
first mobile phone-based payment system (Telstra, NAB and Visa to develop an 
Australian first, 2007, August 30).  The trials included significant deployments of 
readers to merchants.  However, their outcomes have yet to be reported. 
In its conclusions to the 2007/08 Review, the RBA said developments that might allay 
its concerns about payment systems and allow it to step back from regulation, included 
banks making enhancements to Australia‘s EFTPOS system and credit card networks 
making voluntary undertakings that, if deregulated, interchange fees would not rise 
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above their current levels (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2008, p. 19-20).   During 2009, 
Australian Payment Clearing Association established EFTPOS Payments Australia 
Limited with commercial responsibilities for managing and promoting EFTPOS.  Also 
in 2009, the banking industry announced that it was reinitiating an inter-bank, person-
to-person retail payment system called MAMBO, which, as I describe below, had been 
abandoned in 2008.  In August 2009, however, the RBA announced that the industry 
had not made sufficient progress towards its suggestions and regulation would be 
retained (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2009, August 26). 
In 2009, the RBA announced a regulatory framework for the county‘s ATM system, 
saying that it saw an approach of charging foreign fees for ATM use as, ―unjustified and 
against the spirit of the [RBA‘s] reforms‖ (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2009, February 
24). It proposed an access regime that focussed on the price of access (including 
interchange fees) and bought greater transparency to cardholders.  Specifically, the 
regime, which was to be implemented in March 2009, provided for direct charging by 
prohibiting the payment of interchange fees between ATM owners and consumer 
account providers and requiring that ATM owners be compensated  only by a fee being 
paid by consumers accessing foreign ATMs, a fee to be clearly shown to consumers as 
they completed a transaction.  Tthe RBA also commented about regulating Paypal in its 
media release announcing a new regime for ATMs.  The RBA said it felt that Paypal‘s 
use of the No-Surcharge Rule was detrimental to the efficiency of Australia‘s payments 
system.  However, it added that Paypal was still a ―relatively small player in the online 
market‖ and it considered that ―it was not convinced that the benefits of imposing 
regulation to remove the rule would outweigh the costs.‖  Still, the RBA said it might 
change that assessment if Paypal grew significantly and merchants grew less able to 
refuse to accept it. 
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In 2008, the inter-bank bill payment network, BPAY confirmed it was developing an 
online banking project, MAMBO (Me And My Bank Online) (Palmer, 2008, May 5).  
MAMBO allowed BPAY customers to use their individual BPAY codes to establish 
other payments, such as direct debits, allowing them to change banks more easily by 
keeping the same BPAY code.  Later that year, however, the major Australian banks, 
who were owners of BPAY, asked the company to end its development of the project 
(Cane, 2008, November 13).  In response to RBA suggestions of what would help it 
step back from interchange fee regulation, however, the project was reinitiated in 2009.  
However, in spite of the development of MAMBO continuing even after the RBA‘s 
announcement that regulation would be retained, issues with its development also 
remained.  One bank vetoed a MAMBO innovation that would have seen email 
addresses and mobile phone numbers being used to identify customers receiving 
payments (Cane, 2010, April 22).  However, development in the ―long-running‖ project 
has not this time been shelved and significant investment appears to continue (Palmer, 
2010, October 21). 
The RBA indicated it was willing to review aspects to its regulation of Australian retail 
payment systems when it announced it would review innovation in the industry in thie 
middle of 2010 (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2010, July 22).  The RBA‘s media release 
on the review indicated it would look at whether ―innovation in the Australian payments 
system may be improved through more effective co-operation between stakeholders and 
regulators.‖  The release also said the goal is ―ultimately to identify projects that the 
Bank [the RBA] and other stakeholders could work on co-operatively to enhance the 
payments system in Australia.‖  These statements indicate the RBA‘s willingness to re-
consider its approach to regulation.  However, the extent to which it does so remains to 
be seen. 
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4.1.5 Data Showing Payment Instrument Adoption in Australia 
For my analysis of retail payment system adoption in Australia, I obtain data on the 
volume of transactions from the Reserve Bank of Australia (2010a).  The data covers 
issued transactions for cards issued by reporting institutions, which are ―Australian 
banks, foreign banks operating in Australia, and most building societies and credit 
unions.‖  I supplement it with data on Australia‘s estimated residential population from 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2010).  In a discussion of series breaks in its 
statistics, Reserve Bank of Australia (2010b, p. 9) says a break was caused in January 
2002 by changes in definitions, particularly with the inclusion of statistics on the usage 
charge cards.  Furthermore, debit card statistics from Reserve Bank of Australia (2010) 
distinguish cash-only transactions from other transactions only from July 2002 onwards, 
all types of transactions being included in a total before this date.  Given my focus on 
transactions completed for purchases, I do not include data for Australia prior to 2003 in 
Figure 1.1. 
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4.2 Canada 
4.2.1 Retail Payment Systems and Government Controls on Banking 
The development of new payment systems in Canada followed reasonably closely 
behind that of its neighbour, the US.  The Diners Club card was introduced to Canada in 
1951 and was followed by American Express and Carte Blanche in 1958 (Campbell, 
1989, March 25).  It was not until 1968 that the first bank-issued credit card became 
available when four banks cooperated to introduce the forerunner of Visa, 
BankAmericard, under the name, Chargex (Roseman, 2006, August 17).  The 
forerunner of MasterCard, Mastercharge, was introduced by a single bank in 1973 
(Roseman, ibid).  While admitting that records are incomplete, Croft (1999, p. 8) says 
that the first ‗full-fledged‘ adoption of ATM technology occurred in 1977.14  She 
indicates that other major banks followed suit in the next three to six years. 
Creation of the Canadian Payments Association 
The availability of new payment instruments, in particular inter-bank direct debits and 
credit transfers, as well as the growing competitive pressure exerted by NBFIs, led the 
Canadian Federal Government to broaden access to the payments system (Staff at the 
Bank of Canada and Department of Finance, 1997, p. 3).  In 1980, it passed the 
Canadian Payments Association Act, which created the Canadian Payments Association 
(―CPA‖) and gave it responsibilities for clearing and settlement that had been held by 
the Canadian Bankers Association since 1900 (Quigley, 1996, pp. 43-45).  Specifically, 
the Act gave the CPA two objectives: ―The Association shall establish and operate a 
national clearings and settlements system, and shall plan the evolution of the national 
payments system.‖  The CPA initially had a board of directors with 11 members; a 
chairman appointed by the central bank, the Bank of Canada, five directors are 
                                                 
14
  ATMs are commonly known as automated banking machines (ABMs) in Canada, 
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appointed by the chartered banks; two by trust and loan companies, two by credit union 
centrals and one by other members.  Quigley argues that the CPA Act simply 
transferred the statutory   that been held by the Canadian Bankers Association to the 
CPA, extended it to encompass a larger number of institutions and explicitly rejected 
the idea that competition should shape the evolution of the Canadian payments system. 
In 1983, the Canadian Bankers Association transferred responsibility for the national 
settlement system to the CPA (Benson, 2003, p. 6).  The following year, the CPA 
introduced the inter-bank funds transfer system, Automated Clearing Settlement System 
(―ACSS‖), to facilitate clearing and settlement of many retail transactions (Staff at the 
Bank of Canada and Department of Finance, 1997, p. 4).
15
  This clearing system was 
composed of institutions that were either direct or indirect clearers: direct clearers had 
an account at the Bank of Canada that could be debited or credited for settlement; 
indirect clearers maintained an account with a direct clearer to be used for settlement 
(Dingle, 2003, pp. 14-15).  As Dingle says, becoming a direct clearer meant being of a 
sufficient size: 
Any direct clearer had to be a relatively significant institution; pursuant to the 
Clearing By-law, it had to account for at least one-half per cent of the national 
payments volume—the number of cheques and other items passing through the 
clearings. 
Interac debit cards 
In 1984, five institutions that issued Visa credit cards announced their intention to 
interconnect their ATM networks utilising the Visa Credit Card Authorisation Network 
(Competition Tribunal, 1996a, para. 19).  The joint venture was named Interac and had 
the express purpose of sharing certain payment system services between members.  In 
                                                 
15
  Visa and MasterCard transactions are settled using Canada‘s wholesale interbank payment system, 
Large Value Transfer System (O‘Connor, 2003, p. 26) 
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1985, Bank of Montreal, a MasterCard issuer, responded to this announcement by 
saying that it, along with a number of other financial institutions, was developing an 
alternative shared ATM network, Circuit, (ibid, para. 21).  However, development of 
Circuit stagnated soon after, when the five original Visa-issuing members of Interac 
invited the four largest MasterCard-issuing organisations, including Bank of Montreal, 
to participate in Interac (Anderson and Rivard, 1999, p. 402).  Shared ATM services 
were established by Interac in 1986 and Interac‘s members decided to adopt the CPA‘s 
clearing and settlement system, ACSS, to complete transactions made using Interac 
(ibid, p. 405). 
Interac adopted an organisational structure similar to that used by the CPA.  The nine 
original organisations discussed above became Charter Members of Interac, establishing 
direct connections with each other to make use of the shared services (Interac 
Association, 2007, pp. 3).
 
  A tenth bank, the Laurentian Bank, was admitted as a charter 
member in May 1988 (Anderson and Rivard, 1999, p. 402). Other institutions were able 
to gain indirect access to Interac‘s network by using an account with a Charter Member 
and becoming a Sponsored Member. 
Interac offered less than complete ATM services as its by-laws precluded the sharing of 
services such as balance inquiries, transfers and deposits (Competition Tribunal, 1996a, 
para. 26).  Although new entrants might have exploited opportunities such as these to 
improve services, Interac faced only limited competition from new networks.  In 
1984/85, NBFIs introduced two ATM networks, Express and Access ATM in major 
Canadian cities with both networks obtaining commitments from retailers, network 
service suppliers and smaller financial institutions (ibid, para. 22; Anderson and Rivard, 
1999, p. 402).  However, Express failed in 1986 and Access ATM the following year 
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partly because, according to the Competition Tribunal, neither was able to interconnect 
with Interac. 
In 1989, Interac announced plans to develop a new shared service, the debit card POS 
payment system called Interac Direct Payment.  An initial pilot of the service was run in 
1990 followed by its nationwide introduction in 1994 (Competition Tribunal, 1996a, 
para. 31).  All Charter Members of Interac were required to contribute equally to the 
costs of new shared services (ibid, para. 30).  One Member, the Laurentian Bank of 
Canada, was unwilling to do so for the new shared service, resulting in the loss of its 
Charter Member status, although it retained direct connections with Interac‘s other 
Charter Members, meaning it did not have to become an indirect connector. 
In 1988, American Express attempted to become a Sponsored Member of Interac, in 
order to provide its cardholders with access to Interac ATMs (Anderson and Rivard, 
1999, p. 418).  Anderson and Rivard comment that, ―[a]t about the same time,‖ Interac‘s 
Charter Members undertook a review of membership rules and, as a result, amended its 
by-laws in 1989, significantly increasing the cost of becoming a Sponsored Member and 
preventing the admission of new Chartered Members.  In 1991, a number of Sponsored 
Members of Interac attempted to establish Sunrise, a network offering ATM and 
EFTPOS services (Competition Tribunal, 1996a, para. 32).  However, the attempt was 
abandoned when, according to the Competition Tribunal, it became clear that Sunrise 
was ineligible for direct connection to Interac.  Late in 1995, the credit union, Capital 
City Savings and Credit Union of Edmonton, introduced the MasterCard Maestro debit 
card (Johnston, 1995, December).  However, the membership of Interac was shortly 
after expanded to include credit unions. 
The expansion in membership was the result of a government inquiry that started in 
1992, following a complaint from American Express regarding the structure of Interac 
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(Anderson and Rivard, 1999, pp. 410, 418).  Based on evidence from the inquiry, the 
responsible government official, the Director of Investigation and Research, concluded 
that ―the Interac arrangement had inhibited the evolution towards a competitive shared 
ATM/POS markets in Canada and, if left unattended, it would continue to inhibit this 
process.‖  Accordingly, an application was made to the federal, quasi-judicial 
Competition Tribunal for an appropriate order, known as a Consent Order.  The Consent 
Order, approved by the Tribunal in June 1996, amended Interac‘s by-laws to increase its 
membership,
16
 implemented a new governance structure, required Interac to set prices 
only to recover costs- (that is, Interac would operate on a not-for-profit basis) and 
allowed merchants to impose a surcharge for Interac transactions (Bergevin, 2010, p. 5).  
Anderson and Rivard (1999, pp. 444-446) discuss the difficulty of finding an 
appropriate remedy based on competition, when relevant legislation placed many 
payment system decisions in the hands of the CPA.  In particular, the Director elected 
not to challenge the use of the CPA ACSS system for clearing and settling Interac 
transactions, or to call for an end to Interac‘s prohibition on direct card issuance by non-
financial institutions, as these were matters that the Canadian Government had required 
the CPA to decide.  
In order to recover its costs, Interac was able to set switch and interchange fees, 
although it chose not to set an interchange fee, maintaining a small fixed switch fee paid 
by both the issuer and the acquirer for each transaction, with banks able to set fees for 
cardholders and merchants (Competition Tribunal, 1996a, p. 42).  A Canadian 
newspaper report from 1997 shows that cardholders are generally charged small fixed 
fees of less than C$0.50 per transaction, although no transaction fees were charged for 
some accounts (Canadians love their debit cards, 1997, November 3).  Based on data 
                                                 
16
  The membership of Interac expanded from 27 companies in 1996 to 62 in 2010 (Bergevin, 2010, p. 
5). 
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from a 2006 national survey of Canadian merchants, Arango and Taylor (2008, p. 10) 
calculate the median MSF for Interac debit card transactions varying from C$0.07 for 
the lower quartile to C$0.25 for the upper quartile.
17
    Arango and Taylor also report (p. 
8) that merchants are required to install terminals, although these may be rented as well 
as purchased.  What little information I have found suggests the surcharging of debit 
card transactions that does occur is higher than these MSFs.  Carrick (2003, May 29) 
cites a merchant debit card payment service provider controlling one third of debit card 
services in Canada as reporting that fewer than 1% of its clients surcharged Interac 
transactions.  Carrick reports, however, that the surcharging that does occur ranges from 
approximately C$0.25-0.45, which appears excessive when compared to data on the size 
MSFs for Interac transactions provided by Arango and Taylor (C$0.07 for the lower 
quartile to C$0.25 for the upper quartile). 
Other payment instruments 
Another new system created around this time, but one that involved less onerous 
government- or CPA-imposed regulations, was one created for a stored-value payment 
instrument, although it did not progress beyond the pilot stage.  In 1997, 10 major 
Canadian financial institutions created Mondex Canada to develop the Mondex stored-
value card system (Craig and Blackwell, 1998, October 31).  Mondex Canada launched 
an initial pilot in Guelph, Ontario before several of its backers pulled out of the project.  
It tried more pilots, but the system had been shelved by 2001 (Partridge, 2001, 10 May). 
4.2.2 A New Approach to the Regulation of Banks 
The Canadian Payments Act 2001 
                                                 
17
  For credit cards, Arango and Taylor say merchants are charged a median MSF of 2 percent of 
transaction value for credit card transactions, which varied from a lower quartile of 1.75% to an 
upper quartile of 2.5%. 
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In 1992, a process of regularly reviewing financial legislation was made more formal 
when the Government incorporated sunset clauses into specific pieces of legislation 
requiring a review every five years (Daniel, 2003, pp. 5-6).  The 1992 review resulted in 
legislation that continued to remove regulations that separated the activities of financial 
institutions.  For example, it removed constraints on the operations of financial 
institutions and phased out the non-interest-bearing reserve requirements imposed on 
banks that did not affect other deposit-taking institutions.  The 1997 review investigated 
the effects of changes made following the 1992 review and made only minor 
modifications (Daniel, 2003, p. 6).  Separate from this review process, however, Canada 
introduced legislation modifying its prudential regulation and supervision in 1996, 
allowing life insurance companies to demutualise and allowing foreign banks to enter 
Canada as branches rather than as subsidiaries in 1999 (Daniel, 2003, pp. 6-7).  
However, in spite of the changes, the intrusive nature of ownership rules, including 
authorities‘ rejection of bank merger plans, has contributed to concerns about the 
industry.  In his review of financial reform in Canada, Siklos (2003, p. 60) comments 
that ―... the view that Canadian banks are not sufficiently competitive partly stems from 
the rigid ownership rules that prevent the flexibility necessary to react rapidly to 
changing market opportunities.‖ 
Relating to payment systems, the Federal Government announced another review in 
June 1996 to be conducted by the Ministry of Finance with assistance from a Payments 
System Advisory Committee (Department of Finance, 1998, p. 2).  Following the 
review, the Canadian Government passed the Canadian Payments Act 2001 (Dingle, 
2003, pp. 49-52).  The Act modified the Canadian Payments Association Act 1980, 
adding to the CPA‘s objectives the goal of promoting ―the efficiency, safety and 
soundness of its clearing and settlement systems and take into account the interests of 
users‖, expanding its membership to include life insurance companies, securities dealers 
106 
 
1
0
6
 
and money market mutual funds and introducing the ability for the Minister of Finance 
to review the CPA‘s by-laws. 
4.2.3 Payment System Development Following the Reforms 
Issues with new payments instruments 
At the end of 2003, Interac adopted an email-based payment system (Banks adopt 
INTERAC branding for Email Money Transfer service, 2003, 19 December).  This 
service allowed the customers of banks to use bank websites to simply send payments to 
email addresses to be deposited in another Canadian bank account.  Interac Online, a 
system allowing debit card payments over the internet, was launched in mid-2005 (Bank 
groups back new Canadian online debit choice, 2005, June 14).  However, in spite of 
the legislative changes and the new instruments, problems of access still existed for 
CPA payment systems.  While deliberating over the Interac Consent Order in 1996, the 
Competition Tribunal considered a concern raised by Telpay, a company providing bill 
payment services over the telephone, that the Consent Order assumed ―any new Interac 
service would be based on plastic card and terminal-based technology‖ (Competition 
Tribunal, 1996b, pp. 44-45).  Telpay, however, wanted to use the Interac network to 
allow its customers to complete transactions over the telephone.  The Competition 
Tribunal held that Telpay‘s complaint was beyond the scope of the issues it was 
considering (1996b, pp. 44-45). In the middle of 2003, the CPA decided to implement a 
ban of certain telephone-based payments called tele-cheques, which prevented CPA 
members from processing such items during clearing (Canadian Payments Association, 
2003). 
In early 2007, a number of retail payment system issues were discussed by the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Finance.  The Standing Committee heard evidence 
regarding the length of time it took to complete electronic bill payments in Canada 
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(Standing Committee on Finance, 2007, March 22). The CPA gathered information 
from member financial institutions and other stake holders and, in February 2008, 
established Bill Payment Task Force to recommend ways in which bill payments in 
Canada might be improved ―in areas consistent with the CPA‘s mandate.‖ (Canadian 
Payments Association, 2008, p. 7; Canadian Payments Association, 2009, p. 23).  The 
CPA also prepared an Issues Paper (Canadian Payments Association, 2008) reviewing 
interbank operations for bill payments in Canada and other countries.  The Paper 
considers in detail the CPA‘s existing framework for bill payments, highlighting (p. 6) 
anecdotal evidence that indicated up to 80% of billers had elected to operate outside that 
framework.  Reasons for this include difficulties applying the framework to a biller‘s 
billing process.  The paper indicates (p. 8) that some larger billers went as far as 
establishing accounts at numerous banks to increase the number of customers paying 
bills with an ―on-us‖ transaction rather than with an interbank transfer.  During 2009, 
the Bill Payment Task Force developed a draft Policy Framework for all bill payments 
to be cleared and settled using CPA‘s ACSS interbank payment system (Canadian 
Payments Association, 2009, p. 23). 
Further evidence on bill payments was given to the Standing Committee by 
representatives of Usemybank, a third party provider (not a financial institution) of bill 
payment services (Standing Committee on Finance, 2007, April 19).  Usemybank 
complained that, in 2003, two of Canada‘s banks had closed the biller accounts used for 
settlement with those two institutions by Usemybank‘s own financial institution.18  
Another Canadian bank did the same in 2005, shortly before it launched Interac Online. 
Also in 2005, the CPA implemented a rule that required all bill payments to be initiated 
                                                 
18
  Vexler (2004, October 31) provides a description of the nature of Usemybank‘s service and biller 
accounts. 
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using the CPA member‘s own website, precluding the use of a third party‘s website 
(Canadian Payments Association, 2005, February 3). 
4.2.4 Interventions in Retail Payment Systems 
Interac, Visa and MasterCard 
Another five-yearly review of Canada‘s financial legislation began with consultation in 
2005, followed by a Discussion Paper released during 2006 and the Government tabling 
new legislation in November of that year (Department of Finance, 2006, p. 5; 
Department of Finance, 2006, November 27).  The review was notable for the 
development of new retail payment systems because it contained no proposals for the 
direct regulation of payment cards, despite expectations that it would.
19
  In fact, a major 
control on payment cards was removed during 2008, when Canada‘s Competition 
Commissioner formally announced that the Competition Bureau would no longer 
oppose duality of membership in credit card networks that operated in Canada, 
following changes in the ownership structure of Visa and MasterCard (Redican, 2008, 
November 24).  However, regulation of credit cards re-appeared on the political agenda 
late in 2010 when the Competition Bureau announced it had made an application to the 
Competition Tribunal for the Tribunal ―to strike down restrictive and anti-competitive 
rules that Visa and MasterCard impose on merchants who accept their credit cards‖, 
referring to both the networks‘ use of the No-Surcharge Rule and the Honour-All-Cards 
Rule (Competition Bureau, 2010, December 15). 
Development of Interac continued with the network preparing to face increasing 
competition.
20
  In 2007, Interac began discussions with Canada‘s Competition Bureau in 
                                                 
19
  For discussion of such expectations, see Canada rewrites its financial services regulations (2005, 
August 30). 
20
  As an example of the development, Interac supported the roll-out of EMV technology to Canada, 
leaving individual roll-out decisions to each bank, but notifying customers that it would no longer 
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an attempt to modify the 1996 Consent Order described above, to allow it to become a 
for-profit company in order to cope with an increasingly competitive and innovative 
environment (Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, 2009, p. 
25).  In February 2010, however, the Competition Bureau turned Interac‘s request down 
(Lowe, 2010, February 26).  During 2008, MasterCard and Visa made changes to 
interchange fee schedules for credit card transactions and MasterCard re-launched its 
Maestro debit card in December of that year.
21
  MasterCard publishing details showing 
Maestro operated with no interchange fee and a fixed switch fee paid by both the issuer 
and acquirer of C$0.005 per transaction (Arnfield, 2009, September 23).  However, 
Perkins (2010, January 18) reports that at least one major bank had delayed introducing 
the Visa Debit card because of ongoing uncertainty regarding regulation of the debit and 
credit card industry in Canada.   
Those concerns about uncertainty followed the release in June 2009 of Senate 
Committee report covering the credit and debit card systems in Canada.  The report 
recommended that a code of conduct for debit and credit cards be established, 
merchants be permitted to bargain collectively regarding terms and fees, merchants be 
allowed to surcharge for credit card use, debit card fees be charged on a flat fee, rather 
than proportional, basis and that the interchange fee for all debit card transactions be set 
at zero for three years.  In 2009, Canada‘s Minster of Finance released a draft code of 
conduct, which included proposals that merchants be allowed to discount for cheaper 
payment methods (although not be allowed surcharge for more expensive ones), that 
cards not give access to debit and credit card functions and that, when a card gives 
                                                                                                                                               
accept magnetic strip transactions in ATMs from the end of 2012 and in POS transactions from the 
end of 2015 (Interac Association, 2010). 
21
  While the report comments that this was MasterCard‘s ―first‖ transaction using its Maestro brand in 
Canada, that claim appears to ignore the launch, discussed earlier, of a MasterCard Maestro debit 
card by a credit union in December 1995. 
110 
 
1
1
0
 
access to multiple networks,
22
 merchants be given control over which network is used 
for payment (Department of Finance, 2009, November 19).  In 2010, the code was 
―voluntarily‖ adopted, although accompanying press release made it clear that the credit 
and debit card industry must adopt it or face a legally enforceable code under the 
Payment Card Networks Act (Archer, 2010, June 11).  Later in 2010, the Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce introduced a Visa-debit card, called the Advantage Card 
(Visa-branded debit cards swiping into Canada, 2010, October 19).  However, the 
article says that the card would operate by processing POS transactions over the Interac 
debit card network, meaning merchants would not incur higher MSFs using the Visa 
Debit for POS transactions. 
Development of stored-value card systems continues in Canada with Interac announcing 
that it would roll-out contactless terminals in early 2011 as part of its expansion for 
EMV (Hernandez, 2010, June 17).  Hernandez reports that the move came as several 
Canadian banks started issuing Visa payWave technology, which would eventually be 
compatible with the Interac contactless terminals. 
4.2.5 Data Showing Payment Instrument Adoption in Canada 
My key data source showing the adoption of debit and credit cards in Canada is 
transaction and population data available from the Redbook publication, CPSS (2009), 
which provides estimates of issued transactions for the years 2004 to 2008.  For the 
years 2000 to 2003, I use data from an earlier Redbook, CPSS (2006).  Both documents 
clarify that all figures are estimates.  While I did not find any corroborating data for 
Canada, I did find a reference to this source of transaction data made by an employee of 
                                                 
22
  This might occur when, for example, a card gives access to both the Interac network and the Visa or 
MasterCard debit card network. 
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the Bank of Canada (Taylor, 2006, p. 27), giving me greater confidence in the accuracy 
of the figures, at least relative to other data sources for Canada. 
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4.3 European Union 
4.3.1 Affect on Retail Payment System Development in European Countries of 
My Sample 
Legislation made in three of the countries in my sample is heavily influenced by the 
actions of the European Union.  The Union may issue ―Regulations‖, which 
immediately become enforceable as law in all member states simultaneously, and 
―Directives‖, which give legislative frameworks that must be put in place by member 
states.  Although not a member of the European Union, Norway‘s membership of the 
European Economic Area means it is required to adopt the legislative initiatives with 
respect to forming a single European market and be a ‗virtual member‘ of the Union 
(Emerson, Vahl and Woolcock, 2002). 
In 2002, the European Payments Council was set up by the banking industry as part of a 
self-regulatory initiative to develop a common infrastructure and standards.   In 2008, 
the Council announced initiatives to create a Single Euro Payments Area (―SEPA‖) by 
eliminating differences in national standards for payments.  Processes associated with 
SEPA continue with rulebooks for SEPA payments by credit transfer and direct debit 
being published in 2007 (Skinner, 2008, p. XXVI). 
European directives with an influence on retail payment systems include the Payment 
Services Directive (2007/64/EC), adopted in 2007, and the Consumer Credit Directive 
(2008/48/EC), adopted in 2008.  The Payment Services Directive mentioned an 
Electronic Money Institution, but created another category of financial institution, a 
Payment Institution, also giving it a European Passport or access to markets across the 
European Union.    Such directives are commonly prescriptive; for example, the 
Consumer Credit Directive places significant restrictions on the use of information used 
for credit approvals for individuals.  In addition to these directives, the European 
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Commission has conducted a number of investigations of interchange fees and network 
rules applying largely to cross-border transactions made with Visa and MasterCard 
debit and credit cards.
23
  These investigations directly influence only the fraction of 
debit and credit card transactions that are cross-border – most transactions are 
completed domestically and do not require issuing or acquiring services from another 
country.
24
  That said, the investigations may have affects beyond just cross-border 
transactions.  For example, Retail Banking Research Ltd (2005, p. 46) reports that 
MasterCard Europe has removed its No-Surcharge Rule, allowing merchants to 
surcharge credit transactions made with its debit and credit cards in Europe.  I have not, 
however, found sufficient evidence to allow me to explore the role of the European 
Commission in such decisions. 
Because they directly affect only a small proportion of transactions and, even then, 
affect debit and credit cards, which are payment instruments that have already 
experienced a significant amount of development, I argue that much of the European 
Commission‘s operations are beyond the scope of this thesis.   One group of the 
decisions appear, however, to have had a significant influence on development, the 
Commission;‘s directives relating to electronic money.  
4.3.2 The European Union and the Development of Electronic Money 
Athanassiou and Mas-Guix (2008) describe in detail the development of two European 
Directives in relation to the issuance of electronic money.  Although the Directives were 
issued by the European Commission, they describe (pp. 13-16) the European Central 
                                                 
23
  European Commission Memos from 2007 and 2009 dealing with MasterCard and Visa interchange 
fees say that relevant fees applied not only to cross-border transactions, but to domestic transactions 
in a number of European Union members, none of which I study in this thesis (European 
Commission, 2007, December 19; European Commission, 2009, April 6), 
24
  For example, MasterCard calculated that a cross-border multilateral interchange fee applied in just 
5% question of total MasterCard transactions in the European Economic Area (Repa, Malczewska, 
Teixeira and Martinez Rivero, 2008). 
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Bank‘s high level of interest in e-money development, particularly its concerns that 
consumers and merchants were adequately protected.  Of the two Directives, the first, 
Directive 2000/28/EC, amended an earlier banking Directive to include electronic 
money issuers within the definition of credit institution, thereby giving issuers of 
electronic money access to a ―European passport‖ to operate across the European 
Union, and the second, Directive 2000/46/EC, which became known as the Electronic 
Money Directive, defined an e-money issuer as a special type of credit institution, 
subject to similar prudential supervision rules to those that applied to banks.  
Athanassiou and Mas-Guix outline the significant uncertainty caused by the Directives‘ 
shortcomings.  In particular, they argue the Directives did not appropriately address the 
definition of electronic money
25
, failed to consider mechanisms for clearing and settling 
electronic money transactions and placed potentially inappropriate restrictions on the 
operations of electronic money issuers
26
. 
In spite of the significance of these issues, however, Athanassiou and Mas-Guix (2008, 
pp. 16-17) appear to regard it reasonable to find a solution to them by making small 
adjustments to the regulatory framework for electronic money.  Indeed, the European 
Commission adopted an updated Directive applying to electronic money 
(2009/110/EC), which, while it was intended to liberalise the market by lowering 
barriers to entry (Financial Services Authority, 2010), maintained a prescriptive 
approach to the operations of issuers of electronic money. 
                                                 
25
  As I‘ve discussed, I also find the phrase electronic money unclear and prefer to use, stored value 
card, to refer to the card-based prepaid retail payment instrument.  The term, electronic money might 
also refer to computer-based retail payment systems that use the internet.  However, I focus on 
stored-value instruments because the Commission‘s affect of the development of such instruments is 
more obvious. 
26
  For example, in order for a company to be licensed as an electronic money institution, the Electronic 
Money Directive required that it meet initial capital and ongoing own funds thresholds and that there 
be restrictions on their investment in other businesses and the scope of their operations. 
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4.4 Germany 
4.4.1 Retail Payment Systems and Government Controls of Banking 
The German banking system 
Brunner, Decressin, Hardy and Kudela (2004) provide details of Germany‘s banking 
system, which consists of three pillars, the public banks, the cooperative banks and the 
commercial banks.  The public banks can be further broken into two tiers, Sparkassen 
and Landesbanken.  The Sparkassen or savings banks, the first of which originated in 
Hamburg in 1778, are mostly owned by local government.  Landesbanken, which date 
back to the early twentieth century, function as central banks for the Sparkassen and are 
owned by municipalities and associations of Sparkassen.  The cooperative banking 
pillar (Volksbanken, Raiffeisenbanken and Spar- und Dahrlehenskassen) dates back to 
the nineteenth century when banks were founded to help craftsmen, workers and 
farmers.  Cooperative banks are owned by their members, who are also their depositors.  
Finally, there are the commercial banks, which are dominated by the ―big four‖, 
Deutsche Bank, Hypovereinsbank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank, who account for 
roughly two-thirds of commercial bank business in Germany.  Table 4.1 provides 
details on the size of the three pillars. 
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Table 4.1. Summary of German Financial System, 2001 
Pillar Number of 
Institutions 
Share of 
Business Volume 
(%) 
Public Sector Banks: 
 Landesbanken
(1)
 
 Sparkassen 
 
13 
534 
 
20.2 
15.7 
Cooperative Banks 1623 12.2 
Commercial Banks 304 43.1 
Other
(2) 
235 8.8 
Total 2695 100.0 
Source: Brunner et al (2004, pp. 2-3) 
(1) Includes DGZ/DEKA Bank as a Landesbank because it performs similar role as 
other Landesbanken, but is not associated with a specific Land or region. 
(2) Includes public sector mortgage banks 
Brunner et al (2004) comment that profit is unlikely to be the key objective for two of 
the major pillars, the public sector banks and the cooperative banks.  Although some of 
the funding of Landesbanken and Sparkassen comes from retained earnings, therefore 
giving them some desire to maximise profits, they have a mandate to foster economic 
development in their regions and are expected to subsidise local public goods.  Because 
of their cooperative structure, the ownership of the cooperative pillar is held widely, 
reducing incentives to monitor and discipline the organisations‘ management.27  
Additionally, the incentive to monitor the operations of banks is reduced by a number of 
institution and deposit protection schemes, although these are starting to be phased out 
(Brunner et al, ibid, pp. 3-5, 24-25).  Reszat (2003, p. 88) reports that the German 
financial system ―has long been notorious for its financial market backwardness.‖  He 
attributes this to outdated structures, high costs and a high degree of bureaucracy that 
                                                 
27
  Beck (2003, p. 15) argues, however, that substantial cross-shareholdings mean the commercial 
banks cannot be assumed to maximise shareholder value, either. 
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have deterred investment.  Indeed, Brunner et al (2004) find bank profitability lower in 
Germany, compared to countries with similar banking systems. 
In 1908, the first German Giro Association was established and the system proved 
popular.  Other associations followed with a national giro institution being founded in 
1918 as a central point for all the associations (Pohl and Freitag, 1994, p.469; Vittas, 
1995, p. 9).  Under the German Banking Act of 1961 the ―provision of cashless 
payment and clearing operations (giro business)‖ is a banking activity, meaning that 
NBFIs are not allowed to handle cashless transactions (CPSS, 2003, p. 151).  To be a 
bank and provide such services, a licence as a credit institution or a financial services 
institution is required from the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht).  The role of Germany‘s central bank, 
the Deutsche Bundesbank, is set out in the Bundesbank Act of 1957 and requires the 
Bundesbank to ―arrange for the execution of domestic and international payments and 
contribute to the stability of payment and clearing systems‖ (European Central Bank, 
2007, p. 103).  A paper by the European Central Bank (2007) discusses the 
Bundesbank‘s interpretation of this role in regard to retail payment systems (p. 104): 
The Bundesbank is actively involved in shaping developments in cashless 
payments. By means of a cooperative approach, it attempts to coordinate the 
interests and decisions of the parties involved in cashless payments and – if 
necessary – to facilitate decision-making, as well as fostering developments 
with regard to increased efficiency and security of payments. 
However, the same paper goes on to say (p. 105) that ―Germany took a conscious 
decision to avoid going down the route of a sovereign regulation by parliament or the 
central bank.‖  It describes the Bundesbank‘s preference for multilateral agreements 
reached ―by common accord by all of the central associations of the banking industry.‖  
The Bundesbank did, however, have some involvement with retail payment system 
development.  In the early 1970s, it developed the Retail Payment System, which is 
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used for the overnight processing of interbank transfers involving giros, cheques and 
direct debits complementing the giro networks of the banking system (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, n.d.; European Central Bank, 2007, p. 124). 
In 1953, the Zentraler Kreditausschuss (―ZKA‖)28 was established; it consists of 
representatives of each of the central associations of the three groups (European Central 
Bank, 2007, p. 105).  The statutes of the central associations are formulated in such a 
way that the associations can bind their member institutions (ibid, p. 105).  As part of its 
interest in payment systems, the Bundesbank chairs the ZKA‘s Working Party on 
Automation, which was established in 1959 to discuss general aspects of payment 
automation.  In 1963, following its creation, the German banking industry introduced 
the direct debit, which allows the payee, rather than the payer, to initiate payment, 
although the payer may have preauthorised payment (CPSS, 2003, p. 156). 
New payment instruments 
In 1968, one commercial bank, Deutsche Bank, introduced eurocheque, a cheque 
guarantee card that could be used in many places in Europe (Waiting for the plastic 
revolution, 1997, November 28). Debit card and ATM functionality were eventually 
incorporated alongside its cheque guarantee function.
29
  In 1977, Deutsche Bank led a 
consortium of European banks to acquire the travel and entertainment card, Eurocard, 
which already had an international alliance with the American credit card scheme, 
MasterCard.  In 1982, the German banks pooled their credit card operations into a 
jointly-owned organisation, Gesellschaft fur Zahlungssysteme (―GZS‖), which 
undertook all of Germany‘s Eurocard issuing and acquiring activities (ibid). 
                                                 
28
  The ZKA is also known by its English translation, the Central Credit Committee or CCC.  I refer to 
it by its German name in this thesis. 
29
  These other functions led to a decline in the use of the cheque guarantee function, which was 
withdrawn in 2001 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009, p. 4). 
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4.4.2 A New Approach to the Regulation of Banks  
Germany began a process of deregulation well in advance of what was required by its 
membership of the European Union (Buch and Golder, 2001).  According to Buch and 
Golder (p. 348), foreign financial institutions had, ―at least in principle,‖ the ability to 
enter the German banking industry from 1976.  In 1981, remaining capital controls and 
interest rate regulations were fully abolished.  Significant controls remain, however.  
For example, an organisation that wishes to acquire bank-controlled debit card 
transactions has to be authorised and certified by the ZKA, a process that can take 9 to 
12 months (Retail Banking Research Ltd, 2005b, September, p. 47).  Also, legislation 
around the pillar of public banks hinders the efforts of members to restructure to 
improve profitability (Brunner et al, 2004, pp. 26-27).  Indeed, concerns about the 
profitability of German banks have increased.  Brunner et al find that profitability 
dropped significantly in the five years to 2001, which they attribute to non-interest 
revenue opportunities not being sought to compensate for interest rate margins declining 
because of increased competition. 
Laws developed by the European Union also had a major impact on German financial 
regulation.  Germany had fully implemented the European Union‘s Second Banking 
Directive, which harmonised financial regulation across member-states, by 1992.  It 
also adopted the euro as a unit of account in 1999 before converting to using it as the 
only legal payment medium of exchange in 2002 (CPSS, 2003, p. 155).  In 2003, 
German retail payment systems were connected to a new clearing procedure for EU 
cross-border credit transfers, called STEP2, , allowing qualified credit transfers to the 
whole European Economic Area (European Central Bank, 2007, p. 101). 
4.4.3 Payment System Development Following the Reforms 
Competition involving credit cards 
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GZS‘s position as the monopoly provider of Eurocard services was tested by foreign 
banks, including Bank of America, which first issued Visa cards in 1981, although the 
number of banks issuing Visa cards remained small until the 1990s (Waiting for the 
plastic revolution, 1997, November 28).  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, German 
merchants demonstrated a willingness to organise their own payment cards; a number of 
German retailers introduced the credit card, Deutsche Kreditkarte, in 1987 (Plastic 
explosives, 1987, July 4); and a major retail chain, Metro, introduced the YESS card, a 
delayed debit/credit store card, in 1992 (Worthington, 1994, pp. 34-35).  The 
dismantling of GZS‘s monopoly on Eurocard services began in 1989 when some 
member banks began issuing their own brand of Eurocards, rather than using only the 
GZS to issue cards (Waiting for the plastic revolution, 1997, November 28).  In 1996, 
GZS became a dual processor of Eurocard and Visa transactions and, the following 
year, was split into two entities: one to process Eurocard and Visa transactions under the 
GZS name; the other, EuroKartensysteme, to administer the Eurocard licences.  In 
1999, EuroKartensysteme gave up its monopoly on the acquiring of Eurocard 
transactions when it gave the two main Visa acquirers licences to also acquire Eurocard 
transactions (Welch, 2001, December 28).  In 2002, Eurocard was merged with 
MasterCard in 2002 (Breitkopf, 2002, June 10). 
In spite of these developments, however, credit cards have not seen significant use as a 
payment instrument.  Several reasons appear to lie behind this.  Firstly, consumer 
protection legislation on discounts and gifts, described as ―draconian‖ by one media 
source, discouraged the use of loyalty credit card networks (Overdrafts and debit 
dominate over credit, 2004, December 20).  The laws were repealed late in 2001 and 
industry sources expected this to cause a sharp increase in card payments (EHI Retail 
Institute, 2009, p. 31).  Aside from a brief flurry of activity, however, this increase 
failed to materialise.  Perhaps more important for explaining the country‘s low number 
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of credit card transactions, however, is the use in Germany of bank account overdrafts 
as a source of consumer credit.  This means that credit cards are used as delayed debit 
cards with only some banks experiencing success with offering revolving credit through 
credit cards (Overdrafts and debit dominate over credit, ibid).  Bank account overdrafts 
in Germany are able to be accessed by another type of payment instrument, the debit 
card. 
German development of debit cards 
Beginning in 1983, the ZKA ran a number of tests of a debit card system, Electronic 
Cash, promoting its credit card company, GZS, to provide acquiring services to 
merchants (PoS in Germany, 1984; Chemnitz University of Technology,
 30
 2008, June 
22).
31
  The 1984 magazine article hints, however, that the distribution of costs between 
banks and retailers was an issue even at that early stage, but that the banking industry 
was pressing ahead with debit card development to forestall similar development by 
credit card schemes or by retailers.  The article also shows that the industry was keen to 
avoid inter-network competition even amongst banks, when it quotes a representative of 
GZS saying that the aim in Germany is to ―find a national solution and to allow no 
separate regional solutions which cannot be integrated into a general system at a later 
date.‖  Nevertheless, development proceeded slowly and it was not until 1990 that the 
banks reached an agreement to create the online system, which charged merchants a 
proportional MSF of 0.3%. (Howells and Hine, 1993, p. 52; CPSS, 2003, p. 157).  The 
intervention of the Bundeskartellamt, the Federal Cartel Office, meant an open system 
was adopted that allowed merchants to obtain terminals and use the services of 
companies other than GZS.  This led to the creation of the Netzbetreiber, a payment 
network operator, from which merchants could obtain terminals and Electronic Cash 
                                                 
30
  Translation from German to English provided by Sabrina Pick (2010, October 14). 
31
  As I discuss below, Electronic Cash became known as Girocard in 2007. 
126 
 
1
2
6
 
network services (A rough ride for European EFTPOS, 1990, April 12).  This created a 
structure to a payment network that the European Commission, 2006, p. 19) report was 
unique to Germany amongst European countries.  It is unique because the Netzbetreiber 
are the organisations that, effectively, collect MSFs and pass them to the appropriate 
issuing bank.  The fee does not pass through an acquiring bank and therefore is not an 
interchange fee. In 2006, there were 24 Netzbetreiber, which are broadly independent of 
the banks (OCED, 2007, p. 156).  In spite of the creation of the Netzbetreiber, 
merchants were not supportive of the new system, given the delays in its 
implementation and its charges to merchants, which came when they had not been 
charged for the Eurocheque system (Waiting for the plastic revolution, 1997, November 
28). 
At the same time Electronic Cash was being introduced, one department store, Peek and 
Cloppenburg, successfully introduced a debit card payment instrument, called 
Elektronisches Lastschrift Verfahren (―ELV‖), using one major German bank, Deutsche 
Bank, to provide clearing functions for it (Howells and Hine, 1993, p. 52).  ELV used a 
customer‘s Electronic Cash card to generate a direct debit, which the customer would 
authorise with his/her signature.  Deutsche Bundesbank (2009, p. 5) argues that the 
ELV system proved popular because German merchants do not pay additional fees for 
using it.  In fact, the CPSS (2003, p. 158) reports it was the most popular card-based 
payment instrument in Germany at that time.  That was in spite of the ELV card 
involving higher amounts of risk for merchants, compared to other payment 
instruments, because it does not operate with a guarantee that a merchant will receive 
payment.  The merchant bears the risk when a card is used fraudulently or the customer 
has insufficient funds in their account for the purchase, a risk that can be reduced by the 
retailer taking out insurance against such losses and consulting blacklists of stolen cards 
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(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009, p. 5).
32
  Online Lastschrift-Verfahren, also known as 
OLV, was an extension of ELV developed by some payment network operators that 
offered reduced risk by operating electronically (Bartsch, n.d.).  During 2009, network 
operators, terminal suppliers and retail associations cooperated to bring the ELV/OLV 
networks into a combined, EC direct debit network (EHI Retail Institute, 2009, p. 18). 
In 1992, the German banks introduced their own non-guaranteed, no-fee debit card 
payment system similar to ELV called Point of Sale ohne Zahlungsgarantie, also known 
as POZ (European Central Bank, 2007, p. 113).   However, the POZ system did not 
experience similar success and falling usage levels and increasing fraud meant it was to 
be closed down by the ZKA at the end of 2006 (Germany to abandon signature debit, 
2004, November 23). 
Stored-value cards and Geldkarte 
In order to update its financial law with trends in European law, Germany amended its 
banking law in 1997 to include issuing electronic money in the business of banks, 
thereby preventing other organisations from issuing it (Reszat, 2003, pp. 109-110).  The 
ZKA piloted a stored value network, GeldKarte, in 1996, before judging the pilot 
successful and rolling the instrument out nationally in 1997 (CPSS, 2003, p. 159).  Roll-
out of Geldkarte instruments was rapid and, according to the Bundesbank, there were 67 
million Geldkarte cards in circulation by the end of 2001 with Geldkarte functionality 
being added to debit cards (Van Hove, 2004, pp. 13-14).
33
  The GeldKarte system 
operates with a proportional fee of 0.3% charged to merchants.   Furche and Wrightson 
                                                 
32
  As long as they notify of their card‘s loss promptly, cardholders are not generally exposed to similar 
amounts of risk. The card holder is generally not liable for any damage incurred as a result of card 
counterfeiting and can, in principle, contest account debits linked with unauthorised disposals. 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009, p. 20). 
33
  In spite of the large roll-out, Van Hove (2004, p. 19) quotes Andreas Koebe, sales manager for S-
Card Service, the payment card services and marketing unit of Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe, is quoted 
saying that still ―only about 2% or 3% of GeldKarte cardholders are active purse users‖. 
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(2000, p. 42) report that, although it appeared they were ―heavily‖ subsidising the 
system,
34
 banks faced an uproar from merchants about such ―outrageously high fees.‖ 
According to Furche and Wrightson, this came in spite of market research showing the 
costs of the Geldkarte system faced by merchants were lower than the average cost of 
handling cash.  Van Hove (2005, pp. 379-380) quotes GeldKarte Head of Marketing, 
Volker Koppe, as saying in 2005 that the payment network had begun focusing only on 
POS payments not attended by staff (he refers to POS attended by staff as, retail): ―[w]e 
have completely left retail because we see that is very difficult to promote GeldKarte 
there‖. 
Further debit card developments 
Development of debit cards in Germany continued with networks being formed to 
provide for debit card instrument use across Europe.  In 1993, the credit card 
companies, Europay International and MasterCard, launched the edc/Maestro network, 
which provided services for instruments to be used in Europe, through edc (European 
debit card), and around the world, through Maestro (Universal payment card is in for 
European boost, 1993, May 13).  The edc network was merged with Maestro in 1998 
(European Central Bank, 2007, p. 112) and, by 2003, the great majority of debit cards 
had Maestro and Electronic Cash badges, allowing them to be used with Maestro 
outside of Germany and with Electronic Cash inside it (Retail Banking Services Ltd, 
2005b, p. 22; Country Survey - Germany: Cards test Germany's cash economy, 2007, 
May 18).  In 2006, banks also started offering cards with badges for Visa‘s European 
debit card, V PAY, as well as for Electronic Cash (ibid).  A number of developments 
occurred as part of the European development of SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area).  
                                                 
34
  Possibly consistent with there being unprofitable subsidies for the system, van Hove (2004, p. 14) 
reports that Germany‘s private banks had been significantly less supportive of Geldkarte than the 
savings banks or the cooperative banks (represented by their associations).  The former two groups 
of banks had issued 90% of Geldkarte cards with only the remainder issued by private banks. 
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With it becoming SEPA-compliant, Germany‘s Electronic Cash instrument was 
renamed Girocard in 2007 (Electronic Cash, n.d.).  Around the beginning of 2007, one 
German banking group, Sparda, began issuing a SEPA-compliant Maestro card for both 
domestic and international transactions (i.e. not used with Girocard for domestic 
transactions) (Country Survey - Germany: Cards test Germany's cash economy, 2007, 
May 18).  Also as part of SEPA, Germany introduced the EMV chip card standard, 
although, in a July 2009 monthly report, Deutsche Bundesbank reports (p. 53) that, in 
spite of EMV largely being adopted for ATMs and cards in Germany, only a very small 
percentage of merchant terminals were equipped with it. 
Other payment instruments 
In 2006, Germany's savings banks, co-operative banks and the country's postal bank 
partnered with online payments company, PayPal, to launch an online payment service, 
Giropay (German banks offer online payments, 2006, March 24).  Giropay provides 
services that allow customers to pay for online purchases directly from their bank 
accounts, using the country‘s Giro system. 
4.4.4 Interventions in Retail Payment Systems 
During his summary of international regulatory scrutiny of card-based retail payment 
systems, Bos (2006, p. 753) describes the most important development, in terms of 
payment network interventions, as being the ZKA‘s 2000 application to the 
Bundeskartellamt, the Federal Cartel Office, for permission to introduce an interchange 
fee to all debit card payment systems  The intention of the proposal was for banks to 
receive remuneration from merchants for the cost of maintaining consumers‘ cards and 
the infrastructure used for ELV transactions (OECD, 2007, pp. 158-159).  The 
Bundeskartellamt let it be known that it was not in favour of the idea, believing that 
banks should recoup their costs through competition (ibid).  Additionally, retailers' 
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associations vehemently opposed the proposals, and, in April 2001, the banks withdrew 
their application (Australian Retailers Association, 2006, p. 42). 
Early in 2006, the Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels or HDE (Central 
Association of German Retail Trade) made a complaint to the Federal Cartel Office, 
aiming to force Visa and MasterCard to cut their fees for credit card transactions 
(UPDATE 1-German retail group files credit card fees complaint, 2006, January 19).  I 
have not found evidence showing the outcome of the complaint, although a website 
discussing German payment card events suggested the investigation was continuing in 
early 2010 (Paysys Consultancy GmbH, 2010, March). 
4.4.5 Data Showing Payment Instrument Adoption in Germany 
As with Canada, my key data source showing the adoption of debit and credit cards in 
Germany is the transaction and population data available from the Redbook publication, 
CPSS (2009), which provides estimates of issued transactions for the years 2004 to 
2008.  For the purposes of my calculations, I treat transactions on delayed debit cards 
and retailer cards with a payment function as credit or charge card transactions.  CPSS 
(2009, p. 67) confirms that the debit card figures include ELV transactions, but also 
explains the minor decrease in the number of transactions in 2007 and 2008 observed in 
Figure 1.1 by reporting that figures for 2007 are estimates and that different 
methodology and data collection methods used since 2007 cause breaks when 
comparing 2007 and 2008 data with previous years‘ data.  For the years 2000 to 2003, I 
use with data from an earlier Redbook, CPSS (2006).  Although I do not include 
electronic money transactions in Figure 1.1, I use a figure from CPSS (2009) to 
calculate the number of Geldkarte transactions per capita for 2008 to use in my table 
showing features of major German merchant-based, card-based payment instruments.in 
section 3.3. 
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Figure 1.1 shows Germany to have a substantially lower number of debit and credit card 
transactions per person than the other countries in my sample.  For this reason, I have 
paid special attention to the veracity of the CPSS figures I use for Germany.  My 
research has not confirmed or refuted the CPSS figures, yet it suggests that the CPSS 
data do underestimate debit and credit card adoption in Germany.  The EHI Retail 
Institute (2009) provides data from a survey of retail payments made by card in 
Germany based on a sample of 406 companies with 55,000 branches with retail sales of 
177.6 billion euros, which, according to the survey, represents 49% of total German 
retail turnover.  The EHI paper reports (p. 15) that survey respondents reported 1,671 
million debit card transactions in 2008, which is 89% of the CPSS statistic for 
transactions during 2008 for all of debit cards issued in Germany of 1,862 million.  The 
significant difference between 49 and 89% does suggest issues with data.  In further 
research, I found Deutsche Bundesbank (2009), which included details of a payments 
diary completed by 2,204 people for one week during 2008.  The article says (p. 47) that 
survey participants reported conducting a total of 2,907 transactions by debit card and 
333 transactions by credit card during the survey‘s seven days.  This suggests an 
average of 69 debit card transactions and 8 credit card transactions per person per year, 
which is well above the figure implied by the CPSS statistics of 23 and 5, respectfully. 
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4.5 New Zealand 
4.5.1 Retail Payment Systems and Government Controls of Banking 
Holmes (1972) describes aspects of New Zealand's banking system in the period 
following World War 2.  He reports that, during that time, the system was characterised 
by heavy regulation and control by the New Zealand Government.  Holmes discusses at 
length (Chapters VI – X) the effects of controls placed upon New Zealand‘s financial 
industry, the members of which fell into three categories: trading banks (which Holmes 
also describes on p.  97 as commercial banks), trustee savings banks (thrift institutions 
administered by a trust) and other financial organisations (including building societies 
and finance companies).  Holmes summarises the effects of the controls by saying (p. 
79): 
...  the Government has, particularly since the mid-1930s, played an important 
part in controlling both directly and indirectly the activities of ... financial 
institutions.  Its restrictive policies have had a particularly noticeable influence 
on the development of the trading banks in the post-war period, but they have 
also affected other institutions through controls over capital issues and hire 
purchase credit, restrictions on the interest rates which might be offered or 
charged, imposition of requirements to invest in government securities, and 
other measures. 
Restrictions relevant to this thesis include limiting cheque issuance to trading banks 
(Holmes, 1972, p. 121), preventing the entry of new trading banks (Commerce 
Commission, 1980, para. 142) and preventing trustee savings banks from being heavily 
involved in corporate banking (Hayward, 1986, July 21). 
In an effort to control the cost of the expanding use of cheques, in 1968 the trading 
banks created a jointly owned company, Databank Systems Limited (known as 
Databank) to spread the fixed costs of purchasing mainframe computers for processing 
new forms of cheques suitable for the newly created decimal currency and magnetic ink 
character recognition technology (Holmes, 1999, p. 110; Holmes, 1972, p. 103).  In 
1974, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand acted as an arbiter in negotiations that saw 
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other financial institutions gain access to Databank on an agency basis (Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, 1984, July 4, p. 4; De Lisle, 1985, July 4, p. 1).   
A major trading bank, the Bank of New Zealand (BNZ), launched a Visa debit card in 
1978 (National Business Review, 1979, February 7).  Another trading bank, the 
National Bank, followed with a Visa credit card (Holmes, 1999, p. 187), while the other 
three trading banks, which were each Australian owned, introduced Australia‘s 
Bankcard to New Zealand (Commerce Commission, 1980, para. 11).  In 1982, 
Databank started developing a new project, the Integrated Banking Information System, 
known as IBIS, which was designed to computerise the management of banking 
services for the customers of its owner banks‘ (Banks halt $160m computer project, 
1990, February 15). 
In the second half of the 1970s, the New Zealand Government instituted various 
measures partly liberalising regulations in New Zealand‘s banking industry.  Monetary 
policy changes introduced in 1976, including the removal of most interest rate controls, 
were seen as ‗a great leap forward‘ towards deregulation (Holmes, 1999, p. 164).  
Further removals of such controls were seen as having accorded savings banks a ‗virtual 
freedom‘ by 1980.  However, starting in 1981, substantial Government controls were 
exerted over banks and the New Zealand economy, including freezing wages, prices and 
interest rates in 1982 (Holmes, 1999, p. 168). 
New Zealand‘s first ATM was deployed in 1979 (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2005, 
p. 40) and ATMs were increasingly used by customers, resulting in pressure for 
interconnection between banks‘ ATMs.  After "some initial difficulty" with negotiations 
conducted through the New Zealand Bankers‘ Association, banks agreed to create a 
single national network of ATMs in 1985 (Holmes, 1999, p. 188).  These agreements 
are believed to have included the payment of fixed interchange fees between banks, but 
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banks did not generally charge their customers additional fees for using other banks‘ 
ATMs (Dr. David Tripe, Centre for Banking Studies, Massey University, 2010, May 24, 
personal communication). 
In June 1984, a trustee savings bank, Auckland Savings Bank, began a pilot of an 
EFTPOS system (Smellie, 1984, June 28), a pilot that became known as Cashline.  The 
trading banks‘ joint-venture, Databank, began a pilot of the Quicksmart EFTPOS 
system in late 1984 (Hayward, 1985, February 6).  Documents available from the 
archives of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand show the Reserve Bank‘s interest in 
electronic payment instruments (known at that time in the country as electronic funds 
transfer or EFT).  The documents make it clear that the different categories of 
organisations were very conscious of their relative standing (for an example, see 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1984, March 29).  The trading banks said that they were 
opposed to the idea of allowing other types of organisations direct access to the 
payments system and instead envisaged that ―access would be available on an ‗agency‘ 
basis ... under terms and conditions set down by the trading banks‖ (Electronic Funds 
Transfer Committee, 1984, December 3, p. 2).  However, the trustee savings banks 
―strongly oppose the concept of an EFT payments system based on the existing 
Databank network and more generally reject the concept of a trading bank owned and 
managed EFT network in any form‖ (ibid, p. 2). 
4.5.2 A New Approach to the Regulation of Banks 
Reforms of the 1984 Labour Government 
In July 1984, a Labour Government was elected in New Zealand, bringing a significant 
change to the regulation of the banking sector as part of wider reforms to the economy.  
In relation to financial sector regulations, the new Government reacted to the tight 
control exercised by the previous Government by floating the New Zealand dollar, 
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abolishing controls on interest rates, foreign exchange trading and reserve asset ratio, 
removing Government guarantees of bank deposits and deregulating the banking 
industry.  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act was passed in 1986 and 
came in to effect in 1987, opening the opportunity to register new banks subject to a 
company meeting explicit criteria (O'Shaughnessy, 1997, pp. 31-35; Hayward, 1988, 
July 20).  According to Davis (1999, p. 21), ―[u]nderpinning the approach [of the Act] 
were principles of achieving competitive neutrality, increasing contestability, and 
development of a prudential supervision policy consistent with economic efficiency.‖ 
Existing banks and new entrants became known as ―registered banks‖ with the 
Government establishing explicit criteria and information requirements for the 
registration process that came into effect from April 1987.  In July of that year, the 
Government announced that an initial group of eight institutions had been granted 
registered bank status (O'Shaughnessy, 1997, p. 53).  This change, along with the 
abolition of regulations that hampered competition, led to a ―blurring of the demarcation 
lines‖ between the different groups of institutions in the financial sector (ibid). 
4.5.3 Payment System Development Following the Reforms 
A new approach to EFTPOS 
O'Shaughnessy (1997, pp. 37-41) argues the October 1987 sharemarket crash caused a 
significant change to operation of NZ banks by clearly demonstrating the importance of 
making profitable investment decisions in the newly deregulated environment.  In the 
aftermath of the crash, O'Shaughnessy uses analysis of banks‘ costs to argue the crash 
bought on a drive for efficiency, stable profitability, an increased focus on operating 
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costs and greater competition for profitable customers.
35
  In 1988, Databank‘s owners, 
the four former trading banks, reviewed the IBIS project after becoming concerned 
about the excessive costs associated with it.  As a result of this review and because of 
continued concerns about costs, first the BNZ decided to withdraw from the Quick 
Smart network and the Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ) 
followed, causing a crisis shortly before Quicksmart was to merge with the Cashline 
network (Sir John Anderson, former Chief Executive, National Bank, 2009, November 
3, personal communication; Bank of New Zealand is to pull out of the EFTPOS 
network, 1988, September 15). 
The Cashline network was operated by Trustbank, Auckland Savings Bank (ASB Bank) 
and banks in Taranaki and Westland.  Some evidence points to Cashline being cheaper 
for consumers than Quick Smart, although this idea was disputed at the time by 
Trustbank (Edmond, 1988, November 25).  In February 1988, Trustbank, a member of 
the Cashline network, started offering merchants a small fixed payment each time a 
customer paid for a transaction using one of its terminals (Bank of New Zealand is to 
pull out of the EFTPOS network, 1988, September 15).  These payments were based on 
negative interchange fees being paid for Cashline transactions (Peter McLeod, Chief 
Executive of EFTPOS New Zealand, 2009, October 22, personal communication). 
The Databank owners that had not withdrawn from EFTPOS, namely National Bank 
and Westpac, purchased the Quicksmart network from Databank and renamed it, 
Handy-point.  To be more competitive with alternative retail payment systems and 
attract greater merchant account business to their banks, National Bank and Westpac 
                                                 
35
  O'Shaughnessy notes that registered banks‘ operating expenses as a percentage of operating income, 
which had been steadily increasing, peaked in 1989 and fell in four of the first five years of the 
1990s.  He attributes a reduction in banks‘ gross margins and net interest margins to this increased 
competition for profitable customers following the sharemarket crash. 
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decided not to charge merchants per-transaction fees (Sir John Anderson, former Chief 
Executive of National Bank, 2009, November 3, personal communication).  Merchants 
were already required to buy or rent EFTPOS terminals to accept EFTPOS transactions.  
All cardholders, however, were initially charged per-transaction fees and these ranged 
between NZ$0.25-0.50 in the mid-1990s (Peter McLeod, Chief Executive of EFTPOS 
New Zealand, 2010, April 12, personal communication; Manual bank fees to rise, 1995, 
March 14). 
In 1989, Handy-point and Cashline agreed to merge into a single network to be operated 
by a jointly-owned company, Electronic Transaction Services Limited (―ETSL‖), using 
Handy-point‘s approach to merchant pricing.  The merger was approved by New 
Zealand's competition regulator in September 1989 (Commerce Commission, 1989).  
One of the banks that had withdrawn from Quicksmart, the BNZ, eventually became an 
ETSL shareholder while the other, the ANZ, set up its own EFTPOS switch 
independent of ETSL, but which interconnected with ETSL‘s switch.  ETSL‘s owners 
were happy to interconnect with ANZ‘s switch because they saw ETSL as simply 
providing a marketplace for banks‘ interaction (Tony Coulston, Head of Payments 
Industry Strategy, Westpac New Zealand, personal communication, 2010, May 5).  A 
fixed switch fee paid by the issuer to the acquiring network for each transaction was 
negotiated to compensate the acquiring network for interconnection (Peter McLeod, 
Chief Executive of EFTPOS New Zealand, 2010, October 5, personal communication). 
As EFTPOS transaction volumes increased, the nature of per-transaction fees changed 
somewhat.  For consumers, bank accounts without fees for EFTPOS transactions 
became more prevalent.  Matthewson and Hu (2006) analyse a mid-2005 survey of New 
Zealand bank customers, which investigated the fees paid by account holders to banks 
when making deposits, obtaining cash, transferring funds and paying third parties in the 
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previous month.  They report (p. 11) that 52% of respondents who had made EFTPOS 
transactions in the preceding month paid no fee.  Their analysis of bank fees reported by 
major New Zealand banks (p. 7) shows EFTPOS transaction fees ranged from zero to 
NZ$0.35 (with one outlier at NZ$0.75).  For merchants, ANZ attempted to introduce 
per-transaction fees for merchants for EFTPOS transactions in 1998.  The higher fees 
were abandoned after ANZ lost a significant amount of merchant account business to 
banks who had not attempted to raise fees for merchants (Peter McLeod, Chief 
Executive of EFTPOS New Zealand, 2009, October 22, personal communication). 
During 2006, one New Zealand bank, Westpac, introduced Visa Debit, a scheme-based 
debit card that could be easily used internationally and for distance payments, unlike 
New Zealand‘s domestic debit card network, EFTPOS.  At the time of its introduction, a 
board of the company holding the license for Visa‘s New Zealand products and 
representing Visa‘s New Zealand members agreed to operate it without an interchange 
fee being paid between issuers and acquirers (Tony Coulston, Head of Payments 
Industry Strategy, Westpac New Zealand, personal communication, 2010, October 14). 
Other retail payment systems 
An alternative interbank payment system to Databank was started when ASB Bank 
helped to create the company, Payments Clearing Limited, in 1989 (Ex-Databank 
employee sets up rival operation, 1989, October 9).  This alternative firm proved 
successful as ―a stalking horse‖ by encouraging Databank‘s owners to open up 
Databank‘s system to faster processing of cheques (Tony Hood, former Chief Executive 
of Databank, 2009, October 24, personal communication).  In 1990, the four Databank 
owners decided to abandon the IBIS project and to develop their own, internally 
developed information systems (Tough times in store for bank industry, 1990, July 24).  
Databank was sold to a computer technology company in 1993 and its interbank 
142 
 
1
4
2
 
clearing activities were shifted to the company, Interchange and Settlement Limited 
(―ISL‖) (Dr. David Tripe, Centre for Banking Studies, Massey University, 2009, 9 
October, personal communication).  Gradually, other banks joined the four original 
owners of ISL and ASB Bank did not continue with its development of Payments 
Clearing Limited (Tony Coulston, former Chairman of ISL, 2010, 7 September, 
personal communication).  In 2010, the New Zealand banks announced the creation of a 
company owned by all of New Zealand‘s major banks, Payments NZ Limited, to ensure 
greater cooperation between banks over governance, including to allow the exchanging 
of account information when customers change banks and allow NBFIs access to New 
Zealand‘s payments system (New governance structure for bank payments system, 
2010, December 15; Pullar-Strecker, 2011, March 14). 
The relationship between banks following the reforms was not altogether smooth, 
however.  The commonly accepted approach of not charging bank account holders for 
withdrawing cash from other banks‘ ATMs broke down in 1999 when one bank, 
Westpac, started charging its customers for using other banks ATMS (Diaz, 1999, 
August 25).  Because charging customers for foreign ATM use meant the banks paid a 
smaller amount of interchange fees to its competitors, those competitors also began 
charging their customers foreign ATM fees in order not to lose money to cover their 
costs.  
In 1996, six New Zealand banks created the New Zealand Mondex consortium when 
they bought equity in a joint venture to launch Mondex stored-value cards as a payment 
instrument (Brown, 1998, April 6).  However, plans to jointly launch the system fell 
through and, in the end, only one bank, Westpac, trialled the product, although it did not 
continue with it (ibid).  In 1999, another stored-value card system was proposed when 
the council-funded tourism organisation, Totally Wellington, looked to introduce a Visa 
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system by mailing free cards to Wellington‘s 160,000 ratepayers, although the plan was 
not enacted (Newman, 1999, March 23; Burger, 1998, September 21).  More success 
was had with a stored-value system when a private provider of bus services in 
Wellington, Infratil, introduced a stored value card called Snapper as part of its upgrade 
of bus ticketing systems in 2008 (Gabor Szikszai, Head of Marketing, Snapper Services, 
2010, February 15, personal communication).  As well as for bus tickets, the system 
also allows payments at participating merchants (who are required to fund a different 
type of terminal), who are charged an MSF of 1% of a transaction‘s value.  A major 
New Zealand bank provided Snapper with important advice to extend Snapper‘s 
services in this way (Gabor Szikszai, ibid).  The system has not experienced complete 
success, however, failing to be awarded a contract offered by local government for the 
installation of stored-value system on public transport in Auckland in 2009.  After 
missing the contract, however, Snapper stated that it still planned to introduce the 
system to Infratil‘s Auckland buses during 2010.  The introduction of the new system 
on buses was followed by the dismissal of nine bus drivers because the new system 
revealed they had been stealing cash fares under the buses‘ previous cash-based 
ticketing system (Williamson, 2009, July 9). 
4.5.4 Interventions in Retail Payment Systems 
In 2009, New Zealand‘s competition regulator, the Commerce Commission (―the 
Commission‖), reached a settlement with Visa, MasterCard and their member banks and 
financial institutions regarding the networks‘ operations.   Specifically, the settlements 
required that average interchange fees be reduced over a period of years,
36
 retailers be 
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  Little information was released on the exact nature of the interchange fee decreases, although the 
associated Commerce Commission media release simply says, ―significantly reducing the average 
interchange fees charged on New Zealand credit card transactions...‖ 
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offered unbundled, unblended MSFs
37
 and retailers be allowed to surcharge for credit 
card transactions.  The Commission believed these actions would cause issuers to set 
interchange fees in competition with each other.  The settlements also explicitly defined 
criteria for access to networks issuing Visa and MasterCard payment cards for financial 
and non-financial entities.  Although only a limited amount of time has progressed since 
the Commission‘s settlements, initial evidence indicates that the majority of merchants 
are not surcharging credit card transactions (New Zealand Herald, 2010, February 1).  
Indicating its discomfort with the nature of surcharging that was starting to occur, 
however, the Commission issued a press release (2010, January 12) that said it was 
―taking a close interest in the surcharges some retailers have introduced‖ and ―watching 
developments to ensure that the long-term interests of consumers are being served.‖  
4.5.5 Data Showing Payment Instrument Adoption in New Zealand 
To measure the level of debit and credit card adoption in New Zealand, I have used data 
from the Electronic Card Transactions series, maintained by Statistics New Zealand 
(2010a), which provides information for acquired transactions.  I combine this data with 
population data as measured by the Total Estimated Resident Population also from 
Statistics New Zealand (2010b) to calculate the number of transactions per capita. 
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4.6 Norway 
4.6.1 Retail Payment Systems and Government Controls of Banking 
For much of the period following World War 2 until the 1970s, the Norwegian 
Government placed substantial restrictions on the operation of the economy and on 
banks (Ecklund and Knutsen, 2001).  They argue that formal and informal rules rationed 
demand for credit by controlling both investment and interest rates.  Furthermore, the 
report that the Government even encouraged a system of price cartels, which benefitted 
the established firms by drastically reducing competition. 
A giro system also developed in Norway with the postal network‘s Postgiro being 
established in 1943 and Bankgiro three years later (Gresvik and Øwre, 2003, p. 15).  I 
have found little further evidence on the exact nature of Norway‘s giro networks, prior 
to the introduction of electronic giros.  The bank owned, not-for-profit joint venture, 
Bankenes BetalingsSentral AS (BBS), was established in 1973 to operate a clearing 
house for Bankgiro payments (Office of Fair Trading, 2005, p. 237).  In the late 1970s, 
Norwegian banks also established ATM services (Gresvik and Øwre, 2003, p. 15).  
Enge and Øwre (2006, p. 169) cite Norwegian Government reports that consider 
national card networks published as early as 1974.  However, they report (p. 167) that 
cards were not introduced for (direct) payment in Norway until the early 1980s: 
Oil companies were the first to introduce card payments in Norway (each 
company had its own card). In 1982 the Banking Association entered into 
framework agreements with oil companies on the use of banks‘ cards (ATM 
cards) in the oil companies‘ terminals. The first bank-operated card payment 
project took place in 1983/84 at the OBS department store at Løren, Oslo.  
Hirsch (1984, p. 7) describes how the savings banks joined with one oil company, Shell, 
to create a network using the banks‘ ATM cards, which became operational in 
September 1981.  Another oil company, Esso, and the commercial banks followed with 
a network in the autumn, 1983.  By late 1984, the two networks had agreed to 
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interconnect, allowing the use of one card in both.  Hirsch also mentions a small scale 
EFTPOS pilot in Norwegian supermarkets and initial trials of a card based on a chip 
rather than on a magnetic strip. 
4.6.2 A New Approach to the Regulation of Banks: Deregulation and Crisis 
Norway experienced a process of deregulation, starting gradually in the late-1970s and 
gathering pace during the early- to mid-1980s.  Ecklund and Knutsen (2001, p.20) 
comment that: 
The highly interventionist old model of selective credit regulation was not 
scrapped in one formal decision, but rather through a process of several 
decisions stretching over a period of ten years. 
From 1984, Norway allowed foreign banks to enter its banking market (Jacobsen and 
Tschoegl, 1999, pp. 148-149).  Up until the mid- to late-1980s, banking regulators in the 
Nordic countries had forced banks with international operations to use legally distinct 
subsidiaries or partnerships with other banks.  After that time, the regulators began to 
permit their banks to use branches abroad, increasing the level of competition in 
Norway. 
However, from 1987-92, the Norwegian banking system experienced a near collapse, 
resulting in major injections of funding by the Norwegian Government and the 
nationalisation of three major banks.
38
  As a result of the crisis, the Bank Guarantee Act 
was passed to shore up confidence in the banking system (Mayer Brown, 2009, 
September 8, p. 1). Two of the nationalised banks were sold in 1995 and 2000, while 
the Government retained a 34% stake in the third (Atle Berg and Eitrheim, 2009, p. 5). 
                                                 
38
  For an in-depth summary of the crisis, its causes and consequences, see Ecklund and Knutsen 
(2001). 
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4.6.3 Payment System Development Following the Reforms 
In the mid-1980s, there were three debit card systems in Norway: commercial banks 
issued cards with microprocessor chip technology, whereas the two systems operated by 
the savings banks and Postbanken, the Norwegian Post Bank, issued cards with 
magnetic strip technology (Enge and Øwre, 2006, p. 167).  At this time, the central 
bank, Norges Bank, worked to increase coordination by, amongst other things, creating 
the Technical Reporting Committee on Payment Systems.  In 1986, the two banking 
associations reached an agreement with retail organisations to install POS terminals.  
However, according to Enge and Øwre (2006, p. 167), the organisations found it 
difficult to reach a coordinated solution: 
... partly because of the costs of preparing terminals that could read both chips 
and magnetic stripes [sic], partly because of different views on the security 
aspects of the different solutions, and partly for market strategy reasons. 
Indeed, the UK Office of Fair Trading (2005, p. 238) comments that ―Norges Bank was 
instrumental in facilitating the merger of the three schemes, as the banks were unable to 
reach agreement amongst themselves.‖  This quote appears to be contrary to the 
evidence discussed above that agreements were reached to link the POS payment 
networks used by the oil companies.  Whatever the underlying cause, however, the 
banks succeeded in creating a new POS debit card payment network, BankAxept, one 
that relied on explicit pricing for consumers of payment instrument use. 
Explicit pricing and BankAxept 
Enge and Øwre (2006) describe the development from the 1970s to the 1990s of the 
institution of charging consumers, rather than merchants, for the use of payment 
instruments.  To begin with, banks and public authorities gradually promoted charges to 
consumers for the use of cheques, although the practice was resisted by trade unions.  
During the Norwegian banking crisis, authorities encouraged charging for payment 
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services to reduce banks‘ financial losses.  Enge and Øwre indicate that this approach of 
charging consumers for instrument use contributed significantly to the development of 
Norway‘s domestic debit card payment system, BankAxept. 
BankAxept AS was created following the banking associations reaching an agreement 
in 1991 for a jointly-owned company responsible for operating the system, choosing its 
technology and approving the types of terminals to be linked to the network (Enge and 
Øwre, 2006, p. 168).  In 1992, BankAxept commenced operations, with a magnetic strip 
becoming standard on its cards (Norges Bank, 2007, p. 9).  BankAxept was developed 
with cardholders and merchants paying fees to their banks and merchants paying rental 
for terminals, but without any (positive or negative) interchange fees (Norges Bank, 
2006a, Answer to Question 50).  Gresvik and Haare (2009b, p. 24) comment that 
BankAxept ―mainly charges merchants for the rental of the terminal and, in some cases, 
a flat fee per transaction of a few øre (1 NOK = 100 øre).‖39  Based on a survey of fees 
charged by banks for BankAxept transactions (Norges Bank, 2006b, p. 24), Norwegian 
consumers generally pay a transaction fee of 2.00 to 2.50 NOK, with only four out of 24 
banks charging less than 2.00 NOK.
40
 
In 1996, once it was satisfied that there were appropriate arrangements for inclusion of 
the system operated by Postbanken, the Ministry of Finance approved the agreement for 
linking the different systems (Enge and Øwre, 2006, p. 168).
41
  Furthermore, the 
government does not appear to have been involved when the banks arranged to 
                                                 
39
  Norges Bank (2010, p. 11) indicates BankAxept MSFs are slightly higher when it says the fee 
normally charged is approximately between NOK 0.12-0.20. 
40
  Using the average exchange rate for 2006, 1 NOK = US$0.16 (Source: OANDA, 2011). 
41
  Although not initially approved by the Ministry of Finance, an agreement was reached in 1992 
allowing Postbanken customers to use their cards in BankAxept terminals. 
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introduce EMV chip technology to Bankaxept terminals and cards, which was expected 
to happen by 1 April 2009 (Konkurransetilsynet, 2009, p. 93).
42
 
Although BankAxept terminals are also able to accept other cards, BankAxept is 
primarily a domestic debit card network with limited use abroad (Kredittilsynet, 2004, 
p. 17).  However, most BankAxept cards can also function as an international payment 
card; these cards are referred to as combined cards and allow greater use outside of 
Norway.  I have not found evidence on when international payment cards were 
introduced in Norway, although Norges Bank (2010, p. 11) does suggest a date by 
which they had been introduced when it notes that, for such cards, ―[f]ees charged to 
merchants have fallen gradually since the mid-1990s.‖  In regard to merchants‘ fees, it 
is important firstly to note that, within Norway, most merchants‘ terminals are 
programmed to prefer BankAxept whenever possible (Kredittilsynet, 2004, p. 17).  If 
BankAxept is not available, however, merchants incur MSFs of a proportional nature, 
with Norges Bank (2008, p. 14) supplying average MSFs and interchange fees.  
Kaardal, Ryste and Solberg (2007, p. 10) clarify that the merchants are commonly 
charged the same MSF for Visa and MasterCard transactions, regardless of whether 
they involve a credit or a debit card, an approach they say is not common in other 
European Union countries and one that comes in spite of interchange fees in Norway for 
credit card transactions being approximately twice as high as those for debit card 
transactions.
43
  Credit card use has been limited as Norwegian banks have traditionally 
offered credit through overdrafts; though in recent years banks have begun to issue 
credit cards (Office of Fair Trading, 2005, p. 233).  Norges Bank annual reports do, 
                                                 
42
  Translation from Norwegian to English provided by Anton Nannestad (2011, March 4). 
43
  Translation from Norwegian provided by Anton Nannestad (2010, May 11, personal 
communication). 
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however, indicate that a small number of transactions completed using domestic credit 
card networks, although I have not found any evidence of their development. 
Other retail payment systems 
In 1988, following the difficulties of one small bank meeting its obligations, the 
Norwegian banks decided to establish a new interbank retail payment system to be 
operated by the bank-owned joint venture, BBS, the Norwegian Interbank Clearing 
System (NICS).  Following that decision, development was slowed by the Norwegian 
banking crisis, with the system not beginning operations until 1993.  It clears over 90% 
of Norway‘s retail transactions, including debit card payments, cheques, giro credits and 
direct debits (Office of Fair Trading, 2005, p. 236).
44
  In checking the ease of access to 
payment networks, European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority (2008, p. 
64) reports that no request for membership of NICS has been refused, although it 
reports that there are a number of other systems operated by individual banks, such as 
DnB NOR Bank ASA, and smaller banks do not directly need to use NICS (Norges 
Bank, 2005, p. 37). 
In addition to the NICS interbank network, the giro system continued to develop from 
the perspective of consumers.  In 1992, Giromail and the telephone giro were launched 
and the Postgiro and Bankgiro systems were merged in 1996, creating a common 
system, and PC/Internet giro services were launched the same year (Gresvik and Øwre, 
2003, p. 15).  The Norwegian banks launched a domestic bill payment system branded 
eFaktura in 2000 (Office of Fair Trading, 2005, p. 247).  The system functions as a 
billing information service, assisting users making internet giro payments (Gresvik and 
Haare, 2009a, p. 22). 
                                                 
44
  Visa and MasterCard credit and charge card transactions are cleared and settled using each schemes‘ 
own systems. 
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In 1995, Norges Bank established the Cash Card Forum, to be chaired by it and to have 
members from the transport, communications and banking sectors (Norges Bank, 1999, 
December, p. 29).  A number of tests of stored-value systems occurred in the late 1990s, 
including of the Mondex system, but the Forum did not appear to meet again after 1998 
(Norges Bank, 2000, pp. 13, 33).  In accordance with the two Directives issued in 2000 
by the European Commission on the issue, the Norwegian Parliament passed the Act 
concerning Electronic Money Institutions in 2002 (Kredittilsynet, 2008, provides an 
English translation of the Act).  Along the lines of prudential regulations for banks, the 
Act specifies prudential and operational standards that organisations issuing electronic 
money must meet, with the rules to be administered by the Kredittilsynet, the Financial 
Supervisory Authority. 
4.6.4 Interventions in Retail Payment Systems 
As discussed above, the Norwegian Government has traditionally adopted an 
interventionist approach to the country‘s economy.  During the first decade of this 
century, the Norwegian authorities have taken a number of actions consistent with that.  
The Financial Contracts Act, passed by the Norwegian Government in 2000, outlawed 
banks keeping float income
45
 associated with payment system use (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2005, p. 242).  The legislation was supported by, amongst others, consumer 
groups and the Norges Bank who viewed float income as not encouraging transparency 
or efficiency.  Office of Fair Trading (2005b, p. 242) notes that modifying systems to 
remove float income did not require any modifications to the NICS payment system; 
only changes to internal bank systems.  In two incidents, authorities voiced concerns 
about the operation of retail payment systems, possibly indicating a willingness to 
intervene.  In 2004, Kredittilsynet (the Financial Supervisory Authority) published a 
                                                 
45
  Float income is defined as the interest income from the time between when the financial 
intermediary collects the payment from the payor and passes it to the payee (Thompson, 2009, p. vi). 
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report considering the regulation of international card companies‘ fees.  While the 
report did not recommend regulation, it suggests intervention may be warranted in the 
setting of interchange fees and the use of the No-Surcharge Rule
46
 (p. 43): 
If the competitive situation and price level in the acquirer market does not 
improve after the observation period is over, however, the project group will 
recommend that the Ministry of Finance evaluates regulating the interchange 
fee. In addition, it may be in place for the Norwegian Competition Authority to 
evaluate the legality of some competition-limiting clauses in the contracts 
between acquirers and merchants. This will apply in particular to the no-
discrimination clause. 
The report did not make any recommendations regarding the Honour-All-Cards rule,
47
 
instead saying that (p. 41) its abolition ―probably has no practical significance in the 
Norwegian market today.‖ 
In a media release in 2008 (May 8), Norges Bank complained that some banks were 
reducing prices for many payment services or offering them free of charge.  The press 
release says that Norges Bank Governor, Svein Gjedrem, had said that this was ―not in 
bank customers‘ best interests‖, before adding: 
A reduction in earnings may reduce banks‘ capacity and willingness to invest 
in improved infrastructure. Furthermore, without cost coverage, payment 
services will have to be financed by earnings from other services. This sends 
the wrong signal to customers and may result in the inefficient use of 
resources. 
In addition to the above actions, authorities have shown an interest in improving the 
integration of the six Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Faroe 
Islands and Iceland) (for example, see Nordic Competition Authorities, 2006).  
Consistent with this interest, Norwegian authorities have questioned access to 
Norwegian retail payment systems.  In 2003, the Norwegian competition authority, 
Konkurransetilsynet, found that an agreement giving BBS exclusivity for acquiring 
                                                 
46
  The No-Surcharge Rule is also known as the No-Discrimination Rule in European countries. 
47
  Also known as the Handle-All-Cards Rule in Norway. 
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EFTPOS transactions was contrary to competition rules because it prevented banks 
from unilaterally choosing to use other acquirers (Nordic Competition Authorities, 
2006, p. 45).  Nevertheless, European Free Trade Association Surveillance Authority 
(2008, pp. 64-65) reports that, while the governance structure of payment systems and 
the structure of the fee systems may raise entry barriers for smaller players, ―this only 
seems to apply to a very limited extent...‖ 
In spite of the suggestions of interventions describe above, at least one authority has 
shown a pragmatic approach to direct payment system regulation.  Konkurransetilsynet 
(2009, p. 96) argues that an increase in the availability of different types of payment 
cards gives more freedom to cardholders, which it argues leads to an increase in price 
competition for cardholders between the various card companies.
48
 
4.6.5 Data Showing Payment Instrument Adoption in Norway 
To measure the level of debit and credit card adoption in Norway, I have used data on 
the volume of issued transactions and population from the 2007 Norges Bank Annual 
Report on Payment Systems (Norges Bank, 2008), because that data was available in 
spreadsheet format.  To obtain data for 2008 and 2009, I used the 2009 Norges Bank 
Annual Report on Payment Systems (Norges Bank, 2010).  For several observations for 
the year 2007, I use data from this latter report, in place of data from the 2007 Annual 
Report because of minor inconsistencies.  The information presented for card 
transactions made in other countries using Norwegian cards does not distinguish 
between debit and credit cards.  Accordingly, I am able to calculate total issued 
transactions on debit and credit cards for Figure 1.1, but not for my table in section 3.5.  
For these, I calculate only the number of transactions made on Norwegian cards in 
Norway.  Furthermore, the Norges Bank category of ―Cards issued by international card 
                                                 
48
  Translation from Norwegian to English provided by Anton Nannestad (2011, March 4). 
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companies‖ does not distinguish between credit cards and debit cards, so I assume all 
are credit/charge card payments.  I confirmed my interpretation of the statistics in 
personal communication with a Norges Bank employee, Harald Haare, on February 5, 
2011. 
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4.7 United Kingdom 
4.7.1 Retail Payment Systems and Government Controls on Banking 
As Schooner and Taylor (1999) describe, successive British Government allowed the 
banking industry to exist under an informal approach to banking regulation during much 
of the second half of the twentieth century.  The country‘s central bank, the Bank of 
England, preferred dealing in an informal manner with a limited number of banks rather 
than a more formal, prescriptive approach to banking supervision.
49
  Gowland (2003, p. 
254) describes how new entry was difficult and the Bank of England encouraged a club 
with a closed group of players to develop.  The UK started to break away from this 
system following a 1973-74 banking crisis and a 1977 directive from the European 
Economic Community caused the British Government to implement a formal system of 
bank monitoring by passing the Banking Act 1979.  The Act created a two-tier system 
of banking supervision for ―recognised banks‖ and licensed deposit takers, imposing 
more specific supervision criteria on the latter, while allowing the Bank of England to 
continue its informal, flexible, case-by-case approach to the former (Schooner and 
Taylor, 1999, pp. 630-631). 
Charge cards and credit cards 
The Diners Club card began operations in the UK in the early 1950s with American 
Express first issuing cards in the UK in 1963 (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 
1980, paras. 2.10-2.12).  In 1955, Barclays Bank formed the view that, with sufficient 
demand, a credit card could become part of its service offering.  However, it was not 
until 1965 that the company decided demand was enough to begin issuing Barclaycard 
and became the first international issuer of BankAmericard (later to become Visa 
                                                 
49
  As an example, Schooner and Taylor (1999, p. 621) note that the Bank of England has never 
actually issued a formal directive to the banks it supervised, in spite of having the power to do so in 
the period following the Second World War.  
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International).
50
  The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (paras. 2.10-2.13) reports 
that other clearing banks were unconvinced that the Barclaycard would prove profitable 
and introduced cheque guarantee cards, instead.  However, by 1970, it had become 
apparent to three of these banks that the Barclaycard was having a large impact on their 
business, leading them to eventually create the Joint Credit Card Company Limited 
(JCCC) and issue the Access card from 1972 (ibid).
51
 
ATM and direct entry payment networks 
Barclays Bank installed arguably the world's first ATM in its Enfield retail branch in 
June 1967 (Bátiz-Lazo, 2009, p. 6).  A large amount of technological improvement 
followed with banks creating a base of installed ATMs and adding to their functionality.  
From 1982, groups of banks and NBFIs started sharing ATM arrangements to give their 
depositors access to a larger number of ATMs than just those owned by their 
organisation (Bátiz-Lazo, 2009; Rob Walker, former Manager, Business Services, 
EFTPOS UK, 2010, May 20, personal communication).  One group, which initially 
included banks and building societies, the government-owned National Giro bank and 
American Express, established the jointly-owned firm, LINK, in 1985, which was to 
subsequently become the dominant ATM service provider in the UK (Bátiz-Lazo, 2009, 
p. 17). 
In 1968, two major developments occurred that aided retail funds transfers between 
banks.  The Inter-bank Computer Bureau was created to process inter-bank direct entry 
transactions (Rollason, 1989, p. 13) and the National Giro Centre was established to 
help the UK Post Office copy its European counterparts by offering funds transfers 
through Post Office branches (Bátiz-Lazo and Wood, 2002, p. 196).  From the first 
                                                 
50
  The Barclaycard was first issued in 1966 (Cruickshank, 2000, para. 3.6). 
51
  The Access card would become associated with the Interbank Association and eventually become 
MasterCard. 
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organisation, Bankers' Automated Clearing Services Limited (BACS), a company 
jointly owned by members of the Committee of London Clearing Bankers, emerged in 
1971.
52
  The giro, meanwhile, ―had never been more than a pale copy of its German 
model‖ and the organisation that operated it was sold to private interests in 1993 
(Gowland, 2003, p. 268). 
In spite of the progress on ATMs and interbank transfer systems, less progress was 
made on a debit card-based payment system.  Initial investigations of the development 
of such a system began in 1974 (Howells and Hine, 1993, pp. 24-25).  Work did not 
start on such a system until 1985 and the intervening years saw a number of working 
parties and review groups producing reports that failed to convince the banks to 
implement a national network (Howells and Hine, ibid; Rob Walker, former Manager, 
Business Services, EFTPOS UK Limited, 2010, May 20, personal communication).   
In March 1984, the British banks published the Child Report, named after its author, 
Denis Child, in response to criticisms that they were refusing to grant new entrants 
access to payment systems (Duggan and Karpinski, 1988, pp. 35-36).  A central 
recommendation of the Child Report was for ―fair and explicit‖ criteria for the 
admission of companies to interbank infrastructure for payment systems (Rob Walker, 
former Manager, Business Services, EFTPOS UK, 2010, May 20, personal 
communication).  The Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) was set up 
in 1985 as a non-statutory association of the major banks and building societies (Ashton 
and Boyes, 2002, p. 211).  APACS became an umbrella organisation for BACS, the 
Cheque and Credit Clearing Company Limited (C&CCC) and Clearing House 
Automated Payment System Limited (CHAPS).  C&CCC was created in 1985 for 
                                                 
52
  In 1986, the name of the company was shortened to BACS Limited, to take account of a widening 
ownership. 
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cheque and giro clearing while CHAPS started operations in 1984 for large-value, 
wholesale payments in sterling (Cheque and Credit Clearing Company Limited, n.d.; 
UK Payments Administration, n.d.).  Yet some access problems appeared to remain: 
according to Duggan and Karpinski, two consortia of building societies applied to join 
BACS in 1984, but were refused entry. 
4.7.2 A New Approach to the Regulation of Banks 
Re-regulation rather than deregulation 
The removal of exchange controls in 1979 and quantitative controls on bank lending 
were the start of some deregulatory change in the UK (Matthews, Murinde and Zhao, 
2007, p. 2026).  Care should be taken, however, not to describe the process as dramatic; 
for example, Gowland (2003, p. 272) describes banking legislation passed in 1979 as 
―neither deregulatory nor increased regulation but the move towards a more formal 
system [that] was in a sense deregulation.‖  Legislation removed some distinctions that 
existed between financial organisations: one major example was the Building Societies 
Act 1986, which allowed building societies to diversify their business portfolios and put 
them on a similar footing to the clearing banks (Bátiz-Lazo, 2009, p. 17).  However, 
Peeters (1988, p. 404) rejects the description of this legislation as deregulation, instead 
describing it as ―a perfect example of re-regulation.‖  Minor acts of deregulation 
continued to reduce the nature and scope of the regulation of financial institutions 
through to the new century (Gowland, 2003, p. 272).  However, a significant amount of 
ongoing uncertainty existed regarding the regulatory environment, particularly with the 
creation of the Financial Services Authority (―the FSA‖), which acquired 
responsibilities for prudential supervision from the Bank of England in 1997.  Gowland 
(2003, p. 272) states that this uncertainty meant the banking system never reached a 
―liberal model‖ of regulation. 
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Consistent with uncertainty diminishing the pro-competitive impact of deregulatory 
reforms, Matthews, Murinde and Zhao (2007) analyse data for 12 banks for the period 
1980–2004 and find that ―the intensity of competition in the core market for bank 
lending remained approximately unchanged throughout the 1980s and 1990s‖.  
Studying the industry in a report published in 2000, Don Cruickshank found evidence of 
continued competition problems in the UK‘s banking industry (para. 1.7):  
The Review concluded that the special treatment of banks goes further than the 
risks of the banking business require, and that the most likely explanation lies 
in the existence of an informal contract between successive governments and 
banks, designed to deliver public confidence in the banking system, but in 
practice straying well beyond the policies required to achieve that vital 
objective. In return for cooperating in the delivery of this objective, the 
banking industry has been allowed to escape the rigours of effective 
competition. Thus in developing policy government tended to negotiate with 
the larger banks, rather than set up incentives on them and others to deliver 
particular outcomes. 
Cruickshank identifies (paras. 2.16-2.32) a number of significant barriers to entry, 
efficiency and innovation created by, he suggests, this contract.  He argues barriers to 
entrants come from:
 53
 
 the FSA informally requiring new entrants to be linked with an established bank 
 the FSA informally requiring that banks not be owned by a non-banking parent 
 the FSA‘s criteria for authorisation of new banks not being transparent 
 the FSA requiring higher capital asset ratios of new entrants than of established 
players 
 inconsistencies in the application of the UK‘s Value Added Tax (VAT) that make 
outsourcing of banking services a less attractive option, creating a barrier for 
smaller banks 
                                                 
53
  The Bank of England Act 1998 had, by that time, formerly transferred supervisory responsibilities 
from the Bank of England to the FSA. 
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 overly prescriptive regulatory rules, including anti-money laundering rules, which 
favour established banks. 
If the publication of the Cruickshank Report represented an opportunity for the nature of 
the regulatory contract to be changed, it appears to have been missed.  Le Fanu (2004) 
notes that the UK Government remained wedded to holding the banks to its informal 
contract, by having banks function as an arm of government by helping to deliver 
government policies - Le Fanu notes (p. 154) the role of banks in providing training for 
small and medium sized businesses as an example of this. 
4.7.3 Payment System Development Following the Reforms 
Debit cards and EFTPOS UK 
In spring 1985, serious, collective attempts started to develop national EFTPOS 
technology (Rob Walker, former Manager, Business Services, EFTPOS UK Limited, 
2010, May 20, personal communication).  Following a 1986 report from the EFTPOS 
strategy review committee, the banks agreed on a strategy for such a network, creating 
EFTPOS Administration Ltd in 1987 to be run by APACS (Howells and Hine, 1991, p. 
398).  The company eventually became EFTPOS UK Limited (EFTPOS UK) and it 
began work on a national approach to debit cards called the Unified Debit Card Scheme 
(UDCS). 
The review process that preceded the creation of EFTPOS UK appeared overly slow to 
a number of banks, leading them to create their own EFTPOS trials, independent of the 
national network.
54
  Howells and Hine (1993, pp. 25-26) argue that one impetus for the 
banks‘ trials came from Cresta Communications‘ 1984 EFTPOS experiment in London.  
Cresta, whose offline system proved popular with retailers, was owned by British 
                                                 
54
  The first EFTPOS system I have found information on is one called Counterplus trialed by the 
Scottish clearing bank, Clydesdale Bank, in February 1982 (Klein and Lambert, 1987, p. 158). 
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Telecom, who also became involved with EFTPOS UK and eventually discontinued 
development of its separate system.  Bank trials included the Pretty Damn Quick (PDQ) 
terminal launched commercially by Barclays Bank for credit card transactions in 1986.  
PDQ operated using the DES encryption algorithm, which, at that time, was not thought 
to be compatible with an alternative algorithm, RSA (Howells and Hine, 1993, p. 404). 
In 1986, as the industry moved towards a national network, Barclays threatened to 
withdraw unless EFTPOS UK adopted a DES encryption algorithm thereby making the 
UDCD compatible with Barclays‘ PDQ terminals (Howells and Hine, 1993, p. 404).  
EFTPOS UK eventually chose to use a RSA algorithm, in spite of the PDQ receiving 
substantially more use, internationally (ibid, pp. 187-188).  Before this happened, 
however, Barclays announced, in October 1986 it was launching a Visa debit card, 
Connect, adding debit card functionality to its PDQ terminals, and launching Connect in 
April 1987 (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1989, para. 2.79).
55
  The 
announcement represented a substantial departure from the national approach, which 
had been working towards the UDCS and caused other banks to follow suit and 
introduce their own networks - another major UK bank, Lloyds, announced it was 
following Barclays by introducing a Visa debit card, while three other EFTPOS UK 
members announced their agreement to introduce the Switch debit card network in 
1988.
56
   
Given the development of other debit card networks occurring in parallel with UDCS 
development, Howells and Hine (1993, p. 124) pose the question, ―why did EFTPOS 
UK Ltd continue as an ongoing project after 1987?‖  They suggest that the member 
banks stayed involved to influence outcomes, to avoid providing an opportunity for one 
                                                 
55
  In spite of launching a competing card, Barclays remained a member of EFTPOS UK. 
56
  These debit cards functioned using signatures.  The development of online debit cards, which 
functioned using PINs, did not occur until 1997, as I discuss below. 
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bank‘s competitors to unite against its interests and to be seen to conform to the 
interests of the industry.  This latter role is important because the British central bank, 
the Bank of England, held a seat on the board of EFTPOS UK Ltd and Howells and 
Hine argue (p. 115), it had a strong preference for a co-operative national network to 
maintain public confidence in the banking system.  They quote one bank manager as 
saying (p. 114): 
There‘s no way somebody like Barclays could stay out of that [EFTPOS UK], 
even if they wished to stay out of it.  I think there would have been a lot of 
arm-twisting at governmental level, if you like, to persuade a major bank to 
participate in the new clearing system. 
Another is quoted (pp. 114-115): 
Now, I don‘t think it‘s accidental, and this is a personal view, that someone 
from the Bank of England was brought in to try and knock heads together and 
to try and find a way forward. 
In January 1990, APACS announced the success of the first EFTPOS UK trial, known 
as the Business Inaugural Service, but also, in spite of this success, its early wind-up 
(Howells and Hine, 1993, p. 134).  This left competition over the provision of debit card 
services to the Switch and Visa debit card brands. 
Further ATM and debit card developments 
During this time, building societies and banks continued to build on the ATM network, 
LINK.  LINK acquired other shared ATM networks and, during the early 1990s, 
gradually supplanted the practice of banks signing interbank sharing agreements to 
allow customers to use another bank‘s ATMs (Bátiz-Lazo, 2009, p. 18).  According to 
Bátiz-Lazo, such agreements proved cumbersome to manage and gave banks only a 
limited ability to increase the scale of their ATM networks, making membershipof the 
LINK payment network an attractive proposition.  
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Pricing principles in the UK appear to be more limited than in my other sample 
countries.  I have not found any background to its existence, but Milne (2007, p. 66) 
says that, ―... while there is no legal restriction, the convention of 'free in credit banking' 
is well established (this is the convention that personal bank customers should not be 
charged for payments services provided their accounts remain in credit or within agreed 
overdraft limits).‖  Being unable to charge customers for debit cards implies a need to 
charge merchants.  Barclays initially encountered difficulty promoting its Connect card 
to merchants when it proposed charging them proportional fees for acquiring Connect 
transactions, as happened for Visa credit card transactions (Howells and Hine, 1993, pp. 
70-73).  However, merchants rebelled, identifying debit cards as a replacement for 
cheques, which incurred fixed per-transaction fees.  A number of retailers went as far as 
to flagrantly break Visa‘s Honour-All-Cards Rule by accepting Visa credit cards, but 
not debit cards.  In December 1987, however, Barclays backed down and agreed to 
charge a fixed fee for most transactions.  While Visa set fixed interchange fees to be 
used between its members for all debit card transactions, Switch negotiated interchange 
fees bilaterally, which, in the early 1990s, were rumoured to be zero, causing Switch 
transactions to incur significantly lower MSFs than Visa transactions (Howells and 
Hine, 1993, p. 80).  MSFs remained significant for debit cards in the UK; Van Hove 
(2007, p. 8) who, citing the magazine, Cards Technology, refers to debit card 
transactions as having a price of 10 pence or less per transaction for large retailers to 19 
pence for small ones.
57
  In addition to paying MSFs, merchants are generally required to 
buy or rent debit card terminals in the UK (Rob Walker, former Manager, Business 
Services, EFTPOS UK Limited, 2010, September 14, personal communication). 
                                                 
57
  Further evidence comes from Worthington and Harbisher (1997, p. 269); they identify that debit 
card payments cost large corporate merchants only a few pence, but cost some small independent 
retailers anything up to 80 p. 
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The aggressive competition from the Switch debit card brand caused Barclays Bank, a 
Visa debit card issuer, to take Switch to the Office of Fair Trading in early 1990 
because it objected to the Switch rule that any member issue a Switch debit card as its 
main debit card (Howells and Hine, 1993, pp. 55-56).  This rule prevented Barclays 
Bank from acquiring Switch transactions and, according to Howells and Hine, the 
Office of Fair Trading threatened to refer Switch to the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Court, resulting in Switch dropping the rule.  Barclays Bank was subsequently allowed 
to become a member of Switch, as an acquirer and issue Switch cards as well as its Visa 
Connect card. 
A Monopolies and Mergers Commission report (1989) (discussed below) commented 
(para. 2.87) on a complaint from the food supermarket operator, Sainsbury, that it 
wanted to accept Visa‘s debit cards but not its credit cards, but could not do so because 
of the Honour-All-Cards Rule.  Shortly after the report‘s August publication, Visa and 
Barclays Bank launched the Visa Electron card, allowing merchants to accept it, but not 
Visa‘s credit cards, thereby allowing them to increase Visa Electron‘s acceptance and 
compete more effectively with the Switch debit card, which did not suffer from such 
constraints (Barchard, 1989, November 4).  
During the 1990s, both debit card networks introduced online, PIN-based networks; 
Switch with the 1997 launch of the Solo card and Visa with a second launch in 1997 of 
the Electron card (Rob Walker, former Manager, Business Services, EFTPOS UK, 
2010, May 20, personal communication).
58
  The Switch debit card was eventually 
merged into the MasterCard brand, while the Solo card remained a distinct brand.  At 
the time the change occurred, the network shifted from bilateral inter-bank agreements 
to one multilateral, hub-and-spoke agreement (Office of Fair Trading, 2003, p. 119).  
                                                 
58
  The first Visa Electron card was withdrawn in 1991 and replaced with the Visa Delta debit card. 
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Chip and PIN 
In 1994, concerns about fraud meant APACS members formed the Integrated Chip Card 
(ICC) project to provide an infrastructure to replace all magnetic strip based debit, credit 
and ATM cards with chip-based cards (Rob Walker, former Manager, Business 
Services, EFTPOS UK Limited, 2010, May 20, personal communication; Böhle, Rader 
and Riehm, 1999, p. 39).  In 1993, the card schemes, MasterCard International, Europay 
International and Visa International, began co–operating in a working group on smart 
payment cards with their standard, which become known as EMV, first being released 
in 1994 (Birch, 1999, p. 1).  In the UK, initial trials of this technology commenced in 
1997 and were seen as successful with a national rollout begun in 1998 (Keycorp 
Limited, 2006, pp. 2-3).  However, the trials and subsequent rollout continued to use 
signatures for cardholder verification, contributing to delays at the POS that reduced 
retailer support for the technology.  Indeed, Birch (1999, p. 3) notes that the British 
Retail Consortium, which covered approximately 90% of the retail sector, effectively 
boycotted the roll-out and its members refused to be involved.  During 2002, the 
banking and retail industries reached an agreement to proceed with technology that used 
the EMV chip standard with PINs to verify cardholders - technology called Chip and 
PIN (Keycorp Limited, 2006, p. 3).  APACS performed a trial of Chip and PIN, its 
second of EMV technology, once again in Northampton in 2003.  The trial was judged 
successful and the national roll out of the technology began later that year.
59
 
I have not found evidence showing that the roll out of Chip and PIN involved 
substantial modifications to debit card MSFs in the UK.  There was some complaint 
from merchants that there was no business case for Chip and PIN, which is understood 
                                                 
59
  From the beginning of 2005, liability for fraudulent Chip and PIN card transactions at merchant not 
using a Chip and PIN terminal lay with the acquirer or, depending on the its contract with the 
acquirer, the merchant itself (Office of Fair Trading, 2005, p. 118). 
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to have led to a ―relatively small‖ plan to provide merchants with incentives to upgrade 
merchant-owned terminals (Rob Walker, former Manager, Business Services, EFTPOS 
UK Limited, 2010, September 14, personal communication). 
The ATM network, LINK, gradually increased in size with a number of major banks 
joining during the late 1990s (Bátiz-Lazo, 2009, pp. 19-20).  One bank, Barclays, 
attempted to introduce charges for ATM transactions, but the move attracted such 
comment from the media and other members of LINK that it was subsequently 
abandoned, restoring LINK‘s ―free to use‖, single national ATM network status.  By 
2007, all banks and building societies were members of LINK (Milne, 2007, p. 71). 
Stored-value cards and London’s Oyster card 
Ives and Earl (1997) describe the initial development in the UK of the Mondex stored-
value system.  The first major trial of the Mondex instrument occurred in Swindon in 
1995.  Mondex was licensed internationally from around that time with Mondex 
International Limited, headquartered in London, established in 1996 to act as a 
franchisor.  MasterCard purchased 51% of Mondex in 1996.  However, the Mondex 
system was not seen as a successful and later offered as a reason why banks would only 
wish to roll out a new instrument incrementally (MVAConsultancy, 2008, p. 4.5) 
Bamodu (2003) summarises the regulatory framework introduced in the UK, consisting 
principally of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, in response to the European 
Union‘s Electronic Money Directive (2000/46/EC).  The framework introduced a 
regulatory and supervisory framework for an electronic money institution, an issuer of 
electronic money, to be administered by the FSA.  In 2003, Transport for London 
(―TfL‖) developed the Oyster card, a contactless card for use on London‘s Underground 
mass transit system.  According to The Evaluation Partnership (2006, p. 27), TfL argued 
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that the electronic money framework did not apply to it because of its structure, an 
argument that was accepted by the responsible regulatory authority, the FSA.
60
  By the 
middle of 2009, more than 6 million Oyster cards were in regular use (Transport for 
London, 2009, June 29).
61
  TfL had planned to extend Oyster to include an open e-purse 
usable for payments other than those relating to public transport, but TfL E-money 
Project Director, Will Judge, is quoted as saying that European Union regulations 
governing electronic money made it too expensive to go down that route 
(MVAConsultancy, 2008, April, p. 2.7).  Instead, TfL partnered with Barclays Bank, in 
2007, to launch a combined Oyster card with contactless credit card functionality 
(Kauffman, Li and van Heck, 2010, p. 6).  In 2008, TfL partnered with a number of 
other organisations to trial what was dubbed, the ―Oyster Phone‖ with which users 
could pay transit fares and make retail purchases by tapping their phones on readers 
(Balaban, 2008, November 1).  The trial was judged a success: nearly eight out of 10 
trial participants saying, if it was accepted, they would use the devices for payment; 
some participants reported to have "begged" to keep their phones after the six-month 
trial.  However, in spite of this encouragement, Balaban says that a roll-out was not 
forecast until 2010 and might even take longer than that.  I have been unable to find 
information suggesting further development of the Oyster phone. 
4.7.4 Interventions in Retail Payment Systems 
UK regulation of network rules and interchange fees 
Government authorities in the UK have shown a long history in the operation of retail 
payment systems.  Allowing merchants to surcharge credit card transactions was 
                                                 
60
  Specifically, TfL argued that it bought services from the different providers and then resold them to 
passengers. 
61
  This is relative to a population of over 7.5 million residents in Greater London in July 2005 (Office 
for National Statistics, 2007, June 22). 
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recommended by a 1980 Monopolies and Mergers Commission report (para. 11.106(d)).  
However, the UK Government decided against following the recommendation, ―mainly 
because customers were likely to be inconvenienced or confused, and the display of 
information on surcharges would impose undue burdens on traders and be difficult to 
enforce‖ (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1989, para. 2.5).  The Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission‘s 1989 report also found (para. 7.96) the rule ―operates against 
the public interest because it restricts the freedom of retailers to set their own prices.‖  It 
also noted (para. 7.95) that concerns about confusion were exaggerated ―because they 
underestimate the ability of consumers... to look effectively after their own interests.‖  
This time, the Government agreed with the recommendation, passing the Credit Card 
(Price Discrimination) Order 1990 to remove the No-Surcharge Rule from credit cards 
in early 1991 (The implications of Credit Card Order 1990, 1991, March 9).  I have 
found little evidence of the extent of surcharging for credit cards in the UK, although, in 
early 2011, a complaint was made to the UK regulator, the Office of Fair Trading, about 
surcharges that were higher than MSFs by the consumer group, Which? (Credit and 
debit card surcharges 'are excessive', 2011, February 11). 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1989, paras. 2.82-2.95) also considered the 
Honour-All-Cards rule in relation to the fees charged by Barclays Bank during its 1987 
launch of the Visa-badged Connect debit card and a complaint about the Honour-All-
Cards Rule made by Sainsbury‘s (both described in the previous sub-section).  The 
Commission saw the conduct as an attempt by Visa issuers to exploit their market 
power for Visa credit cards when introducing debit cards.  However, the report also said 
(paras. 7.101-7.102) that the Honour-All-Cards Rule was beneficial for cardholders and 
that it increased the ability for issuers to offer new card products.  Accordingly, the 
report did not recommend the abolition of the Honour-All-Cards Rule, but that the 
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Director General of Fair Trading would ―no doubt be alert for any further instances of 
its abuse.‖ 
Authorities have also shown an interest in interchange fees: without giving details of the 
nature of its investigation, Tseng (n.d.) uses information relating to interchange fees 
from an Office of Fair Trading (the ―OFT‖) report published in 1994.  I have not, 
however, found any evidence on OFT interchange fee investigations until 2000, when 
MasterCard applied for its interchange agreements to be granted an exemption to the 
Competition Act 1998, which came into effect that year (Colomer 2006, February 13).  
In response to MasterCard‘s application, the British Retail Consortium filed a complaint 
with the OFT, causing the authority to also investigate Visa, which had not submitted its  
agreements, voluntarily (Lee, 2003, February 12; UK interchange ruling is threat to 
credit cards worldwide, 2003, February 28).In September 2005, the OFT released a 
decision (2005a) that concluded that the MasterCard Multilateral Interchange Fee 
infringed the Competition Act 1998 and European Union competition law.  However, 
MasterCard appealed the finding, leading to the decision being set aside by the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal in June 2006.  The OFT started a second investigation, 
conducting it in parallel with its investigations of interchange fees for Visa; both are 
ongoing (Barclays Bank, 2010, August 6).  In February 2007, the OFT announced that it 
was expanding its investigation into interchange rates to include debit cards.  In 
September 2007, MasterCard abandoned a plan to introduce proportional charges for 
debit card transactions (UK retailers breathe sigh of relief, 2007, September 25). 
Direct entry payment networks 
Government concerns about the competitiveness of the banking industry led to a review 
of competition in banking services, named the Cruickshank review, after the inquiry 
chairman, Don Cruickshank.  The review reported in March 2000, identifying concerns 
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about price competition and innovation in the provision of payment services that 
required public policy intervention.  It recommended modifications to the governance 
structure of organisations involved in payments in the UK and proposed the creation of 
a payments regulator with legal powers to intervene in payments provision.  Milne 
(2007, p. 69) reports this proposal was successfully resisted by the banking industry, but 
the review did lead to the creation, announced by the Government in 2003, of the 
Payments System Task Force, to be headed by the competition regulator, the Office of 
Fair Trading.
62
   
The Cruickshank review‘s concerns about payment network innovation are analysed in 
a paper by Ganguly and Milne (2002).  They agree with the nature of the concerns, but 
suggest they are caused by poor incentives to invest in payment system innovations.  
Ganguly and Milne base analysis of these poor incentives on the unsupported assertion 
(made on p. 155) that, effectively, innovations are non-excludable.  The non-
excludability of innovations is implied by other researchers: the Office of Fair Trading 
(2003, para. 1.42) says ―... reflected some of the disincentives arising from the need to 
cooperate and the interdependency of decisions on investment.‖ Milne (2007, pp. 64-
65) says that, ―... innovation in shared bank-to-bank payments systems is held back 
because no individual bank can gain any competitive advantage from improvements in 
these shared payments arrangements.‖  However, I have been unable to document the 
reasons for the implied non-excludability of direct entry payment innovations in the UK 
and the issue, as well as the ultimate cause of the lack of direct entry payment 
innovations, remains an avenue for further research.   
                                                 
62
  In 2006, a recommendation of the Taskforce led to the creation of a successor body, the Payments 
Council, which has a 15 member board of directors comprising 11 representatives of the banking 
industry and four independents. 
175 
 
1
7
5
 
Whatever the cause, though, such innovation remained problematic: in 2002, BACS 
initiated technological renewal programme known as NewBACS, although significant 
uncertainty existed around the exact functionality of the new system (Office of Fair 
Trading, 2003, paras. 8.3, 9.140).  Although it required some intervention by the UK 
Government to achieve it, greater certainty existed around the creation of a network 
separate from BACS, the Faster Payments Service (Bank of England, 2009).  In 2004, 
the Payments System Task Force commissioned a working group to complete a report 
considering innovation in direct payments.  The working group reported the following 
year and recommended that modifications be made to increase the speed with which 
interbank transactions were processed (Office of Fair Trading, 2005b, p. 4).  In 2005, 
APACS awarded a contract to provide such a network called the Faster Payments 
Service.  Senechal (2010) describes how the service went beyond the Task Force‘s 
initial expectations to create a system suitable for a broad number of retail payments, 
including those made using the internet or mobile phones. 
During 2004, following an investigation of the supply of store card credit to consumers 
and of store card services to retailers, the Office of Fair Trading found the industry 
lacked transparency with the interest rate on credit given to consumers being 10 
percentage point higher, on average, than the average charged by credit cards.  The 
Office of Fair Trading referred the industry to the Competition Commission for further 
investigation.  Following its own investigation, the Competition Commission ordered 
changes to the industry, including that pertinent information, such as applicable interest 
rates, be displayed on customers‘ store card statements and that customers be given the 
easy ability to repay outstanding balances by direct debit. 
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4.7.5 Data Showing Payment Instrument Adoption in the United Kingdom 
To show adoption of debit and credit cards in the UK, I use debit card and credit card 
transaction data with population data from the Redbook publication, CPSS (2009) 
supplemented with data for 2000-2003 from the earlier Redbook, CPSS (2006).  In the 
data I user for credit card transactions, I include transactions completed with delayed 
debit cards.  Data discrepancies existing between different CPSS publications mean that 
I source data from the Redbook, CPSS (2008) for the years 2002 and 2003.  As a check 
on my use of the CPSS data, I use statistics from a UK Cards Association document, 
UK Payments Administration Limited, 2009, p. 2.  It provides a statistical release 
showing debit and credit card payment volumes from 2003 to 2008.  Importantly, the 
data show acquired transactions, in contrast to the CPSS Redbook data showing issued 
transactions.  In spite of the difference, the data compare well, with the Association‘s 
data all being within 5.6% (averaging -2.5%) of the CPSS figures.  
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4.8 United States 
4.8.1 Retail Payment Systems and Government Controls on Banking 
Schooner and Taylor (1999) give a chronology of the US banking system since the 
American Civil War, a chronology involving numerous interventions by state and 
federal governments.  They summarise (pp. 609-613) legislative actions that created a 
dual-banking system in the nineteenth century, involving federally-chartered banks 
alongside state-chartered ones.  Kane (1996, pp. 142-143) says that, beginning late in 
the nineteenth century, state governments introduced statutory barriers limiting the 
branching of state-chartered banks.
63
  Quoting the work of Golembe, Kane describes (p. 
143) the motivation behind branching restrictions: ―[a]lthough sponsors of branch-
banking statutes used the rhetoric of protecting customers against exploitation by 
regional and national money trusts, the lobbying force behind branching restrictions is 
widely acknowledged to be the preservation of local monopolies or oligopolies for 
community banks.‖  A large number of interventions were made around the time of the 
Great Depression.  These included the creation of a federal deposit insurance scheme, 
the regulation of interest rates offered by US banks that and the separation of firms that 
offered commercial banking services from those offering investment banking.  
Schooner and Taylor attribute (p. 651) the structure of US banking regulation put in 
place during the Great Depression to ―a powerful current of domestic politics‖ 
involving a deep-seated suspicion of money and of large financial institutions.  They 
also say (pp. 651-652) that ―difficulties the US has encountered in dismantling this 
system of constraints on banking is testament to the continued political appeal of this 
                                                 
63
  Restrictions on federally-chartered banks eventually developed to complement state restrictions with 
Banking Act of 1933 giving them the right to branch as state-chartered banks did (Kane, 1996, p. 
143). 
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ideology as well as to the strength of the domestic interests that benefit from the 
limitations on competition it creates.‖ 
In addition to regulations covering banking activity, another major influence on retail 
payment system development was the role of the central bank, the Federal Reserve, in 
the processing of cheques.
64
  The Federal Reserve Act, passed in 1913, created a 
regulatory system that was compulsory for federally-chartered banks and optional for 
state-chartered banks (Berle, 1949 p. 594).
65
  It also required the Federal Reserve 
establish a cheque-clearing system with its regional banks acting as cheque 
clearinghouses (Baxter, 1983, p. 567).  Baxter argues that the Federal Reserve used a 
mixture of subsidies and coercion to encourage banks to use its system and redeem 
cheques ―at par‖ (without transaction fees).  It was able to price cheque-clearing 
services in this way for member and non-member banks alike because it did not pay 
interest on the substantial reserves required to be deposited by members as part of its 
regulatory system (Baxter, 1983, p. 567).
66
  This pricing made it more difficult for 
alternative clearinghouses to compete for Federal Reserve members‘ and non-members‘ 
cheque-clearing business. 
The development of credit cards 
A major development for retail payment systems came in 1949 with the large-scale, 
national introduction of a payment card, the Diners Club card, that could be used by 
cardholders at many different retailers (Stearns, 2007, p. 36).  This type of card became 
known as a travel and entertainment, or T&E, card because it was principally used for 
                                                 
64
  The word, cheque, is spelt, check, in the U.S.  I adopt the spelling used in New Zealand in this 
thesis. 
65
  Berle notes that banks were given ―powerful inducements‖ to become members, but a substantial 
number remained non-members. 
66
  It was not until after legislative reform in 1980 that Federal Reserve Banks were required to recover 
the costs of providing services to member banks (Cavalluzzo, Ittner and Larcker, 1998, p. 2). 
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the payment of restaurant, hotel, airline and other business-related expenses.  In order to 
generate profit, Diners Club charged merchants an MSF by only paying them a 
discounted amount of the invoice, commonly six or seven percent less, much as had 
occurred for cheques prior to government interventions in the American cheque-clearing 
industry (Stearns, 2007, p. 36).  The card grew quickly, gaining over 100,000 
cardholders in just its first year, and expanded into Europe using franchise agreements 
in the mid-1950s (Stearns, 2007, pp. 38-39). 
As it expanded, Diners Club experienced strong resistance to its practice of charging 
MSFs by discounting the amount of invoices from some groups of merchants, 
particularly those in the hotel, oil and airline industries (Mandell, 1990, pp. 26-27).  
Some American and European hotel trade associations threw out members who 
accepted cards that had charged MSFs by discounting invoices, while British and 
Swedish hotels established their own card, the BHR card (which eventually became the 
EuroCard) and the American Hotel Trade Association introduced the Universal Travel 
Card.  Neither proved successful.  In fact, the Eurocard, which initially operated with 
only cardholder charges, was forced to introduce an MSF to improve its profitability 
(ibid, p. 27). 
The Universal Travel Card was one of a number of store cards in the US, accepted at 
only a single chain of stores or by a group of retail stores in the same industry.  
Although they have recently become less used by consumers, store cards have been a 
vibrant part of retail payment systems market in the US.
67
  Stearns (2007, pp. 38-39) 
summarises retailers‘ initial resistance to general use cards, in preference to their own 
store cards.  In fact, Stearns reports that the American Hotel Trade Association 
                                                 
67
  Indeed, as I described in section 2.1, the first use of a card to identify customers for payment was not 
a general-use card such as Diners Club, but a store card issued by the telegraph company, Western 
Union, for use by its customers in 1914 (Stearns, 2007, p. 32), 
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prohibited members from accepting some general use cards.  Durkin (2000, p. 624) 
reports that, in the early 1970s, store cards were much more widely held than general-
use credit cards, but that peaked in approximately 1990 and, by 1995, general-use cards 
had become more common.  Store cards also represent an avenue for entry to the T&E 
card (travel and entertainment card) industry, as demonstrated by the US department 
store chain, Sears Roebuck & Co. when it launched the Discover Card in 1985, 
―capitalizing on its tremendously successful store card‖ (Chang, 2004, p. 36).  Diners 
Club operated in the T&E card industry with little competition until travellers cheque 
issuer, American Express, and Carte Blanche, formerly a store card owned by Hilton 
Hotel Corporation, entered in 1958 (Stearns, 2007, pp. 40-41).  The increased 
competition led to greater use of computers for bookkeeping and billing and the 
introduction of gold cards for the most credit-worthy cardholders (Stearns, 2007, pp. 40-
42). 
Competition also came from banks.  From 1947, slightly before the introduction of the 
Diners Club card, over 100 banks experimented with introducing credit or charge cards, 
but most failed to become profitable, partly because banking regulations prevented card 
networks reaching sufficient size (Stearns, 2007, p. 43).
68
  In 1958, Bank of America 
introduced the BankAmericard to locations in California.  Stearns (2007, pp. 43-44) 
suggests this bank was ideally suited to creating a payment card because it operated in 
California, which allowed state-wide bank branching, giving the company a larger 
market for its card, and because it already offered consumer loans, unlike many other 
banks at that time.  Although banks tried similar systems following Bank of America‘s 
lead, many proved unsuccessful (Stearns, 2007, p. 48).  However, the second half of the 
1960s saw a sudden increase in the number of banks offering credit cards, a 
                                                 
68
  As described above, the governments of many US States placed restrictive regulations on the 
locations of branches of national- and state-chartered banks.  See Kane (1996) for further discussion. 
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development that Stearns (2007, pp. 48-49, referring to the work of Frederick Struble), 
attributes to the sudden increase in computing power experienced at that time and more 
importantly to the creation of national bankcard associations. 
Stearns (2007, p.4, 49) argues that associations were developed to create a national 
network of credit cards while getting around regulations preventing inter-state banking.  
Bank of America licensed its card to other banks to issue from 1966.
69
  To compete with 
the BankAmericard and its licensees, other banks formed regional, non-profit 
cooperative associations with their card programmes and joined them together to form 
the Interbank Card Association in 1966, which become MasterCard in 1979 (Evans and 
Schmalensee, 2005a, p. 66).  Initially, Bank of America‘s licence structure for 
BankAmericard was distinct from the associations and the BankAmericard remained 
effectively linked to Bank of America; this made other banks uncomfortable about 
issuing what was their competitor‘s card (Stearns, pp. 62-63; Evans and Schmalensee, 
p. 64).  This remained an issue until the BankAmericard license structure was turned 
into a multi-party membership corporation, named National BankAmericard Inc (NBI), 
in 1970 (Evans and Schmalensee, 2005b, pp. 64-65; Stearns, 2007, pp. 68-80).
70
  The 
new NBI structure was akin to the Interbank structure and the change marked the end of 
use of licenses for credit cards in the US.  National BankAmericard was renamed Visa 
in 1976 (Stearns, p. 130). 
In order to prevent Interbank hearing of its plans for development, NBI introduced a by-
law preventing full members of its organisation from also issuing Interbank‘s cards, a 
practice that became known as ―duality" (Stearns, 2007, pp. 123-125).  One NBI 
                                                 
69
  The card was also licensed for the first time internationally in 1966, to Barclay‘s Bank in the UK 
(Stearns, 2007, p. 50). 
70
  This organisation, and its international affiliate, IBANCO, adopted the name, Visa, in 1976 (Stearns, 
2007, p. 130). 
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member challenged the by-law, arguing that it was a horizontal restraint on trade.   NBI 
responded that the by-law ensured greater inter-network competition and its removal 
would cause little incentive for members to break away to form a new competitor to 
NBI.  The case went to several stages of trial, before NBI and its member settled out of 
court.  NBI unsuccessfully sought clear guidance on the legality of its by-law from the 
US Department of Justice before eventually abandoning it and allowing duality in 1976 
(Stearns, 2007, p. 126).
 71
 
As the two card systems expanded, Evans and Schmalensee (2005b, p. 83) describe 
efforts to deal with how to interchange transactions between merchants‘ and 
cardholders‘ banks.  The BankAmericard network initially attempted to have the entire 
MSF passed over from the acquirer to the issuer.  However, such an approach failed 
because, according to Evans and Schmalensee, it invited deception by acquirers and 
reduced the incentive to sign up merchants.  In some cooperative networks, banks 
attempted to agree interchange fees bilaterally, which was possible when networks had 
few members, but proved very difficult for larger networks.  NBI eventually introduced 
a standard interchange fee of 1.95% in 1971 (Stearns, 2007, p. 78) and, although 
without clarifying timing, Evans and Schmalensee (2005b, pp. 83) report that Interbank 
introduced a similar fee. 
Other developments in the US: Inter-bank funds transfers, ATMs and debit cards 
During the late 1960s, members of the US banking industry started considering the 
potential for technological solutions to the problem of reducing the number of cheque 
transactions (Bradford, 2007, p. 1; Electronic Payments Network, 2004, p. 1).  
                                                 
71
  I purposefully leave aside the Supreme Court‘s 1979 decision in the case, Marquette National Bank 
v. First of Omaha Service Corp, because, while it was key to the operations of credit card networks, 
it is less relevant to credit cards‘ use as a payment instrument; the decision allowed credit cards to 
get around individual States usury laws by making issuers bound solely by the usury laws of the 
State in which they resided (Rosenburg, 2005). 
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Electronic Payments Network (2004, p. 3) says that the first electronic interbank 
payment system to begin operation was the Clearing House Interbank Payments 
System, commonly known as CHIPS, which was used for wholesale interbank 
transactions from 1970.  Associations of systems designed for retail payments soon 
followed, with many using Federal Reserve equipment and staff (Electronic Payments 
Network, 2004, p. 1).  In 1974, five associations formed the National Automated 
Clearing House Association to coordinate ACH transfers nationwide and develop 
uniform rules and standard formats (Bradford, 2007, p. 1).  By 1978, there were ACH 
associations covering the US operating under the standards established by the National 
Automated Clearing House Association (Electronic Payments Network, 2004, p. 1). 
An ATM in the US was installed in Long Island, New York in 1969 (Hayashi, Sullivan 
and Weiner, 2003, p. 12).  Networks of ATMs linked to central computers quickly 
developed, with some being shared between firms that were otherwise competitors.  
Hayashi et al (ibid, p. 14) report, however, that there was significant legal uncertainty 
about whether ATMs (at a later, this uncertainty also affected POS debit card terminals) 
represented bank branches and therefore faced ownership and location restrictions.  In 
spite of this uncertainty, the number ATMs steadily increased from the early 1970s, 
reaching over 50,000 by 1985 (ibid, p. 18).  Hayashi et al also report (pp.13-14) a 
number of other key developments involving ATMs: 
 n 1975, a grocery store chain in Iowa installed ATM machines on its premises  
 in 1976, another grocery store chain in Massachusetts installed a POS terminal the 
following year to allow payments to be made directly to it using cards such as 
those suitable for ATM transactions and  
 in 1977, the first shared ATM network with an online connection to account 
information was developed. 
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The development in the US of debit card transactions at the POS had begun sometime 
earlier than ATMs, with a series of pilot networks, the first of which was initiated by 
Bank of Delaware in 1966 (Caskey and Sellon, 1994, p. 82 and endnote 1).  Caskey and 
Sellon report, however, that the pilots were used ―almost exclusively in local pilot 
programs designed to gauge consumer and merchant acceptance‖ and I have not 
identified any substantial development of debit card networks occurring until later.  
Evans and Schmalensee (2008, p. 5) argue that the technology underlying today‘s debit 
card networks was not created until Visa introduced a POS terminal in 1979.  Since they 
already connected ATM terminals with centralised computers, ATM networks were 
able to provide ―online‖ debit card services to POS terminals with the balance debit card 
being checked automatically and immediately.  The large number of ATM networks I 
described above, however, appeared to impede large scale POS debit card development: 
Caskey and Sellon (1994, pp. 85-86) report that the large number of ATM cards held by 
many merchants‘ customers meant merchants had to install many different terminals to 
accept debit card payments from them all.  Similarly, Hayashi et al (2003, p. 14) report 
that the growth of debit cards was reduced by the existence of multiple technical 
standards governing their use.  A major alternative debit card development was the 
―offline‖ card, which operated using procedures developed for credit card schemes, with 
customers‘ accounts being debited in the days following a transaction as occurred for 
credit card transactions.  In 1975, Visa‘s predecessor organisation, NBI, launched the 
Entrée card, which was later renamed Visa Debit (Stearns, 2007, pp. 175-176).
72
 
Stearns gives the Visa Debit case as one example of what led Visa‘s members to 
interpret Visa‘s actions as overstepping the role for which it had been created.  The 
other example Stearns gives was Visa‘s 1979 deal with one of America‘s three largest 
                                                 
72
  Visa‘s main competitor, Interbank, did not launch a debit card until 1980 (Interbank introduces a 
debit card, 1980, September 16). 
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retail chains, JC Penney, to accept Visa cards, an activity which had, up until that time, 
been resisted by the three chains (Stearns, 2007, pp. 177-181).  As part of the deal, JC 
Penney was to act as its own merchant acquirer and pay fees directly to Visa, rather than 
to a Visa acquiring bank.  Stearns argues that many of Visa‘s members interpreted this 
not merely as a way of increasing acceptance of Visa‘s cards, but as Visa competing 
directly with its members.  Stearns argues (p. 185) that this view led, in 1984, to the 
head of Visa, Dee Hock, eventually being forced to step down from the company. 
4.8.2 A New Approach to the Regulation of Banks 
During the 1980s, many of America‘s states moved away from geographical restrictions 
on banking activity by permitting statewide branching and inter-state banking via bank 
holding companies (Rhoades, 1997, pp. 997-998).  This process culminated in federal 
legislation, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 
which permitted inter-state banking via bank holding companies from 1995 and via 
branches from 1997.  Rhoades (1997, p. 1001) says similar legislation enacted in 1980 
and 1982 also reduced the legal barriers separating banking organisations from thrift 
institutions.  The legislation allowed NBFIs to compete more effectively with banks by 
freeing the interest rates they could pay on deposits and by allowing them to offer new 
product lines from which they had previously been excluded, most notably commercial 
and industrial loans and transactions accounts.  This process of deregulation is 
associated with a substantial decrease in the number of banking organisations in the US.   
From a total of 14,884 organisations in 1984, Jones and Critchfield (2005, p. 32) give 
evidence showing a 47% decrease to a total of 7842 organisations in 2003. 
Another piece of legislation affecting retail payment system development was the 
passing of the Monetary Control Act of 1980.  It required that, from September 1981, 
the Federal Reserve Bank explicitly price the payment services they provided to banks, 
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including cheque-clearing and ACH transfers (although other services remained non-
priced), and face budget cuts if the use of their services declined (Cavalluzzo, Ittner and 
Larcker, 1998, p. 2).  Cavalluzzo et al report (p. 3) that the legislation was followed by 
the entry or expansion of a large number of competing clearinghouses and a reduction in 
the Federal Reserve Bank‘s cheque-clearing market share.  They also find evidence that, 
while the Federal Reserve Bank improved efficiency in priced services, they reallocated 
costs from priced to non-priced services, particularly from cheque-clearing to other 
services.  These observations are consistent with complaints from commercial banks 
and other ACH networks that the Federal Reserve failed to report the costs of its 
services accurately (Cavalluzzo et al, 1998, p. 2; Electronic Payments Network, 2004, 
pp. 12-13).  Cavalluzzo et al suggest (p. 29) that the Federal Reserve did this to keep 
low prices for services facing competition in order to help maintain the levels of use of 
these services. This evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve Banks‘ prices for 
cheque-clearing were subsidised and remained below what they would have otherwise 
been. 
4.8.3 Payment System Development Following the Reforms 
Online versus offline debit cards 
The legal uncertainty about the importance of branching restrictions to ATMs and POS 
terminals, which I described in subsection 4.8.1, was reduced in 1985 when the US 
Supreme Court affirmed an Appeals Court decision that ATMs not owned by banks 
were not bank branches (Scott, 1999, p. 1337).
 73
  The decision clarified that non-bank 
owned ATM networks were not limited by states‘ bank branch restrictions and allowed 
the large scale development of such networks (Scott, 1999, p. 1337; Hayashi et al, 2003, 
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  Scott clarifies that US courts held that bank-owned ATMs did represent branches until that position 
was explicitly repealed by Congress in 1996. 
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pp. 13-14). The decision was followed by a significant consolidation in ATM networks 
with Hayashi and Wang (2009, p. 3) recording a fall in the number of networks from 
120 in the mid-1980s to 30 in 2006.  Hayashi and Wang (2009) attribute this 
consolidation to the adoption of debit card POS functionality by many networks.  They 
find that larger ATM networks were more likely to adopt debit card innovation and 
those networks that adopted were more likely to survive than those that did not.  Caskey 
and Sellon (1994, p. 86) report that ―[w]hile only about half of ATM terminals were 
shared in the mid-1980s, almost all ATM machines belonged to a regional network by 
1993.‖  They argue this meant an increase in standardisation and allowed banks to better 
coordinate the introduction of online debit cards. 
Neither Visa‘s nor MasterCard‘s members issued online debit cards before 1987 when 
the two organisations attempted to create an online debit card joint-venture called 
Entrée, the name that had been used for Visa‘s first offline debit card (Balto, 2000, pp. 
1392-1393).  The two companies proposed to combine their debit card operations with 
Visa‘s Californian POS system, Interlink, and their interests in two national ATM 
networks, Plus and Cirrus.  As part of the joint-venture, Visa and MasterCard agreed not 
to introduce debit systems that would compete with Entrée.  Balto (1998, p. 1095) 
reports that, while the US Department of Justice reviewed the joint venture and declined 
to challenge it, 14 State Attorneys General did challenge the joint-venture, alleging that 
the credit card schemes‘ joint-venture would retard the development of debit cards by 
inhibiting the entry or growth of smaller regional ATM networks in the debit card 
market.  Visa and MasterCard settled in 1990 and agreed to abandon Entrée with both 
subsequently developing online brands: Visa developed Interlink and MasterCard 
created a new brand, Maestro.  Balto (2000, p. 1393) reports both experienced moderate 
growth, but, for reasons that were unclear, chose to shift their promotion of debit cards 
from Interlink and Maestro to their offline debit cards, Visa Check and MasterMoney, 
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in the mid-90s.  These made use of the companies‘ already established credit card 
networks to indirectly access card holders‘ bank accounts (Balto, 1998).  Unlike online 
debit, merchants did not need to buy or rent a POS terminal to accept payments 
(Sienkiewicz, 2002, p. 6).  The inability of companies in the industry to find a 
commonly accepted solution to debit cards contributed to a development of the industry 
that Evans and Schmalensee (2008, p. 6) describe as ―fragmented‖, with, according to 
Weiner and Wright (2005, p. 304), 14 interconnected, yet distinct ATM and debit card 
networks providing online services and with MasterCard and Visa providing offline 
debit card services.  Chang (2004, p. 33) points out that only some cards provide access 
just to online networks with most providing it to both online and offline networks (with 
the number only providing access to offline networks being negligible).
74
 
The fragmented nature of the debit card industry has resulted in consumers and 
merchants facing a range of fees for debit card use.  As for credit cards, offline debit 
cards attracted proportional positive interchange fees, leading merchants to be 
―primarily‖ charged proportional MSFs for offline debit transactions while PIN debit 
transactions have largely incurred a flat MSFs (United States Department of Justice, 
2003, p. 7).  According to Hayashi et al (2003, p. 52), consumers faced no per-
transaction fees, except banks that occasionally charged PIN fees for online debit card 
transactions.  Hayashi, Sullivan and Weiner (2006, p. 13) cite a 2004 Federal Reserve 
Board survey of households as saying that 13% of respondents were charged PIN fees 
and fees ranged from US$0.1 to $2, with an average fee of about $0.75. 
Another result of this industry structure is that networks face high costs when 
introducing new payment instruments.  Evans and Schmalensee (2008, p. 6) say that 
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  Chang says that, at the time they complete a transaction, customers can choose which network to 
use, depending on which their merchant accepts. 
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―innovation can be slow and may be biased towards improvements that are compatible 
with the existing infrastructure.‖  Consistent with this, Povey (2008, p. 356) notes that 
the US is ―extremely visible‖ in its lack of adoption of the EMV security standard, in 
spite of its location between two countries that have adopted the standard, Canada and 
Mexico.  One media report indicates that US merchants have concerns about the lack of 
the country‘s adoption of EMV and wonder if a lack of the standard will cause a greater 
misuse of cards for which they are held liable (Diaz, 2010, September 29)? 
Increasing competition between networks for issuers of debit and credit cards 
In the mid-1990s, Visa‘s Interlink and MasterCard‘s Maestro did not receive as much 
use as the online debit networks of the regional ATM networks (Balto, 2000, p. 1393).   
When Visa and MasterCard began promoting their offline debit cards, however, they 
experienced a significant increase in competition for debit cardholders.  This is reflected 
in figures offered by Hunt (2003, p. 89) showing that, while debit card transaction 
volumes grew significantly during the period, the proportion that were signature debit, 
as opposed to PIN debit, grew from about 40% in 1993 to 62% in 2002.  Balto (1998, p. 
1099) and Hayashi et al (2003, p. 80) both discuss how competition from offline cards 
forced online debit networks to raise interchange fees to attract issuers.
75
  Indeed, 
Hayashi et al (2003, pp. 77-78, 80) say that, while the payment of negative interchange 
was initially common for online debit card payment systems, the institution gradually 
fell out of favour before ending in 1997. 
During this time, it appears that positive interchange fees for credit card transactions 
were also increasing.  For credit cards, Simon (2005, p. 367) provides a graph showing 
the increasing average MSFs and MasterCard and Visa interchange fees from 1994 to 
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  This is also reflected in a graph provided by Simon (2005, p. 368), which shows no clear trend in 
signature debit card interchange fees, but an upwards trend in PIN debit interchange fees between 
1994 and 2004. 
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2004 in the US.  In an analysis of credit card rewards programmes, which had been first 
introduced in 1984 by Diners Club, Hayashi (2009, pp. 39) notes that programmes 
became more diverse during the 1990s, consistent with increasing fees paid by 
merchants.  Indeed, competition for card holders appeared to intensify during this time.  
Mann (2002, p. 1068) points to the rise of ―monoline" specialist credit card issuers that 
use sophisticated credit scoring techniques to assess cardholders‘ credit risk and reports 
that, in 1995, only 16%  of MasterCard and Visa cards issued in the US were issued to 
cardholders that had any relationship with the issuing bank beyond the card.  Evans and 
Schamlensee (2005a) devote a chapter of their book (Chapter 9) to describing the 
complex credit card issuing environment in the US.  Increased competitiveness for 
cardholders is likely however to be reflected in increases in the MSFs paid by 
merchants.  Evans and Schamlensee (2005a, pp. 185-188) discuss one expression of 
merchant discomfort about such fees, the 1991 Boston Fee Party, which involved more 
than 250 Boston restaurants threatening to end their acceptance of American Express 
unless it was willing to flexibly negotiate MSFs.  American Express eventually relented 
and agreed to negotiate fees with individual merchants. 
Further ACH developments 
In spite of the new legislation described above that required the Federal Reserve Banks 
to impose explicit charges for services, private ACH operators continued to experience 
problems with the pricing, as well as the quality, of the Federal Reserve‘s ACH services 
(Electronic Payments Network, 2004, pp. 12-13).  In 1994, three private operators 
formed the private ACH exchange (PAX) to enable them to exchange transactions 
without using the Reserve Banks and incurring the interregional fees these Banks had 
begun to charge.  In 1996, after the Reserve Banks had consolidated their ACH 
operations in each of the twelve districts into one platform, a new system of prices was 
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introduced that one of the three private operators, Electronic Payments Network (EPN), 
felt put it at serious competitive disadvantage (Electronic Payments Network, 2004, p. 
12).  EPN complained and the Federal Reserve Board reviewed the issue, deciding in 
2000 that private operators were being disadvantaged; it instructed the regional Federal 
Reserve Banks to implement a new schedule of prices and deposit deadlines for its 
ACH services (Federal Reserve System, 2000).  The Federal Reserve Banks and EPN 
became the only ACH service operators, with the market share of the latter increasing 
from 5% in 2000 to approximately 40% in 2005 (ibid, p. 16; The clearing house 
reinvented: Gaining a foothold in the future, 2005, July 21). 
Recent developments related to the ACH system include decoupled debit cards and 
funds transfer systems accessed through the internet.  Transactions made using 
decoupled debit cards are completed using the ACH system, with merchants being 
charged much lower fees than for transactions completed using traditional debit cards 
(Bradford, 2007, p. 2).  Bradford notes that ―[w]hile having experienced some measure 
of success with getting retailers to accept ACH-based debit cards, success with 
acquiring issuers has been more modest.‖  The development appears to have continued, 
however, with Crowe (2008) describing a MasterCard-branded decoupled debit system, 
which may be used at any MasterCard-accepting merchant.  Evans and Schmalensee 
(2005a, pp. 307-308) discuss internet-based funds transfer systems, saying that nearly 
all those attempting to create new currencies for the online environment, such as Flooz 
and Beenz, failed, while systems using existing infrastructure, such as payment cards 
and bank accounts, have experienced more success.   They focus on Paypal, which was 
acquired by online auction company eBay in 2002 and which Shy (2010, p. 24) reports 
to be the one successful development of person-to-person electronic payments ―over the 
years‖.  Paypal makes use of the ACH system to transfer funds between its accounts and 
the bank accounts of its customers. 
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Shy (2010) reports that, during 2009, several major commercial banks in the US began 
introducing a new online interface to allow customers to make electronic direct entry 
payments to any account in the US, using the ACH system.  He compares this to the 
German direct entry system based on the Giro.  Shy concludes that development should 
be encouraged and proposes that the Federal Reserve increases the prices it charges for 
cheque processing, while maintaining prices for ACH transactions, in order to give 
users a greater financial reason for using ACH-based instruments.  This argument is 
surprising because, if indeed ACH transactions are cheaper to process than cheque 
transactions why are they not being priced so, already.  Shy also briefly considers (p. 
31) whether NBFIs should be granted access to the Federal Reserve‘s ACH system, but 
argues that this would make ACH payment completion more difficult because NBFIs 
cannot open accounts with the Federal Reserve, and would invite fraud. 
Other payment instruments 
Attempts to introduce contactless stored-value cards in the US are ongoing, but with 
little sign of success.  Mitchell (2007, June 11) reports that Visa had said it had issued 
approximately 10 million payWave contactless cards with MasterCard issuing 13 
million of its Paypass cards and signing up 46,000 merchants to accept them.  
Hernandez (2009, June 9) also outlines US transit authorities‘ ongoing attempts to 
introduce contactless cards, which started in 2006.  In spite of these efforts, however, a 
noted academic specialising in payments, David Evans, described contactless payments 
in the US as being a ―debacle‖, saying that merchants lacked reasons to invest in the 
technology to accept contactless payments and without them, consumers lack a good 
reason to get into the habit of using them much (Evans, 2010, September 29). 
4.8.4 Interventions in Retail Payment Systems 
Judicial action preventing exclusivity 
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In 1988, having abandoned by-laws preventing the duality of issuing MasterCard and 
Visa in  the 1970s, the two schemes faced another challenge to their rules on 
membership summarised by Evans and Schmalensee (2005a, pp. 279-284).  In that year 
the department store chain Sears, issuer of the successful Discover card, attempted to 
become a member of Visa.  Visa stymied that attempt and, in 1990, Sears attempted to 
become a member by buying an insolvent member of Visa, the thrift institution, 
MountainWest..  When Visa also stymied this attempt, Sears filed an anti-trust suit, 
which became known as the MountainWest case.  The Federal Appeals Court decided 
for Visa in 1994, reversing an earlier jury trial decision.  However, following the appeal 
decision, the Department of Justice initiated a lawsuit in 1998 alleging that rules 
preventing member banks from issuing three-party cards, such as Discover and also 
American Express, were a conspiracy to restrain trade (United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2009, p. 20).  The case was heard in the US District Court and its 
decision, reached in 2001, found that Visa and MasterCard were in breach of section 1 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  The trial judge required that Visa and MasterCard end 
their rules preventing their members from issuing three-party cards and rescind 
agreements they had signed with their members that encouraged members‘ loyalty to 
the schemes (United States Government Accountability Office, ibid; Evans and 
Schmalensee, 2005a, p. 283).  The decision was upheld by the US Court of Appeals in 
2003 and the US Supreme Court refused to hear Visa and MasterCard‘s appeal to it in 
2004 (Crenshaw, 2004, October 5). As a result of the decisions, member banks could 
issue any combination of Visa, MasterCard, Discover or American Express cards 
(Prager, Manuszak, Kiser and Borzekowski, 2009, p. 37; Balto and Grube 2002, p. 
1313).
76
  The United States Government Accountability Office (2009, pp. 20-21) noted 
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  Evans and Schmalensee (2005a, p. 283) report that the District Court judge also allowed banks to 
issue either or both of Visa and MasterCard debit cards, thereby allowing duality for debit cards. 
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that officials from Visa had attributed an increase in interchange fees to increased 
competition for issuers resulting from the decision.  The report made observations about 
rising credit card interchange fees following the decision, noting that new interchange 
fees announced by Visa between 2003 and 2009 had raised those fees by 18%, on 
average, while MasterCard‘s new fee announcements over the same period had raised 
them by 11%.  Some evidence indicates that, during a similar period, MSFs for three-
party credit/charge cards were declining.  In 2007, American Express Chief Financial 
Officer, Gary Crittenden, described the longer term trend in American Express‘ MSF as 
being negative, ―due to repricing and mix changes among various merchant 
categories...‖ (American Express merchant discount rate, 2007, January 23).  This 
suggests three-party card networks have become more similar to four-party networks. 
Judicial action and the Honour-All-Cards Rule 
In 1996, a group of merchants filed lawsuits against Visa and MasterCard challenging 
the Honour-All-Cards Rule that required merchants to accept both schemes‘ debit and 
credit cards.  The lawsuits were combined into a single, consolidated action that became 
known as the Wal-Mart case.  The case was settled, out of court, in 2001 with Visa and 
MasterCard agreeing to pay the merchants over US$3 billion in damages and to rescind 
the Honour-All-Cards Rule (Prager et al, 2009, p. 37).  As I discussed in subsection 
2.4.2, Rochet and Tirole (2008) show how the rule performs a socially beneficial 
rebalancing effect between the interchange fees charged by two platforms (such as debit 
and credit cards) facing different levels of competition.  They point to support for their 
model coming from the observation that Visa and MasterCard reduced their debit 
interchange fees and increased their credit interchange fees following the removal of the 
Honour-All-Cards Rule in the US. 
Judicial action, regulation and interchange fees and the No-Surcharge Rule 
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In addition to the litigation described above, several cases in the US have dealt with the 
setting of interchange fees.  The first, known as the NaBanco case, occurred in 1984, 
with the Federal District Court rejecting the argument that the multilateral setting of 
interchange fees was a restraint of trade (Smith, Lipsky, Robinson and Rinner, 2008).  
However, litigation dealing with interchange continued with the US Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit upholding, in a decision known as the Kendall Decision, a lower 
court‘s dismissal of merchant claims that credit card companies and banks violated 
antitrust law by conspiring to fix interchange fees (ibid).  In 2009, a number of suits 
brought against MasterCard and Visa by merchants were consolidated in a case to 
appear before the US District Court (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2009, pp. 41-42). 
Further regulation of interchange fees appears likely in the US.  The regulations will 
follow the passing of the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act 
of 2009 (also known as the Credit CARD Act), which was signed into law in May 2009, 
placing restrictions on the interest rates and fees that issuers could charge consumers 
(Berlau and Radia, 2009, December).  In the first half of 2010, three bills proposing the 
regulation of credit card interchange fees were before the US Congress (Zywicki and 
Frank, 2010, April 6).  All were introduced during 2009 and, as Zywicki and Frank 
outline, involved attempts to use legislation to influence the negotiation of interchange 
fees by banks and merchants.  One of the bills, the Credit Card Interchange Fees Act of 
2009, would have negated Visa‘s and MasterCard‘s use of the No-Surcharge Rule 
(Rosenburg, 2010).  None of the three bills passed, but attempts to regulate interchange 
fees continued.  Late in 2010, the Federal Reserve proposed to introduce a cap of 
US$0.07-0.12 for the interchange fees of debit cards under Section 1075 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Evans, Litan and 
Schmalensee, 2011).  Although serious questions were raised about the suitability of the 
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Federal Reserve‘s proposals by Evans, Litan and Schmalensee (2011) and Epstein 
(2010, December 29), among others, the final outcome of the Federal Reserve‘s 
proposals is as yet uncertain. 
4.8.5 Data Showing Payment Instrument Adoption in the United States 
My key data source showing the adoption of debit and credit cards in the US is 
transaction and population data available from CPSS (2009), which provides estimates 
of issued transactions.  For the years 2000 to 2003, I use with data from an earlier 
Redbook, CPSS (2006).  To corroborate this information, I use two editions of the 
paper, Federal Reserve Payments Study, containing information on credit and debit card 
transaction volume for the US for the years, 2000, 2003 and 2006 (Federal Reserve 
System, 2004; Federal Reserve System, 2007).  It is unclear whether these reports 
contain series showing issued or acquired transactions.  Nevertheless, the data for credit 
and debit card transaction volumes from the Federal Reserve publications are all within 
5.5% (averaging -1%) of the data found in the CPSS publications. 
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4.9 Lessons from my Historical Summaries 
4.9.1 Australia 
In subsection 4.1.1, I described actions associated with the Australian Federal 
Government that appear to have had major effects on retail payment system 
development.  Firstly, its regulation of Australia‘s financial system distinguished 
between banks and NBFIs with banks showing an unwillingness to cooperate with 
NBFIs, reducing inter-network competition.  Consistent with a lack of such 
competition, evidence suggests that the operations of Australia‘s bank‘s first credit card, 
Bankcard, were collusive.  Secondly, an Australian Government review of the finance 
industry called for NBFIs to be given access to banks‘ centralised inter-bank transfer 
system, CEMTEX.  Shortly after the review‘s publication, banks disbanded CEMTEX, 
instead exchanging direct entry transactions bilaterally.  I argue that this reflects banks 
perceiving that they did not hold full property rights over the CEMTEX network.  I also 
argue similar perceptions of property rights and issues with cooperation between banks 
and NBFIs were reflected in banks developing two other payment networks in a 
decentralised manner, EFTPOS and Bankcard.  As I described in subsection 4.1.2, 
Australia‘s regulatory environment continues to distinguish between banks and NBFIs; 
the only successful attempt to create a centralised payment network appears to have 
been the bill payment service, BPAY, which I described in subsection 4.1.3. 
In subsection 4.1.4, I described the serious interventions in the operations of payment 
networks made by the RBA.  Specifically, the RBA intervened to control positive and 
negative interchange fees charged for credit cards and EFTPOS and remove networks‘ 
use of the No-Surcharge Rule.  Furthermore, it has shown a continued interest in the 
network operations by regulating ATMs and indicating the possibility of regulation of 
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the payment networks, BPAY and Paypal.  Evidence points to the effects of the RBA‘s 
reforms: 
 the fees paid for payment instrument use have been redistributed between 
merchants and consumers, but in ways that were not intended by the RBA
77
 
 evidence suggests that, when they occur, merchant surcharges exceed MSFs for 
credit card transactions, showing that the RBA‘s efforts to allow surcharging have 
increased the total cost of paying by credit card and 
 uncertainty created by the reforms appears to have resulted in a decrease in 
competition with evidence indicating major payment card issuers did not enter 
Australia markets because they prefered to enter where conditions are more stable. 
Furthermore, in its conclusions to its 2007/2008 review of the effects of its regulation, 
the RBA announced that it might step back from regulation if banks enhanced 
Australia‘s EFTPOS network and if the RBA received voluntary assurances that 
positive interchange fees for credit cards would not be increased as well.  In August 
2009, however, it announced that progress was not sufficient in these respects and its 
regulation would be retained.  In spite of this continued interest in regulation, however, 
an opportunity appears to exist for the RBA to re-consider its approach as part of a 
recently announced review of innovation in Australian retail payment systems. 
4.9.2 Canada 
In subsection 4.2.1, I described the passing of the Canadian Payments Association Act 
in 1980 established the CPA (the Canadian Payments Association) and dictated that 
only certain organisations were to be members of it and participate in inter-bank 
                                                 
77
  Specifically, Chang et al (2005) find that cardholder fees have mainly been increased through higher 
fixed fees, making little difference to cardholders‘ per-transaction fees or benefits, contrary to the 
RBA‘s stated intention of encouraging relative prices to reflect relative resource costs. 
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payment networks in Canada.  Quigley (1996) argues that the Act was a rejection of the 
idea that competition should shape the evolution of the Canadian payments system.  
Indeed, competition was not sufficient to encourage the CPA‘s offshoot, Interac, to 
provide a full range of services from its ATMs.  Moreover, Interac‘s chartered members 
appeared unwilling to cooperate with non-chartered members, including by impeding 
the attempt of American Express to become a member in 1988.
78
  A complaint from 
American Express about the matter eventually led to a review of Interac by the 
responsible government authority, the Director of Investigation and Research.  This 
review resulted in changes to Interac‘s operations, including an expansion of its 
membership, a requirement that it set prices only to recover its costs and the removal of 
its No-Surcharge Rule.  The small amount of evidence I‘ve found indicates that the 
Rule‘s removal resulted in an increase in the total costs of Interac debit card 
transactions.   
In subsection 4.2.2, I described the passing of the Canadian Payments Act 2001, which 
resulted in an expansion of the membership of the CPA.  In spite of the increased 
membership, however, problems with cooperation between members and non-members 
continued: one non-member bill payment service provider, Usemybank, complained 
about its treatment by CPA members and the CPA went as far as to pass rules in 2003 
and 2005 that impeded member/non-member cooperation.
79
  These events happened in 
spite of significant concerns about the standard of service offered for bill payments by 
the CPA being voiced at a Canadian Government committee meeting.  The concerns led 
to the CPA publishing a report in which it admitted that evidence indicated 80% of bill 
                                                 
78
  I also refer to the Express and Access ATM payment networks created in 1984/85, which did not 
succeed because, reportedly, they were not able to link with Interac. 
79
  I refer to a CPA rule passed in 2003 that prevented the processing of certain telephone-based 
payments called tele-cheques during clearing and one passed in 2005 that required all bill payments 
processed during clearing be initiated using the CPA member‘s own website, precluding the use of a 
third party‘s website. 
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payments occurred outside of the CPA‘s bill payments framework.80   In spite of these 
issues with Canadian retail payment systems, however, further interventions in payment 
operations look likely.  In subsection 4.2.4, I described proposals that Canadian 
government authorities intervene in debit and credit card operations of payment 
networks there. 
4.9.3 Europe 
In section 4.3, I described the influence of the European Union on the three European 
countries in my sample, Germany, Norway and the UK.  Within the Union the European 
Commission can pass Regulations, which immediately become enforceable as law in 
member states, and Directives, which direct Union members to put particular legislative 
frameworks in place.  The Commission has also influenced the development of retail 
payment systems, particularly debit and credit cards, by conducting investigations of 
interchange fees and network rules.  I argued, however, that these investigations were 
beyond the scope of my thesis because they only directly affected a small proportion of 
transactions, those occurring cross-border, and only payment instruments that are 
already established (debit and credit cards). 
In subsection 4.3.2, I did identify one group of European Commission decisions 
affecting a retail payment system that had yet to receive much development, its 
Directives relating to electronic money.  I identified a paper describing the interest of 
the European Central Bank in electronic money, as well as two Directives passed in 
2000 by the Commission, instructing Union members to put in place prescriptive 
legislative frameworks for the issuing of electronic money. 
                                                 
80
  With bill payments instead being conducted with other payment instruments, such as cheques, 
209 
 
2
0
9
 
4.9.4 Germany 
In subsection 4.4.1, I described the structure of the German banking industry, including 
how it is composed of three pillars, commercial banks, cooperative banks and public 
banks with the latter two having less of a profit motive than the first.  Additionally, each 
of the pillars are led by associations that can make decisions binding on their members, 
with a central association, the ZKA, governing all of the pillars.  The industry can be 
characterised by a lack of inter-network competition with, for example, only one jointly-
owned organisation, the GZS, conducting almost all of Germany‘s credit card issuing 
and acquiring until the 1990s.    
In subsection 4.4.3, I described the introduction in 1990 by the ZKA of the Electronic 
Cash debit card, following lengthy negotiations.  Given the delays in creating it, the 
MSFs charged for its use and the fact that merchants could only obtain terminals and 
acquiring services from the GZS, merchants were not supportive of the new system.  
The intervention of the Bundeskartellamt, the Federal Cartel Office, meant an open 
system was adopted that allowed merchants to obtain terminals and use the services of 
companies other than GZS.  This led to the creation of the Netzbetreiber, the payment 
network operator, from which merchants could obtain terminals and Electronic Cash 
acquiring services.  At the time Electronic Cash was being introduced, however, one 
German merchant introduced the ELV debit card payment network, which operated by 
using the account details on an Electronic Cash card to generate a direct debit to be paid 
from a customer‘s account to a merchant‘s.  Although ELV operated without a payment 
guarantee, meaning a merchant risked not being paid for a fraudulent transaction or 
when a consumer had insufficient funds in their account, the instrument proved popular 
with merchants because MSFs were not charged for its use.  In the early 2000s, ELV 
appears to have been more popular than Electronic Cash as a debit card payment 
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instrument.  Electronic Cash was renamed Girocard in 2007 and ELV was renamed, ec 
direct debit in 2009. 
In 1997, Germany amended its banking law to restrict the issuance of electronic money 
to banks, in order to update its law with trends in European law.  That same year, 
Germany‘s banks rolled out the Geldkarte stored-value payment instrument nationwide.  
The rollout was not well supported by the pillar of banks that are argued to have the 
strongest profit motive, the commercial banks.  The development of Geldkarte does not 
appear to have been successful, with one Geldkarte manager admitting that the company 
no longer focuses on marketing the instrument at attended POS because it was ―very 
difficult‖ to market the instrument there. 
Finally, in subsection 4.4.5, I discussed my research to check the veracity of data 
showing significantly less adoption of debit and credit cards in Germany relative to the 
other countries in my sample.  While that research does not refute the data, it does 
suggest that it may under-estimate the extent of debit and credit card adoption in the 
country. 
4.9.5 New Zealand 
In subsection 4.5.1, I described significant government controls that regulated New 
Zealand‘s financial industry, distinguishing between trading banks, trustee savings 
banks and other financial organisations.  Retail payment system development events 
from that time suggest the groups of organisations were unwilling to cooperate with 
each other.  New Zealand‘s central bank was required to act as arbiter when other 
organisations sought access to the trading banks‘ cheque-clearing system and the 
trading banks and trustee savings banks maintained separate pilots of EFTPOS systems.   
I described in subsection 4.5.2, new legislation passed by the New Zealand Government 
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in 1986 that removed the regulatory distinctions that had existed, allowing any 
organisation that met explicit prudential criteria to become a ‗registered bank‘. 
Following the creation of the new regulatory environment, New Zealand‘s financial 
organisations became more willing to cooperate with each other.  Additionally, a new 
state of (potential) inter-network competition existed.  As they re-created the former-
trading banks‘ EFTPOS pilot, two banks reacted to competition from New Zealand‘s 
other EFTPOS pilot by creating an EFTPOS payment network that operated without 
charging MSFs.  This approach proved robust and the former trading banks‘ cooperated 
when they merged their EFTPOS network with that of the former trustee savings banks.  
Inter-network competition was also a factor in the creation of New Zealand‘s inter-bank 
transfer system, ISL, when one bank, frustrated with the low level of service from the 
incumbent inter-bank system, set up a competing system.  This caused the banking 
owners of the incumbent to improve the quality of its service and open access to the 
system.  New Zealand has also seen the development of a stored-value system, through 
a network operated by a private provider of bus services.  I have not observed any other 
privately-owned, public transport-based networks in my sample countries. 
New Zealand‘s competition regulator reached settlements with MasterCard, Visa and 
New Zealand banks in 2009 that regulated interchange fees and ended their use of the 
No-Surcharge Rule.  While initial evidence indicated that little surcharging was starting 
to occur, the regulator issued a press release not long after the settlements that suggested 
it believed the surcharging that was occurring was excessive. 
4.9.6 Norway 
In subsection 4.6.1, I described the heavy involvement of the Norwegian Government in 
the banking system in Norway following World War 2, including its control of both 
interest rates and investment.  From the late 1970s, this control was gradually wound 
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back.  In the late 1980s/early 1990s, however, the Norwegian banking system 
experienced a serious liquidity crisis that resulted in major injections of funding by the 
Norwegian Government and the nationalisation of three major banks. 
During this period, some retail payment system developments occurred with the 
creation of giro direct entry payment networks and ATMs.  There was some 
experimentation during the 1980s with debit card payments at the POS.  With some 
coordination from Norway‘s central bank, Norwegian banks cooperated to from the 
debit card payment network, BankAxept.  The pricing structure chosen for BankAxept 
appears to have partly been the outcome of a political process with banks being 
encouraged to explicitly price payment instrument use for consumers, in the face of 
resistance from unions.  This pricing structure did, however, prove successful at 
encouraging the largest number of debit card transactions in my sample countries, 
although this might partially be a reflection of the importance in Norway of bank 
overdrafts, which are accessible using a BankAxept debit card, as a source of consumer 
credit. 
In subsection 4.6.4, I described the continued interest of Norway‘s central bank and 
other government authorities in payment network operations.  Examples of this interest 
include a 2008 press release from the Norwegian central bank warning that reducing 
prices faced by consumers for many payment services or offering them free of charge 
was not in consumers‘ best interest.  Another area of interest has been stored-value 
payment networks, caused by the introduction of intrusive electronic money legislation 
implementing European Union Directives.  I have not identified any stored-value 
networks that have been successfully developed in the face of this legislation. 
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4.9.7 United Kingdom 
In subsection 4.7.1. I described the development of a number of new payment 
instruments in the UK, including charge and credit cards, ATMs and cheque guarantee 
cards.  Development of one other instrument occurred more slowly, however.  In spite 
of banks beginning to investigate options for debit card systems in 1974, it was not until 
1985 that serious development started to occur.  Even once it had started, however, 
development of the payment network that became EFTPOS UK appeared problematic.  
EFTPOS UK introduced an encryption standard, RSA, that was not thought to be 
compatible with the more commonly used standard, DES, in spite of DES being used 
for an EFTPOS UK member‘s existing debit cards.  This suggests that EFTPOS UK 
members were not interested in the network‘s long term success – indeed, EFTPOS UK 
was wound up following an initial trial and its members subsequently developed their 
own debit card networks.  I have not been able to document the reasons for the lack of 
motivation for members.  One factor that does appear to play a role, however, is the 
involvement of the UK central bank, the Bank of England in EFTPOS UK, which 
caused its members to perceive they were not able to cooperate to form alternative 
networks.   
In subsection 4.7.2, I described a new approach to the regulation of the UK‘s banks that 
involved greater formalisation regarding the role of the Bank of England and the 
creation of the FSA (the Financial Services Authority) to administer the country‘s 
prudential supervision.  The process has, however, been described as re-regulation 
rather than de-regulation and concerns have continued to be expressed about the 
standard of competition in the UK‘s banking industry, including by the Cruickshank 
Report.  This Report identified that an informal contract existed between successive UK 
Governments and the country‘s banks, which it argued contributed to competitive 
problems.  The Report also expressed concerns about the amount of innovation in retail 
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payment systems in the UK.  On analysing the evidence, I relate this lack of innovation 
not to competition, but to perceptions that inter-bank payment network investments are 
non-excludable in the UK.  I have not managed to document the reasons for this 
perceived non-excludability and it remains an aspect for further research.  Evidence 
indicates a more obvious impact of the UK‘s electronic money legislation, which 
implemented European Union Directives, but made it prohibitively costly to use 
London‘s successful Oyster stored-value card for purchases not involving public 
transport. 
4.9.8 United States 
In subsection 4.8.1, I summarised the development of payment instruments in the US 
that was significantly affected by government restrictions on bank branching.  Banks 
created cards that offered consumers access to a line of credit, competing with payment 
cards offered by several non-banking organisations.  They developed associations for 
their credit cards in order to increase the number of merchants accepting their card and 
the number of consumers wishing to use it while not breaching bank branching 
restrictions.  These associations eventually developed into the global credit card brands, 
Visa and MasterCard.  Development of debit cards was more modest and it was not 
until the development of the POS terminal in the late 1970s that electronic debit card 
payments were technologically feasible.  However, legal uncertainty about whether POS 
terminals constituted bank branches, for the purposes of branching restrictions in the 
US, appears to have stymied attempts to further develop debit cards in the US.  In 
subsection 4.8.1, I also outlined the role of the Federal Reserve in cheque-processing 
that followed its creation in 1913, including the development of an electronic alternative 
to cheques, ACH payments, during the 1960s and ‗70s. 
215 
 
2
1
5
 
In subsection 4.8.3, I described a 1985 Supreme Court case that reduced much of the 
legal uncertainty about the legal status of POS terminals.  Following the decision, 
networks that had operated just ATMs began also offering online POS debit card 
services, resulting in a dramatic decline in their numbers.  Visa and MasterCard 
attempted to use their credit card association structures to coordinate debit cards when 
they proposed to introduce the online debit card joint venture, Entrée.  In spite of the US 
Department of Justice reviewing the joint venture and declining to challenge it, 14 State 
Attorneys General did challenge it, resulting in Visa and MasterCard abandoning the 
proposal in 1990.   In the mid-1990s, Visa and MasterCard began successfully 
promoting their offline debit cards, developing them alongside the online PIN debit card 
networks.  The mix of the two types of network has created a ―fragmented" structure to 
the debit card payment system in the US.  Concerns have been raised that this makes 
innovation slow and biased towards improvements that are compatible with existing 
infrastructure.  Consistent with this, the EMV security standard has yet to be introduced 
in the US, in spite of it being introduced in countries either side of the US, Canada and 
Mexico and as well as in all of my other sample countries. 
In subsection 4.8.3, I also described the developments in direct entry payments in the 
US.  The development of electronic forms of such payments in the US appears to have 
been substantially affected by the actions of Federal Reserve, particularly its pricing of 
cheque-clearing services.  Although the Federal Reserve‘s pricing has not entirely 
prevented the development of online direct entry payments between bank accounts in 
the US using the ACH system, a Federal Reserve employee published a paper in 2010 
arguing that the Federal Reserve should encourage such developments by raising its 
prices for cheque-clearing while maintaining its prices for ACH services.  That it takes 
an employee to publish an article arguing for changes in pricing raises concerns about 
the Federal Reserve‘s current approach to pricing. 
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In subsection 4.8.4, I described serious judicial interventions in the operations of 
payment networks, including the end of networks‘ use of the Honour-All-Cards Rule 
and the end of by-laws preventing member banks from issuing three-party cards such as 
Discover and American Express.  Evidence suggests that both actions resulted in an 
increase in the MSFs charged for credit card transactions.  It may, however, be difficult 
to isolate the effects of each action, particularly of the second, because of increasing 
competition for holders of both credit and debit cards that was taking place during this 
time.  In spite of increasing competition, further interventions look likely with the US 
Federal Reserve suggesting a cap be applied to interchange fees for debit cards. 
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Chapter 5  
Analysis of Retail Payment System Development 
In this Chapter, I use the research I have conducted to create a framework for 
considering the development of retail payment systems.  I start by outlining the nature 
of retail payment systems in section 5.1, before considering the demand for the 
instruments offered by the payment networks that are part of those systems in section 
5.2.  In section 5.3, I analyse the supply of instruments by these networks, using this 
analysis to lead into a discussion of the role of government in retail payment systems in 
section 5.4. 
5.1 Nature of Retail Payment Systems 
The payment networks that make up a retail payment system provide platforms, 
payment instruments, across which users interact to complete transactions between 
them.  According to the process I set out in section 5.2, users will choose the instrument 
that allows them to interact by completing their transaction at lowest cost.  Transaction 
costs will therefore be of a fundamental importance to the development of retail 
payment systems.  The analysis of transaction costs is complex, however.  In subsection 
2.3.1, I summarised the analysis of Milgrom and Roberts (1992) who investigated the 
relevance of transaction costs to institutional design.  They argue that transaction costs 
are not always being logically distinct from production costs and competition may not 
always be sufficient to cause transaction costs to be minimised.  In response to such 
concerns, I start my sections covering the demand and supply of retail payment systems 
with a discussion of how I treat transaction costs. 
While all payment instruments might aid the exchange of money between merchants 
and consumers, not all are merchant-based.  As I explained in section 1.4, information 
on usage and pricing are generally available, in combination, only for card-based, 
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merchant-based instruments in my sample countries.  Accordingly, I focus on these 
when I use the available data to develop analysis of instrument demand in section 5.2.  
In section 2.1, however, I pointed to evidence indicating the rise of new consumer-based 
instruments that use mobile phones and I suggest ways in which they might be 
considered, using the framework I create.  No similar constraints exist on data for 
historical events and I use this data when I turn to their supply by payment networks in 
section 5.3 and the role of government in section 5.4. 
5.2 Demand for Payments Instruments 
An instrument will be preferred if it reduces transaction costs associated with trading 
between consumers and merchants compared to other instruments.  These costs I refer 
to as, demand-side transaction costs.  As I discussed in subsection 2.3.1, I use the 
definition of transaction costs suggested by Dahlman (1979).  Of his three categories, I 
argue the most relevant to instrument demand will be costs falling into the two 
categories of search and information costs and bargaining and decision costs.  I argue 
that the former captures the ease with which consumers and merchants find instruments 
suitable for the completion of their transactions, while the latter captures the ease with 
which consumers and merchants use an instrument to complete those transactions (for 
example, the length of time it takes to complete a transaction using an instrument).  In 
Table 1.1 in my introduction, I highlighted that the protection of private property rights 
was relatively strong in each of the countries I study.  Accordingly, I do not further 
analyse policing and enforcement costs for payment instruments, although I 
acknowledge these will be a greater issue in countries without a similar level of 
protection of property rights. 
The multitude and variety of merchants and consumers, no-less of the transactions 
between them, means that assessments of each instrument along a single dimension, 
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such as price or per-transaction fees, will be insufficiently informative.
1
  Payment 
instruments will become differentiated products, assessed on their suitability for 
different transactions according to their attributes.  In subsection 5.2.1, I analyse the 
characteristics over which consumers and merchants will have preferences, before 
further analysing the process they use to choose a merchant-based instrument to 
complete their transactions with.  In subsection 5.2.2, I use that analysis to describe the 
method by which instruments are selected, before summarising the aspects of 
instrument demand that contribute to the importance of network effects in subsection 
5.2.3.  In subsection 5.2.4, I analyse aspects of newly introduced merchant-based 
instruments and of the pricing and adoption of debit card systems to investigate the 
relative importance of merchants‘ acceptance of, and consumers‘ preference for, 
different payment instruments.  I show that it is the relative importance, firstly, of 
encouraging merchants to accept an instrument, rather than of consumers wishing to use 
it, that is key to retail payment system development. 
While I assess factors that raise transaction costs for both merchants and consumers, I 
make no attempt to aggregate these to an index.  Instead, I rely on revealed preference 
(which instrument gets used) to tell me which instruments are accepted by merchants 
and preferred by consumers because they reduce demand-side transaction costs.  
Because of my decision not to aggregate these costs for the two groups, I find the 
description, to minimise (demand-side) transaction costs, unhelpful - minimising 
implies demand-side transaction costs are minimised for both consumers and merchants 
for every transaction.  Instead, I conclude that the instrument used generally reduces 
                                                 
1
  As further support for this statement, I point to the work of Bolt et al (2008) who found the use of 
explicit payment instrument pricing in Norway accelerated the shift to electronic payment systems 
by approximately 20 percent, compared to adoption in the Netherlands where no explicit pricing was 
used.  This observation indicates that factors as well as pricing are important to consumers. 
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transaction costs for consumers and merchants because, if it did not do so, merchants 
would not choose to accept it at the same time that consumers chose to use it. 
5.2.1 Desired Attributes of Payment Instruments 
Consumers and merchants will prefer to use payment instruments that minimise the 
costs of their transactions with each other.  In order to assess the causes of transaction 
costs, I start by investigating consumers‘ and merchants‘ preferred attributes of the 
instruments they use.  Two papers I described in subsection 2.4.1, Borzekowski et al 
(2008) and Arango and Taylor (2008), indicate the attributes of utility for consumers 
and merchants, respectively.  This subsection analyses choices between payment 
instruments, using these attributes and the theories I have reviewed to show how 
attributes affect demand and interact.  I develop Table 5.1 below, which synthesises 
important attributes of payment instruments for consumers and merchants.  Because I 
focus on merchant-based instruments in this section, I consider relevant attributes for 
merchants and consumers together.  For the purposes of comparison, however, I include 
in Table 5.1, two payment instruments that are not merchant-based, cash and computer-
based instruments. 
I start with the consumer preferences given by Borzekowski et al (2008) and, in place of 
the preference for acceptance by merchants, use merchants‘ desired attributes, as 
indicated by Arango and Taylor (2008).  Of merchants‘ attributes, however, I do 
exclude intensity of use because I believe it reflects consumer demand for instruments.  
Some attributes will be relevant to both consumers and merchants.  I have specified 
where an attribute relates to just one or both of those parties.  For the sake of simplicity, 
I assign Borzekowski et al‘s attributes, restraint and tracking, to the attribute of 
convenience.  I also include a measure of the liquidity constraint associated with a 
payment instrument, the importance of which was indicated by Schreft (2006) when she 
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described the complex, inter-temporal decisions that occur when consumers decide to 
use a particular payment instrument.  Additionally, I have phrased the attributes to make 
a low rating more preferable (for example, I have used the attribute, inconvenience, 
rather than convenience). 
I use the attribute of inconvenience to measure the inconvenience of using an instrument 
for POS payments and for remote payments because particular instruments are often 
unsuited to one of these two types of payments.  The need for users to incur account 
fees to access a payment instrument and the need in all of the countries I have studied 
for merchants to buy or rent terminals means I separate financial costs (including 
pecuniary benefits) for merchants and consumers into fixed costs of obtaining access to 
a payment instrument and the marginal costs paid each time an instrument is used (per-
transaction fees).  I also consider the inconvenience and the liquidity constraint imposed 
by an instrument for merchants as well as for consumers. At this stage, I assume 
merchants do not surcharge or discount transactions paid for with particular 
instruments, an assumption I relax when considering competition over instrument 
attributes in subsection 5.2.2. 
Table 5.1 summarises my subjective assessments of these attributes for major payment 
instruments that are commonly used for domestic transactions.
2
  It shows my snapshot, 
taken at the present time, of whether an instrument has a low, medium or high amount 
(L, M or H) of a particular attribute, relative to other payment instruments.  I note that 
these attributes are not mutually exclusive and ratings will naturally change over time.  
Finally, I assume both the consumer and merchant maintain one bank account into 
which is paid their wages and revenue.
                                                 
2
  I note that only credit cards and scheme-based debit cards, being based on Visa, MasterCard or 
similar scheme, are generally used for transactions in other countries other than the one they were 
issued in. 
  
2
2
2
 
 
Table 5.1. Table of Commonly Used Payment Instruments’ Attributes 
Attribute
Relevant 
Party
Relevant Transaction/Cost 
(if applicable)
Cash Cheque Credit Card Debit Card
Stored-Value 
Card
Computer-
Based(1)
Time Both L H M M L M
Concerns About 
Reliability
Both L L L M M M
Associated Risk of 
Crime
Both H M L/M L L L
Point of Sale Payments M M L/M L/M L M
Remote Payments M M L/M M M L
Merchant L L L L L L
Fixed Costs L L H L/M H M
Marginal Costs L L/M L L/M L L
Fixed Costs L L L M/H M/H L
Marginal Costs L L/M H L/M M L/M
Consumer H M L M M/H M
Merchant L M L L L L
NB: Assumes consumers and merchants maintain one bank account for general purposes
(1) Includes instruments such as Paypal
(2) Includes implied interest cost
(3) Includes reward points (a negative financial cost)
Financial Cost(3)
Inconvenience(2)
Liquidity 
Constraint
Consumer
Consumer
Merchant
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Explanation of my ratings of attributes 
Table 5.1 assumes that it takes less time to process transactions made using cash or 
stored value cards than it does other payment instruments because those other 
instruments generally require the customer to use a PIN or signature for identification.
1
  
Because cash, cheque and credit cards have been used as payment instruments for 
longer, I assume merchants and consumers commonly have fewer concerns about their 
reliability.  Debit card, stored-value card and computer-based instruments are more 
reliant on recently developed technology and I assume that they are perceived as less 
reliable.
2
 
The crime associated with payment instruments might come from fraudulent use by 
other consumers (including from theft) or fraudulent use by merchants or merchants' 
agents.  Because it is anonymous and largely untraceable, cash has the highest risk of 
being stolen.  Reliance on signatures for customer identification means a greater risk of 
crime associated with cheques and, to a lesser extent, credit cards than with debit cards, 
which are commonly PIN-protected, or computer-based instruments, which are 
commonly password-protected.  Stored-value cards require none of PINs, passwords or 
signatures for customer identification implying they may be associated with a greater 
risk of crime.  However, because of this, consumers are more likely to limit the funds 
available using their stored-value cards compared to other payment instruments.  
Furthermore, since transactions made using stored-value cards are more traceable than 
cash, they may be associated with substantially lower risk of crime.  For example, the 
introduction of the stored-value card, Snapper, on buses in New Zealand resulted in the 
                                                 
1
  Although I do not adjust my attribute rating for time for credit or debit card, I note Zinman (2009) 
suggests paying by debit card is less time consuming for many consumers because it does not 
require balances to regularly be repaid. 
2
  I argue concerns about reliability are distinct from concerns about the risk of crime, which I discuss 
below. 
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dismissal of nine drivers that had been stealing bus fares under the previous cash-based 
ticketing system (Williamson, 2009, July 9).  For these two reasons, I assign a low 
rating to the associated risk of crime for stored-value cards. 
I have provided separate subjective measures of inconvenience for both POS 
transactions and remote payments, being those that are completed at locations away 
from the POS.  Assuming most consumers carry cash, most small payments are 
completed easily using cash at the POS.  The fact that consumers paid transaction fees 
to use the Norwegian and New Zealand debit card systems (at least when they were first 
introduced), however, suggests that consumers face a significant opportunity cost for 
transacting in cash.  Accordingly, I assign cash a medium rating for its inconvenience 
for POS payments.  Although writing a cheque is commonly thought of as inconvenient, 
a large amount of inconvenience will be associated with the time taken for processing a 
cheque transaction.  Even so, paying by cheque will likely involve additional 
inconvenience at least because it requires carrying a chequebook.  For this attribute, I 
have given cheque the same rating as cash.  I assume most of my other instruments have 
an M rating for consumer inconvenience for POS payments.
3
  The two instruments I do 
not give an M rating are: 
 stored-value cards, which I give a lower inconvenience because they do not 
require signature or PIN for user identification and  
 computer-based payment instruments are currently unsuited to POS payments 
because of their greater need for computing hardware. 
                                                 
3
  Although I give credit cards an M inconvenience rating, I acknowledge that using a credit card 
allows payment to be deferred, which means more interest can be earned on account balances.  
While this might be thought to mean a decrease in the inconvenience of credit card payments, I do 
not modify my attributes for inconvenience to reflect it because interest income will be negligible 
for the great majority of payments. 
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Computer-based payment instruments are, however, more suited to remote payments, 
for which time is generally less of an issue and payments can be made when a consumer 
has access to a computer.  I argue that credit cards are also suitable for remote 
payments, although to a slightly lesser extent than computer-based instruments because 
they generally require greater security checks.  Cheque, debit card and stored-value card 
are less suited to remote payments, because cheques are costly in terms of time, 
transport and processing,
4
 and the two card-based instruments generally require the use 
of a terminal for the completion of payments, making them unsuited to remote 
payments.
5
  Although cash is not generally thought of as suitable for remote payments, I 
argue that this is a result of its high associated risk of crime, rather than its 
inconvenience, and I assign it the same rating that I give cheques for remote payments. 
The literature I described in subsection 2.4.1 emphasises the importance of consumers‘ 
existing payment habits for their current behaviour.
6
  I have not, however, attempted to 
incorporate this into the table, which focuses on commonly-used payment instruments.  
I do return to the importance of habit when I discuss competition over attributes in 
subsection 5.2.2.  Another factor not reflected in the table is that consumers will 
experience additional inconvenience from an instrument, if using it requires them to 
maintain an account separate to the one that absorbs their earnings.  Common examples 
of instruments that require secondary accounts include credit cards, stored-value cards 
and the computer-based instrument, Paypal.  I argue that the inconvenience that comes 
from maintaining a second account is consistent with the observation of Zinman (2009) 
                                                 
4
  For the sake of simplicity, I do not reflect in my Table that transportation of cheques will be more 
costly for remote payments than for POS payments. 
5
  Although I do not change my ratings to reflect it, I note that debit cards have been issued under the 
schemes of Visa or MasterCard in all of my sampled countries and these cards can be used for 
remote payments (as well as internationally). 
6
  In particular, Guariglia and Loke (2004) investigate payment instrument use in 15 developed, EU 
and G10 countries between 1990 and 1998.  They show that a key factor affecting the volume of 
non-cash transactions is consumer habit, as measured by the positive relationship between the 
transaction volume of a particular instrument and the lagged transaction volume of that instrument. 
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that paying by debit card offers greater time savings for consumers because of no 
requirement to regularly repay balances.   
I give instruments the same rating for their inconvenience to merchants because, with 
the exceptions of cash and cheque, I believe each instrument will result in the merchant 
receiving funds from transactions without significant additional difficulty.
7
  For 
different reasoning, I also assign cash and cheque a low rating: although cash payments 
require merchants to make arrangements to deposit the money at the merchant‘s bank, 
this sort of inconvenience has a relatively low marginal (opportunity) cost, but a higher 
average variable cost.  That is, any one transaction does not create much additional cost 
for the merchant, but, taken together, a greater number of transactions made using an 
inconvenient payment instrument for the merchant puts the merchant to significant, 
additional cost.
8
  This would be the result of a greater number of trips to the bank or 
having more manual payments to input into an electronic accounting system, for 
example.  This distinction is important because, for the purposes of my table, I place 
greater emphasis on the relatively low marginal cost by giving the attribute a low rating.  
I suggest that the low marginal cost of cash is the reason that, as I outlined in subsection 
4.4.3, merchants labelled the financial costs of Germany‘s Geldkarte stored-value 
system as outrageous, in spite of market research showing these fees were lower than 
merchants‘ cost of handling cash,.  I give cheques the same rating because each cheque 
will not require significant additional inconvenience. 
In terms of financial costs, consumers will generally face fixed costs from the 
maintenance of an account at a financial institution.   As discussed, I assume a 
                                                 
7
  I acknowledge that electronic payment instruments might be more convenient for some merchants‘ 
accounting systems, although I do not adjust my ratings to reflect this. 
8
  This thinking may also apply to other instrument attributes, particularly the risk of crime associated 
with an instrument, but, for the sake of brevity, I chose not to analyse them in a similar way. 
227 
 
2
2
7
 
2
2
7
 
consumer maintains one account for receiving his or her income.  Payment instrument 
accounts secondary to that are considered additional fixed costs for those instruments.  
Of the payment instruments considered, credit cards and stored-value cards will 
commonly require customers to maintain a second account, in addition to the one used 
to receive wages, although some debit cards require an additional annual or semi-annual 
fee from consumers.  By virtue of requiring a computer, computer-based payment 
instruments will require substantial fixed costs for access, but I assume, however, that 
consumers already have access to a computer and assign computer-based instruments a 
medium rating for consumer fixed financial costs.  Consumers do not generally face a 
marginal financial cost for most payment instruments, although, in some jurisdictions, 
they incur fees for cheque and debit card use.  Consumers may in fact face negative 
financial costs for using credit cards if award points they receive when using such cards 
are included.  Such points only appear to make a small difference to prices, however.  In 
2003, as credit card interchange fees were becoming regulated, the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (2007, para. 95) reported that the standard credit cards of major Australian 
banks required consumers to spend A$12,400 to receive an A$100 voucher, a return of 
just 0.8%. 
Because my table relates to commonly used instruments, I assume that merchants 
require one bank account for their operations and thereby do not incur additional fixed 
costs from account-keeping.  My historical summaries in Chapter 4 show, however, that 
merchants in all of my sample countries generally need to buy or rent terminals to 
accept debit cards and the evidence I‘ve gathered on stored-value cards shows they 
generally require a different terminal to accept these, also.  Merchants are often charged 
per-transaction fees when accepting transactions, known as MSFs.  Although 
proportional in nature, I have assigned the highest rating to these for credit cards 
because such cards generally incur the highest MSFs of commonly used payment 
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instruments.  If there are MSFs for cash payments, these will be insignificant when a 
number of transactions are conducted using cash.  MSFs will be low to medium for 
account-to-account payment instruments, such as cheque, debit card and computer-
based instruments, but higher for stored-value cards.  Because these require a separate 
account to be maintained, but are less able to charge users for it (since users will then be 
much less likely to use it), a payment network will have little choice, but to charge a 
higher MSF for a stored-value instrument. 
Credit cards provide consumers with a source of short term credit and therefore offer the 
least constraint on liquidity of the instruments I consider.
9
 
10
  Because they commonly 
link to a consumer‘s bank account, the other instruments provide more liquidity than 
cash or stored value cards.  All the instruments considered quickly provide merchants 
with funds, with the exception of cheques, which may take some days to clear into a 
merchant‘s bank account. 
Attributes of consumer-based instruments 
To consider consumer-based instruments, I believe elements of Table 5.1 are such that a 
merchant's attributes could be replaced with a payee's (assuming a consumer‘s attributes 
become those of a payer).  Indeed, I discussed two instruments, cash and computer-
based instruments, that may be used for transactions not involving merchants.  Of 
course, competition over attributes will be quite different for consumer-based 
instruments and I expand on this point at the end of my next subsection. 
                                                 
9
  In Norway and Germany, banks commonly provide accounts with short-term overdrafts accessible 
using a debit card.  However, this is uncommon in the other countries I consider. 
10
  In their review of the literature, Garcia-Swartz et al (2007) refer to one particular reason for debit 
card use: debit cards represent a commitment device for individuals to constrain their spending.  
However, Zinman (2009) makes no reference to this reason for debit card use in his analysis of debit 
card/credit card decisions for consumers and I do not include it in my analysis, here.  Nor do I adjust 
my analysis for the use of cash as a commitment device. 
229 
 
2
2
9
 
2
2
9
 
5.2.2 Competition Over Attributes 
As discussed in section 2.4.1, Rosen (1974) shows how a differentiated product may be 
thought of as having a vector of implicit or hedonic prices that describes the amount of 
characteristics each product has, including its final price.  Users will choose the best 
product in accordance with their assessment of all of these characteristics and the 
valuation they put upon them.  This large set of characteristics combines with the 
variety of transactions between merchants and consumers to mean that many payment 
instruments will exist in equilibrium.  While such prices might guide consumers‘ and 
merchants‘ choices between these instruments, I provide additional analysis of the 
process by which consumers and merchants settle on an instrument to use to complete 
their transactions. 
In subsection 2.4.1, I reviewed literature showing that consumers face significant sunk 
costs when they adopt new payment instruments, which is consistent with literature that 
shows the importance of habit to the ways consumers choose to pay.  Consistent with 
Greif (2006), who argues that economic actors use institutions to economise on scare 
cognitive resources,
11
 I relate both the sunk costs of adoption and the importance of 
habit to the analytical complexities for consumers forming hedonic price estimates for 
each available instrument.  The analytical complexities of using unfamiliar instruments 
might also explain the observation of Rysman (2006), who argued that consumers‘ 
favoured networks were often those most accepted by merchants.  This leads to a key 
observation, consumers will be unable to form habits of using particular instruments 
unless those instruments are accepted by merchants.  Arango and Taylor (2008) find 
                                                 
11
  As well as cognitive resources, Greif (2006) also points to actors‘ need to economise on knowledge 
and attention as reasons underpinning the fundamental asymmetry; for the sake of brevity, I intend 
my reference to cognitive resources to include these two factors.  As another underpinning, Greif 
discusses the value for economic actors of coordinating their actions with other actors.  However, 
because I analyse both the two-sided and network effect elements of payment instrument decisions 
in this section, I believe I cover this underpinning elsewhere. 
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that ―aside from the initial decision to accept a payment method, merchants have little 
influence over the payment decisions made by consumers‖.12  They support this 
statement with analysis of the market shares of different retail payment instruments, 
which bear little relation to the attributes of utility for merchants.  However, the 
statement belies the importance of merchants: while consumers will have a preferred 
instrument (based on their valuations of its characteristics), a merchant‘s customers will 
only be able to use it if it is accepted by the merchant.   
Merchants will likely find some instruments provide a better service for the nature of 
their business than others.  If, however, they refuse to accept a payment instrument 
proffered by their customers and those customers do not have a convenient alternative 
to hand, they risk causing their customers significant disutility.  Not wishing to cause 
disutility is equivalent to the argument made by Rochet and Tirole (2006b) and others, 
that merchants internalise benefits for consumers.  If disutility is caused, however, I 
argue it will be associated with the search costs caused by consumers finding an 
alternative payment instrument to complete a transaction or finding a product to 
purchase elsewhere.  This disutility will make it more likely that consumers shop 
elsewhere for goods or, in the case that the merchant is a local monopoly, not buy 
goods.  A further concern for merchants will be whether customers wishing to pay with 
an instrument are likely to purchase more than a merchant‘s average customer.  For 
                                                 
12
  Arango and Taylor studied merchants‘ retail payment system decisions in Canada, where the No-
Surcharge Rule remains in force for Visa and MasterCard credit cards, although not for Interac debit 
card payments.  I start by assuming merchants are unable to surcharge customers for, or otherwise 
steer them from, using a particular payment instrument, before I relax this assumption later in this 
subsection. 
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these reasons, some merchants will decide to accept payment instruments that they 
would not otherwise accept.
13
   
However, the range of options available to the merchant is commonly greater than just 
whether to accept a certain payment instrument.  In some countries, merchants are able 
to accept certain instruments, but surcharge transactions made using them.  
Alternatively, merchants may influence their customers‘ choice of instrument by 
refusing to accept transactions of less than a certain value.  Since merchants likely incur 
higher transaction costs from surcharging, I focus on it, first, before returning to other 
methods merchants might influence or steer their customers‘ choice of payment 
instrument. 
Merchant surcharging 
Evans and Schmalensee (2005b, p. 93) suggest merchants are reluctant to surcharge 
transactions made with instruments not preferred because doing this raises significant 
transaction costs.  Transaction costs associated with surcharging come from two major 
sources: 
 Costs associated with the merchant effectively maintaining a separate price for 
some customers 
 Costs associated with the merchants‘ customers deciding to shop elsewhere or, in 
the case a merchant is a local monopoly, deciding not to purchase a good. 
These transaction costs explain a key observation about surcharging, when it is allowed, 
many merchants choose not to surcharge.  For example, Bolt et al (2009) find that the 
22% of Dutch merchants who surcharge do not do so for transactions greater than, on 
                                                 
13
  For example, some merchants accept three-party credit and charge cards, such as American Express 
and Diners Club, in spite of their charging significantly higher MSFs than other payment 
instruments. 
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average, 10 EUR.  If a customer wishes to use a debit card for transactions greater than 
this size, they are less likely to have an alternative to hand, and a surcharge of that 
instrument will cause them greater disutility.  For smaller transactions, however, 
customers are more likely to have sufficient cash for that to be a convenient alternative 
making merchants more likely to surcharge. 
Two motivations explain why some merchants surcharge in spite of the transaction 
costs: 
 A firm may be able to raise its profits by encouraging its customers to use its 
preferred payment instrument 
 As indicated by Wright (2003), a local merchant monopolist might steer 
customers by setting surcharges excessively to extract rent from inframarginal 
cardholders. 
These are not mutually exclusive.  In fact, surcharging may encourage a merchant‘s 
customers to use another instrument, while extracting rent from those customers 
unwilling to do so, compensating merchants for the transaction costs they incur.  For 
example, Bolt et al calculate that merchants who surcharged debit card transactions 
charged 23 euro cents on average, compared with an average MSF of 4-5 euro cents.  
That discounting cannot provide any compensation for transaction costs may be one 
reason explaining the observation of Kitch (1990) that it is even less common for 
merchants to discount for cash than it is for them to surcharge for more expensive 
instruments.
14
 
If the merchant is in a competitive environment, encouraging some customers to use its 
preferred instrument, as well as extracting greater rent from those consumers that do 
                                                 
14
  Another reason for merchants‘ preference not to discount may be that difference in posted prices 
across firms adds uncertainty for consumers. 
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not, may allow it to lower its prices, generally.  However, the lack of stores that 
surcharge, when allowed to do so suggests transaction costs associated with surcharging 
commonly make this strategy unprofitable. 
Should a merchant surcharge a payment instrument, the inconvenience consumers 
experience from using that instrument will likely increase significantly.
15
  This is 
reflected in evidence from Reserve Bank of Australia (2008, p. 18, citing confidential 
information) that the use of a surcharged payment instrument ―declines 
substantially‖.16,17  Yet, even if a consumer does not use a surcharged instrument, he or 
she still bears search costs associated with finding an alternative instrument or an 
alternative source as well as search costs relating to uncertainty about a merchant's 
prices.  Surcharging raises transaction costs. 
The No-Surcharge Rule is thus consistent with generally reducing transaction costs.
18
  If 
a No-Surcharge Rule is not imposed, merchants that decide to surcharge must decide 
surcharging is profitable because they recoup the additional transaction costs they face 
from consumers.  The analysis of merchant surcharging I outlined in my historical 
country-by-country reviews in Chapter 4 that surcharges commonly exceed the size of 
MSFs, suggesting that merchants look to recoup the additional costs they face when 
surcharging.  Such recoupment might occur because surcharging allows merchants to 
take advantage of different price elasticities of demand for consumers generally wishing 
                                                 
15
  Although I focus on the inconvenience of using a surcharged instrument, an alternative 
representation that I do not use would be to increase a consumer‘s financial costs of using that 
instrument. 
16
  This is consistent with merchants only surcharging when customers have a convenient alternative to 
hand that is accepted and desirable to the merchant. 
17
  It is commonly argued that merchant surcharges discourage the use of payment instruments that 
have higher fees (for merchants) and, in this way, are efficiency improving (for example, see the 
Joint Study, 2000, p. 75).  However, I argued in section 5.2 that payment instruments are 
differentiated products, indicating it is difficult to reach conclusions regarding efficiency, on the 
basis of relative financial fees, alone. 
18
  I refer to my discussion in section5.1 that the use of a payment instrument shows it generally 
reduces, rather than minimises, demand-side transaction costs. 
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to pay with a particular instrument.  Additionally, surcharging will raise transaction 
costs for consumers who search for an un-surcharged instrument with which to 
complete their transaction or become uncertain about merchants' prices.  Accordingly, 
the imposition of a No-Surcharge Rule prevents merchants from imposing transaction 
costs on consumers and generally reduces demand-side transaction costs. 
Other steering methods 
As well as influencing consumers‘ choice of payment instrument by refusing to accept 
an instrument or by surcharging or discounting transactions made with one, a merchant 
may employ other methods to influence the payment instrument used.  A relatively 
common one is that merchants refuse to accept a payment instrument for transactions 
below a certain amount.  Additionally, a merchant may wish to accept one type of a 
scheme‘s instruments (such as a Visa or MasterCard credit card), but not another type 
(such as a Visa or MasterCard debit card).  Some payment networks, however, involve 
rules that prevent merchants from taking this type of action, indicating that it may raise 
transaction costs for consumers, impeding an instrument‘s use.  In particular, I refer to 
the Honour-All-Cards Rule that likely reduces consumer uncertainty, thereby reducing 
demand-side transaction costs. 
Competition over attributes of consumer-based instruments 
For consumer-based instruments, competition over attributes will occur in a different 
way.  When not actually merchants, payees are unlikely to internalise the benefit a payer 
gets from using an instrument in the way that a merchant internalises a consumer‘s 
benefit.  This will likely mean that payees cannot be charged higher fees than payers for 
using consumer-based instruments, as merchants are charged higher fees (than 
consumers) for using some merchant-based instruments (such as credit cards). 
Consistent with this argument, I described the work of Jack and Suri (2010) in section 
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2.1, who reported (p. 7) that only payers pay a fee for transactions completed using the 
consumer-based instrument, M-PESA.  Furthermore, since consumers may be either 
payers or payees during different transactions, it would seem more important for a 
payment network providing a consumer-based instrument to ensure participation, 
generally, rather than to ensure the participation of payers and payees, separately, as 
occurs for merchant-based instruments.  A lack of data from my sample countries makes 
me unable, however, to make any strong observations about the competition that will 
occur over attributes for consumer-based instruments. 
5.2.3 Payment Instrument Demand and Network Effects 
I have discussed one key factor relating to demand for payment instruments that 
enhances the importance of network effects.
19
  The factor is that sunk costs of adoption 
incurred by consumers, as reported in the literature I described in section 2.4.1.  In 
subsection 5.2.2, I related these costs to the importance of consumer's habit, but argue 
here that they will also mean that consumers observe the habits of those around them, 
before deciding to adopt a new instrument.  Such a process will have parallels to 
Ching‘s (2008) dynamic learning process for the diffusion of generic drugs, which I 
discussed in subsection 2.4.1.  It will mean that use of an instrument grows 
disproportionately faster, the greater the number of people using it.  Because they 
influence the number of users, all of an instrument‘s attributes, such as its 
inconvenience and financial cost, will influence the extent of network effects.  Aside 
from any learning process, however, I argued in subsection 5.2.1that the significance of 
two instrument attributes will likely be reduced if merchants and consumers expect to 
make a higher number of transactions with an instrument.  These two attributes are: 
                                                 
19
  Consistent with Liebowitz and Margolis (1994), which I discussed in subsection 2.3.1, I use the 
term, network effect, to refer to the effect on the net value of an action of the number of agents 
taking equivalent actions. 
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 The financial costs of an instrument for merchants and consumers that are fixed 
(they do not vary with the number of transactions), such as the cost of a terminal 
for merchants or the cost of acquiring an instrument for consumers
20
 
 Concerns about reliability held by merchants and consumers, which will be most 
important when a payment instrument is first introduced and 
I mention this characteristic of these two attributes because it points to a payment 
network‘s instrument being more useful to users, the greater the amount they expect to 
use it.  This is a further argument that the significance of network effects will be 
reduced if payment networks have access to a greater number of potential users.  While 
this argument might seem obvious, I use it in subsection 5.4.4 to describe why 
merchants needing multiple types of debit card terminals in the early 1980s reduced the 
use of debit cards at that time in the US.  I also return to the argument when I analyse 
the decisions of organisations to participation in payment networks in subsection 5.3.1.  
Before I consider instrument supply decisions, however, I pay further attention to the 
operation of network effects in retail payment systems, outlining aspects to network 
effects for merchant-based, and then consumer-based instruments, before analysing 
their importance to complete this subsection. 
Network effects for merchant-based instruments 
A factor complicating the nature of network effects is that merchant-based payment 
instruments involve two distinct groups of users, consumers and merchants.  
Consumers‘ expectations, and therefore desire to use a payment instrument, depend on 
merchants‘ acceptance of that instrument while merchants‘ expectations, and therefore 
                                                 
20
  For example, a consumer might incur fixed financial costs when opening an account to use a 
payment instrument.  Although it is not strictly a financial cost, it seems appropriate to include the 
opportunity cost of a consumer‘s time in acquiring an instrument in this category, also. 
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acceptance of an instrument, depend on consumers‘ desire to use an instrument.  This 
creates what is commonly called the chicken and egg problem: why will consumers 
wish to use an instrument unless it‘s accepted by merchants and why will merchants 
wish to accept it, unless consumers wish to use it?  For consumer-based instruments, the 
problem collapses into one of having a sufficient number of other users to make using 
an instrument worthwhile for any single user. 
Network effects for consumer-based instruments 
Although I argued in the previous subsection it was difficult to be explicit about 
competition over attributes for consumer-based instruments, evidence indicates that 
network effects are likely to be a major issue for these, also.  Unlike for consumers, I 
have not found literature arguing that merchants face sunk costs of adoption of new 
payment instruments.  When a consumer replaces a merchant as a payee for a 
consumer-based instrument, both sides using it will face sunk costs of adoption.  This 
suggests network effects will be stronger for consumer-based than for merchant-based 
instruments.  My lack of observations on this issue, however, makes me unable to reach 
any strong conclusions on the matter. 
The importance of network effects 
Network effects‘ importance, is highlighted by the difficulties experienced in all of my 
sample countries creating a successful stored-value card system during the 1990s.  None 
of the pilots of the Mondex payment instrument introduced in all but one of my 
countries led to large-scale deployments.
21
  As I discussed on subsection 2.4.1, 
however, I believe concerns about network effects can be overstated:  I mentioned one 
                                                 
21
  The country that did not see a Mondex pilot was Germany, where the ZKA German banking 
association instead promoted the Geldkarte stored-value network, which it rolled out nationally in 
1997.  In 2005, a Geldkarte manager is quoted as saying that saying that the system had started only 
focusing on unattended points of sale because of the difficulties promoting it in other attended 
locations. 
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author who blamed them for the failure of stored-value payment networks in the US 
while another pointed out that these networks had failed to convince consumers and 
merchants that they should use and accept such instruments.  I provide further analysis 
of the importance of network effects when I compare merchant acceptance of payment 
instruments and their use by consumers in the next subsection. 
5.2.4 Comparing Merchant Acceptance with Consumer Habit 
To support my description of the process used to choose a merchant-based instrument 
and my description of relevant network effects, I analyse aspects to the introduction and 
the adoption of new payment instruments.  The analysis indicates that, while the 
instrument that gets used will generally reduce demand-side transaction costs, that 
instrument will likely be the one that is acceptable to merchants, rather than being the 
most technologically advanced instrument. 
The introduction of new retail payment instruments 
Table 5.2 sets out the MSFs of selected new retail payment instruments, compared to 
the MSFs of what I judge to be the major competing instrument(s).  The new 
instruments shown are, with one exception, selected as instruments that did not require 
merchants to incur significant additional fixed financial costs, such as through the 
purchase or rental of card terminals, before they were able to accept the instrument.
22,23
  
I have also chosen not to show the introduction of credit cards in my table for the sake 
                                                 
22
  This is, in effect, a simplifying assumption.  As I identified in subsection 5.2.1, the fixed financial 
costs faced by merchants will make their desire to use a retail payment instrument dependent on 
their expectations of how much that instrument will be used.  In order to allow my analysis to 
disregard such expectations, I focus on payment instruments where merchants do not face additional 
fixed financial costs. 
23
  I have not included new payment instruments introduced in Norway or the UK in the table, because 
I have not found sufficient evidence on the introduction of instruments meeting my table‘s criteria. 
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of simplicity.
24
  An instrument provided for use with no MSF does not charge the 
merchant a fee, per-transaction; a fixed MSF refers to a per-transaction fee that does not 
change with a transaction‘s value while a proportional fee is proportional to value. 
The exception I have made is a stored-value system, Snapper, being developed in New 
Zealand.  I have included it because it demonstrates why a merchant might accept an 
instrument, in spite of the need to invest in a special terminal to do so.  Additionally, I 
have included Snapper, but not other stored-value systems because, unlike London‘s 
Oyster card, it can be accepted by more than one type of merchant and, unlike 
Germany‘s Geldkarte card, it has a public transport application.  The literature discussed 
in subsection 2.4.1 suggested this would help an instrument overcome relevant network 
effects. 
                                                 
24
  My tables in Chapter 3 showed that credit card transactions incur proportional MSFs without 
exception in my sample countries, making such data inappropriate for assessing possible causes of 
differences in instruments‘ MSFs. 
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Table 5.2. Unregulated MSFs of Selected Newly-Introduced and Competing Payment 
Instruments for POS Transactions 
Country New 
Payment 
Instrument 
Year First 
Introduced 
New 
Instrument’s 
MSF 
Major 
Competing 
Instrument 
Competing 
Instrument’s 
MSF 
Australia 
Scheme-
Based Debit 
Card 
1982 Proportional 
Cash 
(Credit Card) 
None 
(Proportional) 
Canada 
Scheme-
Based Debit 
Card 
2008 Fixed 
Interac Debit 
Card 
Fixed 
Germany 
Scheme-
Based Debit 
Card
(1)
 
2007 Proportional 
Electronic 
Cash 
Proportional 
New 
Zealand 
Scheme-
Based Debit 
Card 
2006 None 
EFTPOS Debit 
Card 
None 
Stored-Value 
Card
(1) 2008 Proportional 
EFTPOS Debit 
Card 
None 
United 
States 
Scheme-
Based Debit 
Card 
Mid-
1990s
(3) Proportional 
Cash 
(Credit Card) 
None 
(Proportional) 
(1) While scheme-based debit cards, in the form of co-badged Electronic 
Cash/Maestro cards were already available in Germany, Maestro cards became 
available in this year that did not use Electronic Cash for the completion of 
transactions within Germany. 
(2) Contrary to my assumption discussed above, merchants do incur some additional 
fixed financial costs to accept Snapper stored-value card transactions, in the form 
of an additional terminal.  I discuss this further below. 
(3) Although scheme-based debit cards were first developed during the 1970s, it 
wasn‘t until this time that they were significantly promoted by the Visa and 
MasterCard credit card schemes.  
 
Unless a new instrument represents a substantial improvement for merchants over the 
major competing instrument, they are more likely to refuse to accept the new instrument 
if it charges a significantly higher MSF than the incumbent instrument.  In the three 
countries, Canada, Germany and New Zealand, where networks introduced a scheme-
based debit card to compete with each country‘s domestic debit card system, they did 
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not charge merchants MSFs that were different to MSFs charged by the domestic 
system.  This is consistent with my characterisation given that, as I described in 
subsection 5.2.1, scheme-based debit cards do not represent a substantial improvement 
for consumers and merchants over domestic debit cards for POS transactions.  When 
scheme debit cards were introduced in Australia and the US, however, they did 
represent a substantial improvement over one major competing retail payment system, 
cash, but less so over the other, credit cards.  As my characterisation predicts, the MSFs 
of these two instruments matched those of credit cards and were proportional, in nature. 
Because it requires neither a PIN nor a signature, New Zealand‘s Snapper stored-value 
card is significantly more convenient for merchants who benefit from transactions being 
processed more rapidly than can be achieved with the PIN-based incumbent payment 
instrument, the EFTPOS debit card.  Furthermore, Snapper has a lower associated risk 
of crime than cash by virtue of being more traceable, which is important for merchants 
who operate in cash rich environments, but rely on employees to operate as their agents.  
For these reasons, I argue some merchants are willing to accept it, in spite of incurring 
both fixed costs and proportional fees in order to do so. 
Although I have not included it in my table, it is instructive to consider Germany‘s 
Geldkarte stored-value system.  As I discuss in subsection 4.4.3, although 67 million 
Geldkarte cards had been issued by 2001 (following the system‘s nationwide 
introduction in 1997), only about 2-3% of these were held by active card users.
25
  The 
importance of merchant acceptance was indicated when a manager at the payment 
network operator admitted in 2005 that the network had ended promoting acceptance 
outside of unattended retail because it had found such promotion ―very difficult‖.  This 
                                                 
25
  The Geldkarte system did not receive significant promotion from the pillar of the banking system 
with arguably the strongest profit motive, the commercial banks (the other pillars being the 
cooperative and the public banks). 
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further indicates the importance of having merchants accept an instrument, but also to 
have consumers desire to use it. 
Table 5.2 deals with all successfully introduced payment instruments I have identified 
that, with the exception of Snapper, did not require merchants to incur fixed costs 
before accepting them.  That is, I have not identified any successfully introduced 
instruments without such costs that did not compare favourably for merchants with the 
incumbent instrument.  In order to test the pricing for merchants of instruments that do 
require fixed costs, I turn to usage of debit cards. 
Debit card pricing for merchants 
Consumers in my sample countries were using similar payment instruments when debit 
cards were introduced (that is, cash supplemented by cheques, credit cards and, in two 
countries, giros).  Following the development of the POS terminal, debit cards 
represented a major improvement over existing payment instruments because it allowed 
consumers to directly access the accounts that absorbed their earnings.
26
  I analyse 
relevant prices, being the per-transaction fees charged to consumers and merchants, and 
differences between countries in the adoption of debit cards.  In my country-by-country 
summaries in Chapter 4, I reported that merchants in all of my sample countries are 
generally required to purchase or rent POS terminals in order to accept payments by 
debit card. 
Table 5.3 summarises information on relevant prices for major debit card systems in the 
countries studied, as well as the usage of debit cards in a country, generally.  Where I 
have reported significant trends in fees, these are given in brackets.  I have also 
provided the year major systems were introduced. 
                                                 
26
  Although credit cards were developed before debit cards, their use requires consumers to open an 
account generally additional to the one that absorbs their earnings. 
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Table 5.3. Pricing and Usage of Major Debit Card Systems 
Country Names of 
Major Debit 
Card 
Networks 
Year 
System 
Established 
Nature of Per-transaction 
Fees of Major Networks 
Faced By:
(1)
 
Average 
Number of 
Transactions 
Per Capita, 
2008
(2)
 Merchants Consumers 
Australia EFTPOS 1985
(3)
 
Fixed 
(increasing) 
Some fixed 81 
Canada Interac 1994
(4)
 Fixed Some fixed 111 
Germany Ec Cash 1990
(5)
 Proportional None 23 
New 
Zealand 
EFTPOS 1989
(6)
 None 
Some fixed 
(decreasing) 
181 
Norway Bank-Axept 1991
(7)
 
None 
significant 
Fixed 
(decreasing) 
191
(8)
 
United 
Kingdom 
Visa Debit, 
Maestro and 
Solo 
1986-88
(9)
 Fixed None 89
 
United 
States 
MasterCard 
and Visa 
Mid-
1990s
(10)
 
Proportional 
(increasing) 
Commonly 
none 
113 
(1) Column refers to the current per-transaction fees for POS transactions made using 
major systems.  None means no per-transaction fees are charged.  Fixed refers to 
per-transaction fees that do not change in size with the size of the transaction.  
Some fixed refers to fees that, depending on a consumer‘s account, are generally 
either zero or fixed.  Proportional refers to fees that are proportional to the 
transaction‘s value.  The labels in brackets, increasing and decreasing, refer to 
general trends that I reported in Chapter 4 in the levels of fees charged 
(2) Figures include debit card transactions completed over all networks, rather than 
just major ones 
(3) Year from which contracts between EFTPOS networks were negotiated, allowing 
interconnection 
(4) Year in which Interac debit card network rolled out nationally 
(5) Year in which agreement reached between banks for the national roll-out 
(6) Year in which agreement reached between banks creating EFTPOS network of 
Electronic Transaction Services Limited 
(7) Year in which agreement reached between banks creating BankAxept 
(8) As I discuss in subsection 4.6.5, this figure does not include transactions made 
with Norwegian cards in countries other than Norway, nor transactions on non-
BankAxept debit cards 
(9) Years in which major banks introduced their own debit card instruments, Visa and 
Switch debit cards 
(10) Approximate date that Visa and MasterCard started promoting their Visa Check 
and MasterMoney offline debit cards. 
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In subsection 4.4.5, I outlined my inability to fully explain Germany‘s low use of debit 
(and credit) cards, which remains important here.  Ignoring Germany, Table 5.3 clearly 
shows that, in the two countries with the most well-used debit card systems, New 
Zealand and Norway, merchants are not charged significant MSFs by the major debit 
card system.  The table shows little, if any, relationship between the year of a system‘s 
introduction and the extent of its adoption.  Merchants‘ per-transaction fees are 
important to the adoption of debit cards because, once merchants have incurred the 
fixed cost of a debit card terminal, they will likely accept transactions of any amount.  
In the two countries where merchants are not charged significant fees, consumers show 
a preference to use their debit cards in spite of facing fixed per-transaction fees.
27
  When 
merchants are charged significant per-transaction fees for debit cards, as happens in the 
other five countries in my sample, they are less willing to accept smaller debit card 
transactions because, I argue, their customers will often have a an instrument to hand 
that is cheaper for them to accept, cash.  As with my analysis of the introduction of new 
instruments, it is the acceptance of instruments by merchants that appears key to the 
development of retail payment systems. 
The focus of Table 5.3 on just one payment instrument, the debit card, makes it difficult 
to draw conclusions beyond what I have already discussed.  Norway‘s high use of debit 
cards, relative to New Zealand‘s, will be influenced by the greater use of bank account 
overdrafts (accessible using just a debit card), rather than credit cards, as a source of 
short-term consumer credit.  I have not found additional information to assess the use of 
credit cards against bank account overdrafts in New Zealand. 
                                                 
27
  As I discussed in subsection 5.2.1, I believe this fact indicates that consumers face significant 
inconvenience when completing transactions in cash. 
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The evolution of retail payment systems based on demand by consumers and 
merchants 
My analysis has shown that many payment instruments will exist in equilibrium, but 
that competition will occur between them to generally reduce demand-side transaction 
costs.  It has also indicated that a key way for instruments to reduce these costs is to first 
make a new payment instrument acceptable to merchants.  I provide further reasoning 
for why I believe this is the case using an example of a payment network providing a 
merchant-based instrument and receiving fees from either consumers or merchants.  The 
network needs merchants to incur fixed costs, such as the purchase or rental of a 
terminal, before they can accept its instrument and, if acceptance of the instrument does 
not offer significant benefits to merchants over alternative instruments (such as by 
increasing sales or allowing faster transaction completion), merchants will be less keen 
on a new instrument.  If merchants are charged in any significant way for using the 
instrument, fewer incur fixed costs needed to accept it.  While consumers may be more 
willing to use an instrument if they go uncharged, the lower level of acceptance by 
merchants will reduce the chances consumers have to use debit cards and develop new 
payment habits.  In this way, acceptance precedes the forming of habits.  My description 
is obviously static, but it provides a way of understanding a dynamic process.  If 
merchants find a payment instrument attractive, more will incur the fixed costs 
necessary to accept it.  This will lead to more consumers forming the habit of paying 
with an instrument, which will increase the pressure for other merchants to also accept 
an instrument.  I have not seen merchants‘ acceptance of new instruments emphasised in 
this way, in the literature before.   
While my conclusion about merchant acceptance preceding customer habit looks 
obvious, it supports my characterisation of competition over instrument attributes and 
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explains why instruments based on technological improvements will have problems 
overcoming network effects if they do not confer benefits on merchants and merchants 
do not wish to accept them.  However, even if merchants accept an instrument, 
consumers need a reason to use it and form the habit of using it.  The essence of the 
network effects problem will remain: how do payment networks get enough merchants 
to accept an instrument, in order to get enough consumers to form the habit of using it 
to get still more merchants to accept it?  Payment network choices, including pricing 
and interchange fee decisions and the imposition of the No-Surcharge Rule will be part 
of the answer, but, to properly answer the question, I investigate the supply of payment 
instruments by networks in the next section. 
5.3 Supply of Instruments by Payment Networks 
In this section, I analyse incentives faced by payment networks as they provide 
instruments to users.  A profit-maximising network will attempt to maximise the 
difference between the fees it gets paid by users of its instrument and the costs it incurs 
in providing that instrument.  In subsection 5.3.1, I begin my analysis of instrument 
supply by introducing the operations of a payment network and describing how network 
effects create an incentive for profit-seeking payment networks to increase their 
participation.  In subsection 5.3.2, I analyse opportunities for a payment network to 
provide a new payment instrument, arguing that, in workably competitive conditions, a 
profit-seeking payment network will provide an instrument that gets used while it at 
least recoups its costs of supply from fees paid by users.  I go on to argue that this 
indicates a process of payment networks adapting to changing circumstances.  In 
subsection 5.3.3, I analyse the role of (potential) inter-network competition, arguing that 
a payment network will likely experience greater participation if, ceteris paribus, it 
offers an instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs to a greater 
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degree than competing networks‘ instruments and provides it with lower costs of 
supply.  I argue that, since network effects raise the incentive for profit-seeking 
payment networks to increase their participation, (potential) inter-network competition 
promotes dynamic efficiency.  I summarise my findings on payment instrument supply 
in subsection 5.3.4. 
As well as production costs, costs relevant to a payment network include transaction 
costs incurred during the production of, and the provision of services for, a network‘s 
instrument.  Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue that transaction costs are only 
sometimes distinct from production costs, suggesting to me that an approach of defining 
production costs that includes transaction costs would create confusion for readers.  For 
this reason, I define the costs of supply below. 
Transaction costs and the costs of supply 
In the preceding section, I discuss the relevance of demand-side transaction costs to the 
demand for payment instruments.  While it might be tempting to define supply-side 
transaction costs as transaction costs occurring within a payment network, the literature 
I described in subsection 2.3.1 argues that transaction costs are not always distinct from 
production costs.  I believe this is mainly an issue when transaction costs relate to the 
transaction at hand.  Transaction costs for transactions completed during earlier stages 
of the production process still need to be considered, however, because they will likely 
raise the price members of a payment network are willing to charge instrument users.  
Accordingly, I define the costs of supply of a payment instrument to include the 
production costs a payment network incurs in offering an instrument to users and the 
transaction costs incurred between members of a payment network in the course of 
producing and servicing that instrument. 
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5.3.1 Payment Networks: Operations and Participation 
Baxter (1983) gives an account of the development in the US of four-party payment 
networks for the processing of cheques during the previous 150 years.  Banks that 
otherwise competed might participate in the same payment network by accepting each 
other‘s cheques.  A transaction involving such a network would see a consumer using a 
cheque to complete his or her transaction with a merchant.  After collecting the cheque 
from the merchant, the merchant‘s bank (the acquirer) would pass the cheque on to the 
consumer‘s bank (the issuer) for settlement of the transaction.  To fund an instrument‘s 
costs of supply, a payment network will collect fees from instrument users. 
In subsection 5.2.3, I argued that network effects mean the use of an instrument grows 
disproportionately faster, the greater the number of people using it.  Having more banks 
participating in a cheque-based payment network will generally mean a greater number 
of consumers proffer the network‘s cheques and a greater number of merchants accept 
them.  In my discussion of network effects, I also demonstrated two particular 
instrument attributes that could be improved (to encourage greater instrument use) 
through greater participation in a payment network, those attributes being concerns 
about an instrument‘s reliability and the fixed financial cost of an instrument‘s use.  I 
argue a network reaching a greater size will find it easier to convince potential users of 
an instrument that they are likely to conduct a greater number of transactions using it, 
making them more accepting of concerns about reliability and more willing to incur 
fixed costs before using it.  Greater participation thus contributes to payment networks 
overcoming network effects, allowing them to raise profits by increasing their usage 
fees (because greater participation means cheques will be used more widely, generally 
reducing demand-side transaction costs, ceteris paribus)   A profit-seeking payment 
network thus has an incentive to increase participation because it reduces the 
significance of the network effects faced by users of its instrument. 
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An additional concern for payment networks is of course costs and cost minimisation 
does have some importance.  For example, Baxter (1983) describes the process banks 
developed (prior to the intervention of the Federal Reserve) to provide services for 
transactions made with their cheques.  Banks would set cheque processing fees 
collectively, which Baxter argues was efficiency-enhancing because it reduces costs 
associated with the negotiation of such fees.  It is, however, the costs of supply that are 
relevant to payment networks and these include transaction costs.  In work I described 
in subsection 2.3.1, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argued that it was not obvious efficient 
organisations would minimise transaction costs, suggesting instead that sufficient 
competition is required before minimisation of such costs can be assumed.  For this 
reason, I return to analysis of payment networks‘ costs when I consider the role of inter-
network competition in subsection 5.3.3. 
5.3.2 Profitable Opportunities and Institutional Adaption 
A significant new technology for retail payment systems was the payment card, which 
increased the range of instruments that could be offered by payment networks and the 
range of organisations able to offer instruments that generally reduced demand-side 
transaction costs.  Diners Club, the first mass marketed payment card in the US, was not 
offered by a bank, but by a company whose business was primarily focused on the card 
– by itself, it coordinated both the issuing of cards to consumers and acquiring 
transactions from merchants.  I argue that Diners Club introduced its card because it 
perceived there was a profitable opportunity to offer an instrument that generally 
reduced demand-side transaction costs while recouping its costs of supply.  Given 
banks‘ role in providing customers with funds and that cards accessing funds held at a 
bank will likely be an asset specific to that bank, transaction cost analysis indicates 
banks‘ interest in payment cards.  In addition, Diners Club competed as a payment 
instrument with banks‘ cheques.  Banks‘ payment cards offered consumers a line of 
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credit and became called credit cards.  Consistent with a preference for institutions that 
had previously been used - the fundamental asymmetry described by Greif (2006) - 
banks created networks for their credit cards similar to networks used to process 
cheques.  These early efforts at cooperation eventually developed into the national 
credit card brands, Visa and MasterCard, with both organisations developing a 
corporate structure based on a multi-party membership corporation. 
The early stages of the introduction of payment cards demonstrate a dynamic process of 
institutional adaption as has been described by Greif with parameters useful to Greif‘s 
framework being those that influence the ability of a payment network to increase profit 
by offering an instrument that gets used because it generally reduces demand-side 
transaction costs while the network at least recoups its costs of supply from fees paid by 
users.
28
  I caveat this comment by specifying that it applies to payment networks in 
workably competitive conditions.  I add this caveat to rule out the possibility of a 
monopolist failing to introduce an instrument because it would cannibalise profits from 
existing instruments. 
Another example of institutional adaption is the stored-value payment instrument, 
Snapper, created by a private provider of bus services in New Zealand.  Literature I 
described in subsection 2.4.1 indicated that a public transport application represented a 
way for stored-value payment networks to overcome network effects.  In subsection 
5.2.4, I argued that, in spite of transactions made using Snapper incurring significant 
MSFs (relative to what I label to be the incumbent payment instrument, the EFTPOS 
debit card), a stored-value instrument was acceptable to merchants because it allowed 
faster processing of transactions than PIN-based EFTPOS card payments as well as 
                                                 
28
  Importantly, I do not treat capabilities as parameters, but instead treat parameters as giving a 
payment network the capability to offer an instrument in the way I‘ve suggested. 
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having a lower associated risk of crime than cash.  Snapper‘s bus company owner saw a 
profitable opportunity to provide an instrument that benefited consumers by reducing 
their demand-side transaction costs. 
As well as demonstrating an adaptive, profit-maximising process, the above examples 
demonstrate the relevant private objective for profit-seeking payment networks: in 
workably competitive conditions, a network will wish to increase its profits by offering 
an instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs while at least 
recouping its costs of supply.  This indicates a dynamic question relevant to my thesis: 
if opportunities appear to exist for profit-seeking payment networks to generate profit 
while generally reducing demand-side transaction costs, why are these not taken?  The 
question points to the role of (potential) inter-network competition in encouraging 
dynamic efficiency, which is what I now turn to. 
5.3.3 Inter-Network Competition and Dynamic Efficiency 
In subsection 5.3.1, I described how network effects raise the incentive for profit-
seeking payment networks to increase participation.  To analyse organisations‘ 
decisions about participation, I use the framework of institutional change provided by 
Grief (2006), which I described in section 2.3.  Based on it, I find that (potential) inter-
network competition promotes dynamic efficiency.  Specifically, I find that, in the 
presence of such competition, a profit-seeking payment network will likely experience 
greater participation if, ceteris paribus, it offers an instrument that generally reduces 
demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than competing networks‘ instruments 
and provides it at lower costs of supply. 
Greif (2006) describes a process of institutional change that is based on individuals 
deciding how to behave, taking the behaviour of others as a given.  Institutions will be 
self-enforcing if, given a set of parameters and the behaviour of others, individuals use 
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behaviour consistent with those institutions as they decide how to behave.  Taking 
Greif‘s framework and using the profit-seeking behaviour of payment networks that I 
argued occurs in the previous subsection, I analyse the role of (potential) inter-network 
competition in instrument supply decisions made by payment networks.  I find that 
inter-network competition means a profit-seeking payment network that does not reduce 
demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than competing networks‘ instruments 
and/or does not provide them with lower costs of supply will be self-enforcing under a 
smaller set of parameters than it will without inter-network competition.
29
  I 
demonstrate this point with two examples of retail payment system development in New 
Zealand and one of development in the US. 
My first example is the creation of the New Zealand debit card payment system, 
EFTPOS, in a series of events that I describe in detail in subsection 4.5.3.  In New 
Zealand, there were initially two separate EFTPOS networks, one known as Cashline 
created by the trustee savings banks and the other known as Quicksmart created by the 
trading bank-owned joint-venture, Databank.
30
  A crisis for the stability of EFTPOS 
followed the 1988 decision of two (former) trading banks, ANZ and BNZ, to end their 
involvement with the Quicksmart network.  The decision came as New Zealand‘s banks 
faced financial pressure following the 1987 sharemarket crash and I interpret it to 
indicate that the banks no longer felt able to recoup the costs associated with Databank‘s 
EFTPOS network while still generally reducing users‘ demand-side transaction costs.  
In events I described in subsection 4.5.3, the two other owners of Databank, Westpac 
and National Bank, purchased the assets of Quicksmart, renamed the network Handy-
point, and decided to operate it without MSFs in order to compete with the Cashline 
                                                 
29
  I assume that a profit-seeking network will not supply an instrument unless it recoups its costs. 
30
  As I discuss in subsection 4.5.2, legislation passed in 1986 removed the regulatory distinctions 
between trading banks and trustee savings banks, allowing all who met certain criteria to become 
entities known as, registered banks. 
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network.  I argue this indicates that Westpac and National Bank saw this development 
as the most profitable way to generally reduce demand-side transaction costs.  
Furthermore, I argued in section 5.2 that pricing a debit card in this way made the 
instrument more effective at generally reducing demand-side transaction costs.  
Successive events, each of which I also described in subsection 4.5.3, reinforced the 
institution of not charging MSFs for POS debit card transactions, further demonstrating 
that pricing debit cards in this way generally reduced demand-side transaction costs to a 
greater degree than potentially competing networks‘ instruments : 
 the owners of the Cashline network merged it with Handy-point, while adopting a 
similar approach to MSFs as Handy-point, to form the jointly-owned company, 
ETSL (Electronic Transaction Services Limited) in 1989 
 BNZ joined ETSL and ANZ set up a competing switch that offered merchants 
EFTPOS services without their incurring MSFs 
 ANZ Bank attempted to charge MSFs for EFTPOS transactions in 1998, but was 
forced to end the practice after it lost significant merchant account business to 
other banks and 
 Westpac introduced a Visa Debit Card, which did not charge MSFs for 
transactions at the POS, in 2006. 
In my second New Zealand example, another bank, ASB, was frustrated at what it felt 
were poor cheque-clearing services being provided by the incumbent processing 
company, Databank.  I argue that this frustration suggests Databank‘s cheque-clearing 
network did not reduce demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than 
potentially competing networks‘ instruments.  As I described in subsection 4.5.3, ASB 
responded to this situation in 1989 by creating what was described to me as a ―stalking 
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horse‖, an alternative payment network, Payment Clearing Limited.  That action 
resulted in the four banks that owned the incumbent network improving it by providing 
for faster cheque processing.  Databank‘s owners also invited other banks to become 
joint-owners of the Databank inter-bank transfer processing assets, which eventually 
became the joint-venture ISL (Interchange and Settlement Limited).  I argue that this 
action would have reduced expectations of the costs of supply of instruments that used 
ISL.  The institution of inclusive development of inter-bank networks was reinforced in 
2010 when New Zealand‘s banks created a payment network to replace ISL, Payments 
NZ Limited. 
Further evidence of the effect of inter-network competition on an instrument‘s costs of 
supply comes from analysis of the development of credit card payment networks in the 
US, which I described in subsection 4.8.1.  Also consistent with Greif‘s fundamental 
asymmetry, Visa and MasterCard introduced structures to make use of the institutional 
approach to pricing developed by the Diner‘s Club three-party payment network – the 
collection of the majority of an instrument‘s fees from merchants.  To properly 
approximate such an approach in a four-party network, Visa and MasterCard used an 
interchange fee to pass at least a portion of the MSF the acquirer collected from the 
merchant to the issuer.  In subsection 2.4.2, I referred to literature, specifically Evans 
and Schmalensee (2005b), that indicated that these payment networks eventually 
coordinated to set interchange fees multilaterally in order to reduce their costs of supply.  
I argue that inter-network competition for issuers and acquirers between Visa and 
MasterCard caused them to adopt this approach.  Evidence also shows Visa‘s 
predecessor organisation eventually adopted a corporate structure similar to 
MasterCard‘s, a multi-party membership corporation, in an effort to minimise the costs 
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of supply for issuers of its instrument.
31
  The Visa and MasterCard schemes, including 
their institutions of interchange fees and corporate structures, were used repeatedly as 
banks introduced payment cards across the globe.  The institutions allowed banks and 
other financial institutions to introduce payment cards to countries without needing to 
coordinate operations with other organisations, avoiding associated costs of supply.  In 
support of this, I observe that the first banks to introduce credit cards in New Zealand 
and the UK were able to do so without cooperating with other banks in their countries.
32
  
Rather than this observation showing cooperation is not important, I argue it shows 
banks in New Zealand and the UK effectively showed merchants and consumers they 
were cooperating with all of the other issuers and acquirers of the scheme of card they 
introduced. 
5.3.4 Summarising Instrument Supply by Payment Networks 
In this section, I introduced the concept of a payment network, outlining how it likely 
benefits from greater participation.  I argued that the relevant private objective for a 
payment network: in workably competitive conditions, can it increase its profits by 
offering a new instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs while at 
least recouping its costs of supply?  I used this objective to suggest a process of 
institutional adaption for profit-seeking payment networks.  I also demonstrated that, by 
influencing which institutions are self-enforcing, inter-network competition raises the 
incentive for a profit-seeking payment network to offer an instrument that generally 
                                                 
31
  Visa‘s development started when a Californian bank, Bank of America, started licensing its payment 
card, BankAmericard, for it to be issued by other banks.   Those other banks were, however, 
uncomfortable about issuing what was seen as Bank of America‘s card until the card‘s operations 
were taken over by a separate organization, National BankAmeriCard Inc. in 1970, which later 
became Visa. 
32
  In my country-by-country summaries in Chapter 4, I observed a greater amount of cooperation 
between banks in Australia, Canada, Germany and the US when credit cards were first introduced.  I 
have not found sufficient information to assess experiences in Norway.  In section 5.4, I argue that 
cooperation between banks in Australia and Germany was an outcome of the banking environments, 
specifically the state of inter-network competition, that existed in those places at the time of the 
introduction of credit cards. 
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reduces demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than competing networks‘ 
instruments and provide it with lower costs of supply.  In this way, (potential) inter-
network competition increases dynamic efficiency.   
Although I have demonstrated these incentives, I have not yet explained the obvious 
differences that exist between countries‘ adoption of two payment instruments, debit 
cards and credit cards, which I observed in Figure 1.1.  To better explain these 
differences, I analyse the role of government in retail payment systems in the next 
section. 
5.4 Retail Payment Systems and Government 
Until this point, I have analysed individuals‘ and organisations‘ dynamic attempts to 
solve maximisation problems (such as profit or utility) subject to external constraints.
33
  
In this section, I add to my analysis, the role and effect of external constraints imposed 
by governments on retail payment systems.  In subsection 5.4.1, I analyse aspects of the 
roles of government relevant to retail payment systems, a key role being the protection 
of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, but another important one being the 
restrictions governments impose on the freedom of contract for payment networks.   In 
this section, I argue that restrictions on the freedom of contract of payment networks 
that prevent the trading of property rights risk reducing instrument demand or supply, 
harming dynamic efficiency. 
In subsection 5.4.2, I discuss examples of the effects of these restrictions on instrument 
demand, arguing that they will reduce demand if the instrument that would have been 
used no longer generally reduces demand-side transaction costs.  In order to clarify that 
                                                 
33
  I reiterate that, while any individual will take the behaviour of others as external to their own 
decisions about how to behave, such behaviour will not be external to the framework of institutional 
change that I use in this thesis. 
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these restrictions only risk reducing demand, I include in my discussion one example of 
a significant restriction on a payment network‘s freedom of contract that prevented the 
trading of property rights, but I argue has not reduced instrument demand.   
In subsection 5.4.3, I introduce discussion of examples of restrictions affecting 
instrument supply by payment networks.  I argue that restrictions on the freedom of 
contract of payment networks that prevent the trading of property rights risk reducing 
supply in two ways.  In subsection 5.4.4, I investigate the first, considering examples of 
restrictions‘ effects on institutional adaption of profit-seeking payment networks.  In 
subsection 5.4.5, I investigate the second, considering examples of restrictions‘ effect 
on inter-network competition.  To clarify that restrictions on the freedom of contract of 
payment networks only risk reducing supply, I include in subsection 5.4.5 discussion of 
an example of a significant potential restriction on a payment network‘s freedom of 
contract that may have prevented the trading of property rights, but that did not likely 
reduce instrument supply.   
Finally, I summarise the effects of government on retail payment systems in subsection 
5.4.6. 
5.4.1 The Role of Government 
In Table 1.1, I summarised the extent of the protection of property rights in my sample 
countries.  In section 5.2, I argued that their relatively strong protection in each country 
was a reason to not further analyse policing and enforcement costs as a source of 
(demand-side) transaction costs.  That argument points to a fundamental role for 
governments in retail payment systems: protection of property rights and enforcement 
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of contracts.
34
  I argue that fully protecting property right extends to the distinct activity 
of enforcing of contracts, referring to literature I discussed in subsection 2.3.1 that 
argues contracts underpin the transfer of property rights.  If the role of protecting 
property rights and enforcing contracts is not adequately performed, the demand-side 
transaction costs associated with using recently-developed payment instruments would 
rise substantially and consumers and merchants would be more likely to use instruments 
arguably less reliant on the enforcement of contracts, such as cash. 
Literature I described in subsection 2.4.3 suggests another role of government important 
to retail payment systems.  Both Deungoue (2008) and Mann (2002) find government 
regulations and restrictions affect payment instrument adoption.  I further analyse 
restrictions, acknowledging that many restrictions on payment networks‘ freedom of 
contract are likely to be beneficial for retail payment system development, for example, 
those that protect property rights.  A smaller number of restrictions on the freedom of 
contract will, however, prevent the trading of property rights by restricting certain 
organisations from performing certain activities and not allowing those organisations to 
purchase the right to perform such activities.  Examples of such restrictions include 
preventing NBFIs from issuing cheques or preventing payment networks from including 
the No-Surcharge Rule in their credit card acquiring contracts with merchants.  I argue 
that these restrictions risk affecting the demand and/or the supply of payment 
instruments.  
A standard for assessment of government actions – dynamic efficiency 
In section 2.3, I described the work of Evans and Hahn (2010), who recommend that the 
objective of the regulation of telecommunications should be to maximise dynamic 
                                                 
34
  Although my sample countries have a strong general protection of property rights, I argue specific 
examples exist when governments failed to protect the property rights of payment networks.  I 
discuss these examples in subsection 5.4.4. 
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efficiency.  I follow this recommendation, analysing the effects of government 
regulation on payment networks‘ dynamic attempts to offer payment instruments that 
generally reduce demand-side transaction costs.  In accordance with the value 
maximisation principle of Milgrom and Roberts (1992), my standard is a total welfare 
standard, one that was recommended as the appropriate standard for competition policy 
by Motta (2004) – it gives no weight to government efforts to redistribute rents relating 
to payment instruments.
35
 
5.4.2 Restrictions Affecting Payment Instrument Demand 
In the majority of my sample countries, restrictions exist over contracts governing the 
use of certain payment instruments.  Indeed, governments and government authorities 
have directly regulated such contracts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK.  
Additionally, the US judicial system, applying law that had been introduced by the 
Federal Government, ended two aspects of Visa and MasterCard‘s payment networks, 
the Honour-All-Cards Rule and by-laws preventing their issuers from also issuing 
American Express and Discover cards.
36
  In the presence of inter-network competition, I 
expect payment network operations to generally reduce demand-side transaction costs.  
My presumption is that intervention in payment network operations will generally raise 
such costs, diminishing the dynamic efficiency of payment networks.  Nevertheless, I 
analyse each of these cases below. 
Australia 
Starting in 2003, the RBA made a number of interventions in the operations of retail 
payment systems.  While these interventions have had a large number of effects, I focus 
                                                 
35
  As I discussed in subsection 2.3.1, I assume that there are no wealth effects in the operation of retail 
payment systems. 
36
  The Honour-All-Cards Rule was ended through an out-of-court settlement in 2001 and the US 
District Court found the by-laws in breach of the Sherman Act in 2001. 
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here on their effect on demand-side transaction costs.  Given payment networks have an 
incentive to I cited evidence in subsection 4.1.4 that issuers recovered 30-40% of 
interchange revenue lost because of the RBA‘s reforms by increasing fees to 
cardholders.  Consistent with my conclusion that the No-Surcharge Rule generally 
reduces demand-side transaction costs, I also cited evidence showing that the surcharges 
chosen by merchants often exceed the marginal cost of accepting instruments.   While I 
have found no evidence clearly showing the effects of the RBA‘s removal of the 
Honour-All-Cards Rule, I note that the RBA expressly intended to remove the Rule 
because it believed it gave a competitive advantage to Visa Debit over Australia‘s 
EFTPOS system.  I interpret the phrase, competitive advantage, to mean the Rule 
generally reduced demand-side transaction cost and therefore I conclude that its 
removal will have likely harmed dynamic efficiency. 
Canada 
In subsection 4.2.1, I described a remedial order that was approved in 1996 following an 
inquiry into the operations of the Canadian Interac debit card payment network.  That 
order required that merchants be allowed to surcharge Interac transactions.  What little 
evidence I have found of merchants surcharging Interac transactions following the 
remedial order suggests that surcharges generally exceed the size of MSFs. 
New Zealand 
In October 2009, New Zealand‘s competition regulator, the Commerce Commission, 
announced it had reached a settlement with New Zealand‘s banks and Visa and 
MasterCard.  The settlements, which I described in subsection 4.5.4, required banks to 
lower average interchange fees, offer retailers unbundled, unblended MSFs and allow 
retailers to surcharge for credit card transactions.  I have found no evidence of the 
effect, in New Zealand, of lowering interchange fees or unblending MSFs for retailers.  
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I did, however, find a press release made by the Commission in January 2010 that 
indicated its discomfort with the level of surcharges being applied by some retailers and 
I believe it is consistent with my explanation that the No-Surcharge Rule in fact 
generally reduces demand-side transaction costs. 
The United Kingdom 
I described evidence in subsection 4.7.4 that UK credit card payment networks were 
prevented from using the No-Surcharge Rule by Government Order in 1991.  I have 
little evidence of the extent of surcharging in the UK, except that a complaint was made 
to the UK regulator, the Office of Fair Trading, that surcharges were generally higher 
than MSFs by the consumer group, Which?, in early 2011. 
The United States 
In the US, an out-of-court settlement reached in 2001 ended Visa and MasterCard‘s use 
of the Honour-All-Cards Rule, which had required merchants that accepted the 
scheme‘s credit cards also accept their debit cards.  In section 2.4.2, I described the 
work of Rochet and Tirole (2008), which indicated that, before its removal, the Rule 
performed a socially-beneficial rebalancing effect on the interchange fees.  
Additionally, I argued in section 5.2.2 that my analysis indicates the Rule reduces 
consumer uncertainty and its removal would likely raise demand-side transaction costs.  
A 2001 US court decision, which was upheld in appeals that ended in 2004, allowed US 
banks to issue any combination of Visa, MasterCard, Discover or American Express 
cards.  Somewhat perplexingly, I have not found analysis relating this decision to an 
increase in interchange fees until a 2009 US Government Accountability Office report 
said that Visa officials attributed an increase in Visa‘s interchange fees to the increased 
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competition for issuers that followed this decision.
37
  Evans and Schmalensee (2005a) 
relate greater competition for issuers to greater competition for cardholders and I argue 
that merchants facing higher MSFs (because of higher interchange fees) is consistent 
with an increase in consumer single-homing, which the seminal work of Rochet and 
Tirole (2003) argues reduces the ability of merchants to influence instrument choices, 
thereby shifting the pricing structure against them.  I refer also to Rysman (2006) who 
argues that, although consumers often multi-home or have multiple types of cards in 
their wallet, they generally only use one of those cards (they effectively single-home).  
Although the exact reasons for why MSFs have risen are not clear, I suggest that, 
because it allowed banks to issue any combination of the different types of cards 
(against card networks' wishes), the court decision raised demand-side transaction costs 
and harmed dynamic efficiency. 
Australia’s Bankcard 
The examples I have discussed so far suggest that restrictions on payment networks‘ 
freedom of contract specifically relating to instruments‘ provision (that prevent the 
trading of property rights) do reduce the demand for payment instruments.  I have, 
however, found one example of such a restriction that I argue did not reduce and may 
have actually increased demand for an instrument.  This example means that I argue that 
restrictions only risk reducing instrument demand.  The example, which I first discussed 
in subsection 4.1.1, involves the 1980 case of an Australian regulator restricting 
Bankcard participants‘ ability to enter into contracts that controlled the prices that could 
be charged to merchants and consumers.  If these prices were being set collusively, and 
my analysis suggests they were, I argue that removing participants‘ ability to contract 
                                                 
37
  Some evidence indicated a long term downwards trend in merchant service fees for American 
Express, suggesting the networks were becoming more similar in terms of their offering to 
merchants and consumers. 
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around them would not have reduced instrument demand.  In fact, if it caused prices to 
change, I argue the action may have increased instrument demand. 
5.4.3 Introducing Analysis of Effects of Restrictions on Instrument Supply 
In section 5.3, I argued that, in workably competitive conditions, a payment network 
will attempt to raise its profits by offering a new instrument that get used while it at 
least recoups its costs of supply from fees paid by users.  I went on to argue that this 
will cause a process of institutional adaption for profit-seeking networks.  Additionally, 
I argued that (potential) inter-network competition raises the incentive for a profit-
seeking network to offer an instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction 
costs to a greater degree than competing networks‘ instruments and provide it with 
lower costs of supply.  These arguments suggest there are two ways government 
restrictions may affect the instrument supply decisions of payment networks.  In 
subsection 5.4.4, I analyse the effects of restrictions on the institutional adaption of 
profit-seeking payment networks.  In subsection 5.4.5, I do the same for restrictions 
reducing inter-network competition. 
5.4.4 Effect of Restrictions on Institutional Adaption 
In subsection 5.3.2, I argued that an adaptive process is brought on by the relevant 
private objective for profit-seeking payment networks: in workably competitive 
conditions, a network will wish to increase its profits by offering an instrument that 
generally reduces demand-side transaction costs while at least recouping its costs of 
supply.  If government restrictions affect this adaption process, it follows that they will 
diminish the dynamic efficiency of payment networks.  Nevertheless, I analyse each of 
cases of this occurring below.  Except for the final examples that cover an Australian 
regulators‘ attempts to introduce institutions without modifying incentives, I also 
discuss other ways individuals have used or might have used instruments that generally 
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reduce demand-side transaction costs and why I believe those attempts have not been or 
would not be as successful at reducing these costs.  That is, I discount the possibility of 
inter-network competition operating to promote dynamic efficiency.  
Government restrictions and the costs of supply 
In this subsection, I analyse a number of examples of system development when 
government rules meant some firms, such as NBFIs, were restricted from performing 
certain business activities while others such as banks, were not.  This would obviously 
raise the scarcity value held by the unrestricted firms and make them less willing to 
cooperate with the restricted firms.  I argue that such restrictions result in an increase in 
the costs for the unrestricted firms of cooperating with restricted firms, which I 
represent by identifying that restrictions increase the costs of supply of instruments 
provided by cooperative payment networks. 
Debit cards in the US 
Unlike credit cards in the US, debit cards were not significantly developed beyond their 
first pilot in 1966 until after the development of the POS terminal in the second half of 
the 1970s, which allowed debit card payments to be completed immediately using a 
bank‘s ATM card at a merchant‘s location.  At that time, US banking regulations 
restricted banks‘ size by regulating their branch locations.  I argue that this raised the 
costs of supply of debit cards because payment networks needed to consist of a large 
number of different firms to overcome network effects, meaning a higher level of 
transaction costs.  I argue that such restrictions made the costs of supply of a universal 
debit card prohibitive.  Indeed, the multitude of different ATM networks supported by 
banks from the mid-1970s until approximately the mid-1980s meant that merchants 
needed to invest in multiple POS terminals to provide debit card services to all of their 
customers.  In subsection 5.2.3, I argued that merchants needing multiple terminals 
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would have decreased their willingness to incur the fixed financial costs to accept debit 
cards. 
A US Supreme Court decision in 1985 that non-bank owned ATMs did not represent 
bank branches greatly increased the number of ATMs connected to centralised, non-
bank owned networks.  In turn, this reduced the number of POS terminals merchants 
needed to service their customers, allowing debit card payment networks in the US to 
overcome network effects sufficiently for debit card use to increase.  Following the 
Supreme Court decision and the reduction in legal uncertainty, the credit card 
cooperative structures, Visa and MasterCard, attempted to create a joint venture to 
introduce the online debit card, the Entrée card, in 1987.  However, the attempt was 
effectively blocked by a number of State Attorneys General and, in its place, Visa and 
MasterCard came to rely on offline debit cards that used credit card infrastructure and 
did not require merchants to invest in POS terminals; they did however charge 
merchants proportional MSFs similar to those charged for credit cards.
38
  The 
alternative to offline debit card networks are the online ‗PIN‘ debit card services offered 
by non-bank owned ATM networks. 
High costs of supply of new instruments caused by the fragmented structure of the debit 
card payment system continue to affect the pace of innovation in the US and its process 
of institutional adaption.  In subsection 4.8.3, I reported concerns that had been 
expressed that the pace of innovation was slow and biased towards improvements that 
are compatible with the existing infrastructure.  Recently, payment networks in the US 
have been unable to coordinate the introduction of the chip-based, EMV security 
                                                 
38
  The large-scale use of Visa and MasterCard‘s offline debit cards appears to have caused a gradual 
increase in debit card interchange fees. 
267 
 
2
6
7
 
2
6
7
 
standard.  That is in spite of networks in the standard‘s introduction in the two countries 
bordering the US, Canada and Mexico, and in all of my other sample countries. 
It is conceivable that inter-network competition could operate through payment 
networks not involving banks offering debit card instruments that better reduce demand-
side transaction costs.
39
  However, debit cards are an asset specific to bank accounts, 
raising the issue of transaction costs (as I discussed in subsection 2.3.1, asset specificity 
is a transaction cost reason that makes an activity more likely to be coordinated within, 
rather than outside, a firm).  Were debit cards offered by organisations other than banks, 
it is difficult to believe demand-side transaction costs would generally be reduced.  
Consistent with this, I observed above that debit cards were not greatly developed in the 
US prior to the invention of the POS terminal, which allowed debit cardholders to 
directly access their bank accounts, and evidence from Evans and Schmalensee (2005a) 
that three-party schemes have not been interested in issuing debit cards in the US.  
Moreover, I note that debit cards coordinated by organisations other than banks or 
NBFIs in two of the countries I study, Germany and the US (being the ELV and 
decoupled debit products, respectively), were only developed following merchants 
encountering problems with existing debit cards failing to generally reduce demand-side 
transaction costs. 
The Federal Reserve and ACH payments 
Evidence I described in subsection 4.8.2 suggests the Federal Reserve has been 
underpricing its cheque-clearing services.
40
  In a paper written by a Federal Reserve 
employee, Shy (2010), calls on the Federal Reserve to raise the fees on other Fed 
                                                 
39
  While MasterCard and Visa are obviously not banks, they do not in fact issue payment instruments – 
only their member banks do. 
40
  I note that the Electronic Payments Network does operate an ACH processing network, but that it 
does not appear to constrain the prices the Federal Reserve charges for ACH transactions. 
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services (such as cheque-clearing), while leaving the fee for ACH transactions 
unchanged.  If one assumes that ACH payments are cheaper to process than cheques, 
this strongly suggests the Federal Reserve is not taking a (socially) profitable 
opportunity to generally reduce demand-side transaction costs and its dominance in 
ACH transaction processing appears to have restricted the ability for other payment 
networks to take that opportunity.   
To an extent, inter-network competition operates through non-bank direct entry systems 
such as Paypal.  Indeed, I argue that the creation and development of Paypal was an 
attempt to find an alternative way to generally reduce demand-side transaction costs for 
direct entry transactions.  I believe it is unlikely to be fully effective at generally 
reducing such costs because it requires the maintenance of an account additional to the 
bank account that absorbs consumers‘ wages, which, as I argued in subsection 5.2.1, 
increases its inconvenience for consumers as a payment instrument. 
Stored-value cards 
I have found evidence that in Australia,
41
 Germany,
42
 Norway,
43
 and the UK,
44
 
legislation was passed that restricted issuers of stored-value instruments.  In the case of 
Germany, legislation appears to specifically require that the issuance of stored-value 
cards be performed by banks.  For the other three countries, legislation has made it 
significantly more costly to issue stored-value instruments, unless an issuer is already 
                                                 
41
  As I discussed in subsection 4.1.2, legislation passed in Australia in 1998 meant issuers of stored-
value instruments are a type of Authorised Deposit Taking Institutions, regulated by Australia‘s 
prudential supervisor, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
42
  As I discussed in subsection 4.4.3, Germany amended its banking law in 1997 to specify that 
electronic money issuance was the business of banks, thereby restricting others from performing it, n 
order to update its financial law with trends in European law. 
43
  As I discussed in subsection 4.6.3, Norway passed the Act concerning Electronic Money Institutions 
in 2002 to meet EU Directives with regulations of electronic money issuers to be administered by 
the Kredittilsynet, the Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority. 
44
  As I discussed in subsection 4.7.3, the UK introduced a regulatory framework  to meet EU 
Directives with regulations of electronic money issuers to be administered by the FSA. 
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regulated by prudential supervisors, as banks already are.  That is, issuance is to some 
extent restricted to banks.  As evidence of the costliness and inefficiency of being 
regulated in this way, at least in the UK, I point to the somewhat questionable argument 
accepted by a UK government regulator as to why EU-directed electronic money 
regulations did not apply to the non-bank issuer, TfL (Transport for London), of the UK 
stored-value instrument, the Oyster card, which I described in subsection 4.7.3.
45
  This 
stands at odds with my analysis indicating that public transport represents a promising 
way of generally reducing demand-side transaction costs for stored-value instruments 
and that, for transaction cost/asset specificity reasons, a stored-value instrument would 
better be owned, at least initially, by the owner of the public transport operations.  
Moreover, the development of Snapper in New Zealand clearly demonstrates that such 
an instrument can successfully be offered by a public transport operator that is not 
prudentially supervised.  It follows that the regulation of stored-value instruments 
significantly reduced the profitable opportunities available to payment networks, 
harming dynamic efficiency. 
It is possible that inter-network competition could operate through banks providing 
stored-value instruments for use on public transport.  I have not, however, identified any 
such attempts that appear to have been successful.  Nor has obvious success been 
experienced when banks issued stored-value instruments in tandem with those issued by 
public transport operators as occurred in the UK with the Oyster card and Barclays 
Bank in 2007.  It is also informative to consider the possibility of banks issuing stored-
value instruments completely separate from public transport.  The German banking 
system attempted to provide such an instrument when it rolled Geldkarte out nationally 
                                                 
45
  The argument I label as somewhat questionable is that TfL buys services from different providers 
and then resells them to passengers so that the UK‘s electronic money legislation does not apply to 
it.  This argument was accepted by the relevant UK regulator, the FSA. 
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in 1997, which I described in subsection 4.4.3.  In subsection 5.2.4, I argued the 
development of Germany‘s Geldkarte stored-value system was, and remains, unlikely to 
be successful and this is in spite of evidence that the system was ―heavily‖ subsidised.  
It seems likely that the private costs and benefits faced by the organisations in Germany 
that decided to introduce Geldkarte did not appropriately reflect the costs and benefits 
for society of a payment network offering an instrument that generally reduced demand-
side transaction costs.  I argue that this issue is reflected in the fact that the private 
banks, which are argued to be the pillar of the German banking system with the 
strongest profit-motive, did not strongly support the rolling out of the Geldkarte 
instrument.   
I argue that more obvious cases of private costs and benefits diverging significantly 
from social costs and benefits come from analysis of occasions when the Australian and 
UK Governments appear to have failed to protect the property rights of payment 
networks. 
Profits and property rights - evidence from Australia and the UK 
In subsection 2.3.1, I surveyed literature showing the linkage between property rights 
and transaction costs (or the costs of supply).  Because bargaining between parties is not 
costless and the incidence of property rights affects the ease of bargaining, it follows 
that a poor assignment of property rights will affect the profitable opportunities 
available to payment networks.  I have found examples of retail payment system 
development in two of my sample countries being affected by governments arguably 
failing to protect the property rights of payment networks. 
When an Australian Government review of the country‘s banking system, the Martin 
Review Group, recommended that NBFIs be given access to CEMTEX, the banks‘ 
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inter-bank transfer system (an event I discuss in subsection 4.1.1), I argue this was a 
taking of a property right because it strongly suggested the removal of banks‘ ability to 
exclude others from CEMTEX.  I also argue that laws that prevented NBFIs from 
issuing cheques prohibitively raised the costs of supply of instruments provided by 
networks involving both banks and NBFIs.  Indeed, banks appeared to react to the 
Review Group‘s recommendation by disbanding CEMTEX, instead exchanging direct 
entry transaction information bilaterally.  This demonstrates that they perceived they 
were no longer able to use CEMTEX to offer instruments that would be profitable – 
dynamic efficiency was harmed.   
Events with CEMTEX occurred at the time that Australian banks were also developing 
the EFTPOS debit card payment network.  At odds with nearly all other debit card 
systems in my sample countries, the banks argued that a payment network with bilateral 
interchange agreements was appropriate for this.  I argue that, because participants need 
to negotiate bilateral agreements with every other participant, this framework 
significantly raised the costs of supply of EFTPOS debit cards.  I also argue that inter-
network competition was not sufficient to improve the operation of these networks 
because Australia‘s NBFIs did not represent a large enough proportion of its financial 
system to compete with its banks.  As I described in subsection 4.1.1, Australian NBFIs 
did in fact process EFTPOS and direct entry transactions multilaterally through 
Cashcard Australia Limited and AUSTNET.  My argument implies that NBFIs‘ 
instruments would have been more successful, had they made up a larger part of 
Australia‘s financial system.  
Property rights also appear to be an issue for the development of debit card and direct 
entry payments in the UK.  In 1985, banks created a joint-venture to manage a 
cooperative debit card system, EFTPOS UK, an event that I discuss in subsection 4.7.3.    
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The operations of EFTPOS UK suggest that EFTPOS UK‘s members were not 
concerned about participation in EFTPOS UK.  For example, there was a significant 
debate regarding EFTPOS UK's use of the (apparently incompatible) DES or RSA 
encryption algorithms, with the organisation eventually deciding on the latter, in spite of 
the former being used more internationally and for a debit card network introduced 
earlier by Barclays Bank, PDQ.  If this decision does show a lack of concern about the 
network‘s success, I argue that it demonstrates members did not hold appropriate 
property rights for EFTPOS UK – members did not benefit (sufficiently) from the 
network‘s success.  I have not, however, found any other evidence of this and it remains 
a point for further study. 
Inter-network competition for EFTPOS UK appears to have been hampered with some 
evidence pointing to the role of the UK‘s central bank, the Bank of England in this.  A 
representative of the Bank sat on the board of EFTPOS UK and his or her presence 
resulted in banks perceiving they had fewer options, but to be involved in EFTPOS 
UK.
46
  With Barclays Bank leading, banks introduced their own debit card networks 
(and EFTPOS UK was eventually wound up in 1990).  Although three banks cooperated 
to introduce one of the debit card networks, Switch, the banks were not able to form a 
fully cooperative network, such as EFTPOS UK would have been.  Retailer discomfort 
regarding the MSFs charged for these services, particularly the proportional MSFs that 
Barclays Bank proposed to charge, suggests that the networks that followed the demise 
of EFTPOS UK were less than completely effective at offering instruments that 
generally reduced demand-side transaction costs.  I acknowledge that the UK institution 
of free in-credit banking for consumers that existed at that time makes it difficult to 
                                                 
46
  In subsection 4.7.3, I discussed Howells and Hine (1993) who quote (p. 114) one bank manager as 
saying, ―[t]here‘s no way somebody like Barclays could stay out of that [EFTPOS UK], even if they 
wished to stay out of it.  I think there would have been a lot of arm-twisting at governmental level, if 
you like, to persuade a major bank to participate in the new clearing system.‖ 
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know how payment networks might have been more effective at generally offering such 
instruments while recouping their costs of supply. 
The Cruickshank government report into the UK‘s financial system, published in 2000, 
reported that banks appeared unwilling to invest in innovations improving the 
transmission of money (which I argue relate to direct entry payment networks).  The 
report blamed the lack of innovation on a lack of competition between those banks.  
More in keeping with the framework of institutional adaption I have created, however, 
Ganguly and Milne (2002) blame insufficient incentives for the lack of innovation, 
which I relate to a lack of profitable opportunities for payment networks, particularly 
the recoupment of a payment network‘s costs.  Interestingly, they argue that payment 
instrument innovations are a public good, thereby indicating that such innovations are 
non-excludable.  Although I have not found sufficient evidence to confirm the 
relationship, I relate the non-excludability of a payment networks to its owners not 
holding property rights over direct payment networks.  Perhaps reflecting this, the 
Faster Payments payment network, set up to improve on the interbank transfer system, 
BACS, was not created until following the Cruickshank review and, even then, only 
with the involvement of a government authority, the Office of Fair Trading.  Other than 
Faster Payments, I have not observed any obvious attempts to use inter-network 
competition for direct entry payments. 
Creating institutions without modifying profitability – evidence from Australia 
On a number of occasions that I discuss in subsection 4.1.4, the regulator of retail 
payment systems in Australia, the RBA, attempted to encourage the creation of 
institutions that it perceived as being more efficient that existing institutions.  When it 
did so, however, I argue it made no real attempt to modify the profitability of payment 
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networks offering instruments.  Using Grief‘s framework of institutional change, I argue 
these institutions have not (yet) become self-enforcing. 
In 2003, the RBA intervened to regulate interchange fees downwards.  In its 2007/2008 
review of the effects of its reforms, it appeared to remain concerned that, without its 
regulation, interchange fees would rise once again.  The RBA suggested that its 
concerns about Australia‘s credit card retail payment system might be allayed, allowing 
it to step back from regulation, if networks made voluntary assurances that average 
interchange fees would not rise beyond current levels.  (Such assurances were not 
forthcoming and, in August 2009, the RBA announced regulation would remain.)  I 
argue that the RBA had not modified, to any significant extent, the incentives faced by 
credit card networks and a rise in interchange fees was and is likely to occur, following 
the removal of regulation.  Contrary to the RBA, however, I argue that this would be 
socially beneficial because it would allow payment networks to offer instruments that 
were more effective at generally reducing demand-side transaction costs while 
recouping networks‘ costs of supply. 
In an attempt to deal with the RBA‘s concerns with EFTPOS interchange fees, 
Australian banks approached Australia‘s competition regulator in 2002 about modifying 
the EFTPOS network to end the payment of interchange fees, which the regulator 
eventually authorised.  I argue that no real effort was made to ensure that change would 
allow the network to offer an instrument that generally reduced demand-side transaction 
costs.  Indeed, it appeared to increase these costs for merchants, relative to the EFTPOS 
instrument that had been offered before.  I argue this was reflected in a group of 
merchants appealing the competition regulator‘s authorisation to a review panel, the 
Australian Competition Tribunal, which upheld the appeal and set aside the regulator‘s 
decision.  The RBA responded by designating the EFTPOS network and directly 
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regulating interchange fees closer to zero.  This decision was also appealed by a group 
of merchants, but this time the appeal was unsuccessful. 
In its 2007/08 review, the RBA said a second way that banks might allay its concerns 
was if banks made enhancements to Australia‘s EFTPOS network.  In 2009, one 
banking organisation announced the establishment of EFTPOS Payments Australia 
Limited which would have commercial responsibilities for managing and promoting 
EFTPOS while another announced it was restarting development of a direct entry 
payment network, MAMBO.  In August 2009, however, the RBA announced that the 
industry had not made sufficient progress towards its suggestions and regulation would 
be retained, removing any incentive effect its approach would have had.  It is not yet 
clear what long run influence EFTPOS Payments Australia or MAMBO will have on 
retail payment system development in Australia. 
5.4.5 Effects of Restrictions on Inter-Network Competition 
In section 5.3, I argued that participation was beneficial for payment networks.  In the 
presence of potential inter-network competition, this means a profit-seeking payment 
network will likely experience greater participation if, ceteris paribus, it offers an 
instrument that generally reduces demand-side transaction costs to a greater degree than 
competing networks‘ instruments and provides it with lower costs of supply.  It follows 
that restrictions on inter-network competition will reduce the incentive for profit-
seeking payment networks to offer instruments that generally reduce such costs, 
harming dynamic efficiency.  This argument is supported by analysis of examples from 
a number of my sample countries. 
The Canadian Payments Association 
The passing of the Canadian Payments Association Act in 1980 gave responsibility for 
(inter-bank) retail payment systems in Canada to the CPA (the Canadian Payments 
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Association), causing a substantial reduction in inter-network competition.  I argue that 
this reduced the incentive for networks to offer instruments that generally reduced 
demand-side transaction costs and I argue two examples of the CPA‘s instruments 
reflect this:
47
 
 In the period following their 1986 introduction, Interac‘s shared ATM services 
included only withdrawals and did not extend to include balance inquiries and 
ATM deposits and 
 In 2007, testimony was made before a House of Commons Standing Committee 
that bill payments took an excessive amount of time to complete.  That testimony 
led to the publication of a report by the CPA showing up to 80% of billers elected 
to operate bill payments outside the CPA‘s bill payments framework,48 
demonstrating the framework was not effective for offering instruments that 
generally reduced demand-side transaction costs. 
I argue the legislation that restricted participation in CPA payment networks to CPA 
members raised the costs of supply for instruments that involved cooperation between 
members and non-members.  The examples above indicate that significant profitable 
opportunities existed for payment networks to offer instruments that generally reduced 
demand-side transaction costs.  Yet, it appears that prohibitive costs of supply have 
prevented networks forming that involved cooperation between CPA members and non-
members.  Indeed, in subsection 4.2.3, I observed two occasions that the CPA went as 
far as to pass rules preventing the creation of networks involving such cooperation:  
                                                 
47
  Not long after the creation of the CPA, the CPA‘s banking members used a similar governance 
structure to create a debit card and ATM network, Interac.  The similarities in the structures, no-less 
in the behaviour, of both Interac and the CPA means I do not differentiate between them for the 
purposes of this discussion of inter-network competition. 
48
  The paper reports that bill payments were instead conducted with other payment instruments, such 
as cheques, 
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 in 2003, the CPA banned members from processing certain telephone-based 
payments, called tele-cheques and  
 in 2005, the CPA required that bill payments be initiated from members‘ own 
websites, rather than the websites of third parties. 
When taken into account with the evidence of demand-side transaction costs not being 
generally reduced, it appears the rules were an attempt to prevent members from taking 
advantage of the profitable opportunities existing for payment networks that would have 
placed at risk the restrictions CPA members enjoyed.  This clearly demonstrates that the 
creation of the CPA has resulted in a significant reduction in the incentive for 
instruments to be offered that generally reduce demand-side transaction costs. 
Germany’s Electronic Cash 
In subsection 4.4.1, I discussed the German banking system, which consists of three 
pillars, each governed by an association that can issue decisions binding on its 
members.  The three associations provide representatives to a central association, the 
ZKA (the Zentraler Kreditausschuss) and I conclude that profitable opportunities for 
payment networks not involving the ZKA, and therefore inter-network competition, 
would have been substantially reduced.  Consistent with the centralised nature of the 
industry, the German banks chose to centralise the operation of the new credit card 
payment network giving a jointly-owned company, the GZS (Gesellschaft fur 
Zahlungssysteme) a monopoly of the processing of their Eurocard transactions in 1982.  
This was a major concern for retailers, however, and I have found information showing 
the creation of two retailer-owned credit cards in the time of 1990, making it apparent 
that demand-side transaction costs were not generally reduced.  The ZKA began testing 
the Electronic Cash debit card system in 1983, although Germany‘s banks did not 
succeed in agreeing on a national roll out until 1990.  The length of time taken to agree 
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on a national roll out might also reflect the lack of inter-network competition Electronic 
Cash faced. 
Merchant concerns about inter-network competition for Electronic Cash were reflected 
in several ways.  Firstly, merchant complaints that they were being forced to purchase 
terminals from the GZS led to the intervention of the Bundeskartellamt, the Federal 
Cartel Office, who brought about the creation of an open system that allowed 
merchants, rather than dealing with the GZS, to obtain terminals and use the services of 
Netzbetreiber or network operators.  Secondly, at the time it was introduced, one retailer 
responded by introducing the ELV (Elektronisches Lastschrift Verfahren) debit card 
network, which functioned by using information on Electronic Cash cards to generate 
direct debits for signature by cardholders and, in spite of not guaranteeing payment to 
merchants, proved a popular payment instrument in Germany.  I argue, however, that 
these attempts did not appear to provide full inter-network competition for Electronic 
Cash because the response that resulted in the creation of the Netzbetreiber did not 
fundamentally change the terms of Electronic Cash and because the second response, 
ELV, did not operate with a payment guarantee. 
Australia’s Bankcard 
Evidence I discussed in subsection 4.1.1 indicates that Australia‘s banks may have acted 
collusively when they introduced the Bankcard credit card in 1973.  NBFIs were not 
given access to issue Bankcard themselves and an Australian regulator sought the 
removal of aspects to Bankcard agreements, particularly those that controlled the prices 
charged to consumers and merchants, in 1980.  Australia‘s banks represented the major 
portion of Australia‘s financial system and NBFIs appeared unable to create their own 
payment network to compete with Bankcard; it was not until the introduction of a Visa 
debit card in 1982 that NBFIs offered payment cards.  If the operations of Bankcard 
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were collusive, it demonstrates that the constraints on inter-network competition had 
reduced the incentive for the Bankcard network to offer an instrument that generally 
reduced demand-side transaction costs. 
Norway’s BankAxept 
The majority of the examples I discuss in this subsection suggest restrictions on 
payment networks‘ freedom of contract that prevent the trading of property rights do 
reduce the supply of payment instruments.  I have, however, found one example of an 
action from a government authority that arguably restricted payment networks‘ freedom 
of contract, but that I argue did not reduce instrument supply.  This example means I 
argue that restrictions only risk reducing instrument supply.  In the mid-1980s, 
Norway‘s central bank, Norges Bank, created the Technical Reporting Committee on 
Payment Systems.  I argue that this may have represented a restriction on payment 
networks‘ freedom of contract because it potentially, the actions of Norges Bank, would 
have made it difficult for Norwegian banks to reach agreement to form payment 
networks not involving the Norges Bank committee.  In 1991, however, Norwegian 
banks reached an agreement to form the BankAxept payment network, which I argue 
indicates instrument supply was not significantly reduced. 
The actions of Norges Bank do, however,continue to create concerns about the state of 
inter-network competition.  In 2008, the Norwegian central bank, Norges Bank, made a 
press release complaining that some banks were now pricing payment services to 
consumers free-of-charge.  This practice, the release argued, risked reducing investment 
in payment services and risked the creation of cross-subsidises, which ―sends the wrong 
signal to customers and may result in the inefficient use of resources.‖  I argue that the 
statement risks reducing inter-network competition because it indicates an instrument 
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not charging consumers a per-transaction fee would not be viewed favourably by 
Norges Bank. 
5.4.6 Summarising the Effect of Government 
In this section, I have shown that governments play two important roles in retail 
payment system development.  Firstly, they define property rights and enforce 
contracts.  Secondly, they can impose restrictions on the freedom of contract for 
payment networks.  When these restrictions prevent the trading of property rights, I 
have argued that they risk reducing the demand for payment instruments and their 
supply by payment networks, harming dynamic efficiency.  Such restrictions will 
reduce demand if the payment instrument that would have been used no longer 
generally reduces demand-side transaction costs.  They risk reducing supply in two 
ways: by impeding payment networks‘ attempts to offer instruments that reduce these 
transaction costs or by reducing inter-network competition.  In summary, government 
restrictions on the freedom of contract have had a substantial negative effect on the 
development of retail payment systems.  
281 
 
2
8
1
 
2
8
1
 
Chapter 6   
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have created a framework I believe has not been seen in the literature 
before that aids the understanding of the development of retail payment systems.  My 
framework yields insights into the incentives of (potential) users of payment 
instruments and of the payment networks that provide them.  Additionally, it provides a 
means to assess the role of government in the evolution of retail payment systems. 
At the beginning of this thesis, I stated that I sought an answer to the question, how 
have institutional arrangements affected the development of the retail payment systems 
that have emerged since the creation of Diner‘s Club in 1949?   The framework I 
created to help answer this question utilises demand-side transaction costs to explain 
aspects of the demand of payment instruments and their supply by the payment 
networks that are part of a retail payment system.  I showed that government restrictions 
on payment networks‘ freedom of contract that prevent the trading of property rights 
risk reducing the demand or the supply of payment instruments.  I find that it is 
government restrictions on the freedom of contract that are the substantial cause of 
differences in the use of newly-developed retail payment systems between my sample 
countries.  This finding suggests a partial answer to my research question: it is 
government restrictions on freedom of contract that are a key influence on the 
development of the retail payment systems.  Such restrictions risk reducing the supply 
and demand of retail payment systems, diminishing innovation in payments and thereby 
harming dynamic efficiency. 
In addition to the historical events discussed in this thesis, there will be many other 
important aspects to retail payment system development that I have not analysed in 
detail.  Although the framework developed here may prove useful for answering them, 
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many important research questions will remain.  Included in those will be questions 
relating to two specific areas I identified.  I have been unable to explain why Germany 
is a significant outlier in terms of credit and debit card transaction volume in the 
countries in my sample and I have been unable to document why perceptions of 
property rights for retail payment systems appear to be such an issue for their 
development in the UK.  In addition, I have identified a number of countries/regions 
suitable for further analysis: 
 I lacked sufficient information on retail payment systems in Iceland, which I 
calculated to have 330 debit and credit card transactions per capita during 2008, 
well above New Zealand‘s 241 and Norway‘s 228 transactions  
 In section 4.3, I argued that a full exploration of the influence of the European 
Union on retail payment system development in its member countries was beyond 
the scope of this thesis and 
 In section 2.1, I mentioned the success of mobile phone-based systems in a 
number of developing countries, and Korea and Japan, but argued that it was 
beyond the scope of my thesis and I did not fully consider evidence on these. 
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